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US deterrence signals will allow resolution of Ukraine crisis now

O'Hanlon 3/3/14

Michael Edward O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He began his career as a budget analyst in the defense field.

<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/03/the-power-of-sanctions-against-putin-on-ukraine/>

Were the current crisis to escalate to a bad situation — **which it hasn't yet** — and Ukraine to face civil warfare and an

invasion by Russia to back up one side, then I think these kinds of tools would be applied. They'd be effective and **Putin**

knows it. So I'm relatively confident he won't take this gamble, **provided we are clear in our**

communications about how we would respond. That said, the West's policy now needs to focus on

making sure he doesn't invade. He should be asked to declare no plans for forcible annexation of any part of Ukraine — or any longer military stay in any part of Ukraine than absolutely necessary. He should allow international monitors and mediators to help verify the protection of various populations within Ukraine — a plan he reportedly discussed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sunday. He should also work toward a new deal with the Ukrainian government that will be respected by all. The Ukrainian government also needs to continue to show that it is seeking to include and represent Ukrainians of all major parts of the country and society. Moscow must restore Ukraine's full sovereignty in short order — while ensuring protection for Russian speakers as noted above. Putin should continue to have his military units in Crimea refrain from the use of force, and also to stop trying to recruit defectors from the Ukrainian army into their general ranks. No further Russian troop

mobilizations or large-scale additional reinforcements of Russian positions in Ukraine should occur. **Chances are high** that this

crisis can still be contained and ultimately defused. We need to distinguish between the unpleasant things that have already

happened and the catastrophic possibilities that, **with good policy and clear warnings** as well as inducements to all

relevant parties, we can probably still prevent.

Obama diplomatic capital finite – must spend on Russia, not on the Aff Plan

Dovere 3/3/14

<http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/barack-obama-ukraine-crimea-russia-104203.html#ixzz2wdk7y0yj>

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As the relationship with Russia has publicly collapsed over the past year, American officials have eagerly pointed out that the two countries remain close collaborators on counterterrorism and on supplying troops in Afghanistan. That's about it, though, leaving the administration responding now in an environment shaped by the continued fallout from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the larger intractability of the Arab world and Putin's lack of concern for international rules. "All of this would have put the U.S. as superpower on its back foot," said Strobe Talbott, a former deputy secretary of state for Clinton who's now the president of the Brookings Institution and chairman of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. "President Obama has a particularly acute version of that, because he is, in his version of pragmatism, into cutting our losses and being quite forthright in that." That will have to

change now, Talbott said. **"Much as he would like to spend his time and his remaining capital on**

other things," Talbott said, **Obama will have "to spend quite a bit of his time and quite a bit of**

his political capital making clear to the American people and the international community

that we're not just going to roll over on this."

Obama resolve is currently sufficient to avoid escalation

O'Hanlon 3/5/14

<http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/05/why-believe-putin-western-leaders-will-find-solution-for-ukraine-crisis/>

Michael Edward O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He began his career as a budget analyst in the defense field.

It is risky to say this, but I am slightly less anxious about the Ukraine crisis than many people seem to be, for several reasons.

First, I **see no fundamental test of U.S. resolve or President Obama underway**, no broad international doubting about America's commitment to global leadership. To be sure, there are problems in our foreign policy, starting with Syria. And President Obama's rhetoric on Afghanistan focuses too much on ending the war, not enough on highlighting our gains and seeking to lock them in. **But on balance the president looks reasonably resolute to me in most of his**

actual policies For starters in Afghanistan itself, where actions speak louder than words, and 35,000 U.S. troops remain. Then there's Iran, where I think he means it when he insists that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb on his watch. And, on the Asia-Pacific rebalance, where the main threat to success is not Obama but sequestration (something the president is trying to overturn). As for the situation in Ukraine itself, as badly behaved as President Putin has been in this crisis, there have been limits. - He hasn't killed people, at least not yet. - He is apparently trying to show force in a way that gets a specific task done. - He wants to protect his military bases in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (historically one of Russia's big four) is based. - He wants, he says, to protect fellow ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, of whom there are many in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This latter point does raise the worry that he will move into eastern Ukraine, but it also suggests there are ways for the government in Kiev to make such an intervention less likely by working hard to stabilize the situation there.

Extinction

Baum 3/7/14

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seth-baum/best-and-worst-case-scenario_b_4915315.html

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No one yet knows how the Ukraine crisis will play out. Indeed, the whole story is a lesson in the perils of prediction. Already we have a classic: "Putin's Bluff? U.S. Spies Say Russia Won't Invade Ukraine," published February 27, just as Russian troops were entering Crimea. But considering the best and worst cases highlights some important opportunities to make the most of the situation. Here's the short version: The best case scenario has the Ukraine crisis being resolved diplomatically through increased Russia-Europe cooperation,

which would be **a big step towards world peace**. The worst case scenario has the crisis escalating into **nuclear**

war between the United States and Russia, causing human extinction. Let's start with the worst case scenario, nuclear war involving the American and Russian arsenals. How bad would that be? Put it this way: Recent analysis finds that a "limited" India-Pakistan nuclear war could kill two billion people via agricultural declines from nuclear winter. This "limited" war involves just 100

nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Russia combine to possess about 16,700 nuclear weapons. **Humanity may not survive** the aftermath of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war. It seems rather unlikely that the U.S. and Russia would end up in nuclear war over Ukraine. Sure, they have opposing positions, but neither side has anywhere near enough at stake to justify such extraordinary measures. Instead, it seems a lot more likely that the whole crisis will get resolved with a minimum of deaths. However, the story has already taken some surprising plot twists. **We**

cannot rule out the possibility of it ending in direct nuclear war. A nuclear war could also

occur inadvertently, i.e. when a false alarm is misinterpreted as real, and nuclear weapons are launched in what is believed to be a counterattack. There have been several alarmingly close calls of inadvertent U.S.-Russia nuclear war over the years. Perhaps the most relevant is the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident. A rocket carrying scientific equipment was launched off northern Norway. Russia detected the rocket on its radar and interpreted it as a nuclear attack. Its own nuclear forces were put on alert and Boris Yeltsin was presented the question of whether to launch Russia's nuclear weapons in response. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian General Staff apparently sensed it was a false alarm and

declined to launch. Still, the disturbing lesson from this incident is that nuclear war could begin even during periods of calm. **With the**

Ukraine crisis, the situation today is not calm. It is even more tense than last year, when the United States was considering military intervention in Syria.

Link – Arctic

Oil is the backbone of Russia's economy and international pressure – they will fight to protect their market share in the Arctic

Sigov 14

(Mike, Block News Alliance, February 20, 2014, "RUSSIA'S DEPENDENCE ON UKRAINE IS TIED TO ENERGY EXPORT GOALS COMMENT" Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, L/N)

The death and abomination that is going on in Ukraine should be blamed on the greed of some corrupt Russian officials and **Russia's dependence on the oil and natural gas industry.** As

the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia's south wind down -- marred by graft allegations and by a bloody conflict in nearby Ukraine -- Russia's kleptocrats are looking to the north, gearing up for an exploration of the Arctic that would make what happened in Sochi look like dime-store shoplifting. In Sochi, Kremlin-affiliated businessmen have made off with what experts believe to be most of the \$51 billion it took Russia to build up the necessary infrastructure and host the games, more than four times the \$12 billion originally planned, which would not be possible without Russia's energy cash cow. In Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has used the country's dependence on Russian natural gas supplies and a promise of a \$15 billion bailout to have Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich abandon plans of economic integration with the European Union and crack down on the opposition. Russia depends on its natural gas lines running through Ukraine to export Russia's natural gas to Europe. Besides, it is Mr. Putin's widely known fear that a revolution in Ukraine could be a precursor of a revolution in Russia that he might not survive. This move is the catalyst behind the clashes this week in Ukraine's capital city of Kiev, in which at least 26 people have been killed. Also dependent on Russian energy supplies, the European Union largely stood idly by as the conflict in Ukraine -- where more than half of the 45 million population is pro-Western -- turned bloody as Mr. Yanukovich stepped up his attempts to crush the protests in return for the Moscow bailout. Enter the North Pole, which crowns the Arctic that experts say may account for as much as 20 percent of the world's recoverable oil and natural gas resources yet to be discovered. Unparalleled since the Soviet industrialization in the 1930s, the project presents an opportunity beyond the dreams of avarice for Mr. Putin's cronies to further plunder Russia. It also comes in handy to Mr. Putin, who proclaims Arctic fossil-fuel resources as an untapped source to help restore his country's grandeur. In 2007, Russia planted its national flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole, symbolically claiming the Arctic seafloor and whatever resources may be lying underneath. Then last year, Russia resumed a permanent naval presence in the Arctic, where it already has 25 icebreakers -- while the U.S. Navy maintains only two. Despite its inferior industrial infrastructure, **Russia's oil and gas industry**

remains the backbone of its economy and its re-emerging international clout,

allowing the Kremlin to reach far beyond Ukraine. And it is exactly in the interest of Russia's natural gas exports that it sabotages the U.S.-led efforts for eventual stability in Syria, and helps Iran in its nuclear projects while pretending to be a peacemaker. Should peace prevail in Syria, and should Iran verifiably give up its ambition to create a nuclear weapon, nothing would prevent Iran from going ahead with its plan to export natural gas to Europe via Iraq and Syria, which would threaten Russian natural gas exports to Europe. The good news is that Russia now faces a challenge from the budding U.S. assertiveness that came to life after Russia antagonized the White House by granting political asylum to Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor and secrets leaker.

Russia's trying to expand Arctic -- plan leads to sovereignty disputes

Friedman 14

(Uri, senior associate editor at The Atlantic, March 28, 2014, "The Arctic: Where the U.S. and Russia Could Square Off Next" <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/the-arctic-where-the-us-and-russia-could-square-off-next/359543/>)

Russian officials were getting a bit ahead of themselves. Technically, the UN commission had approved Russia's recommendations on the outer limits of its continental shelf—and only when Russia acts on these suggestions is its control of the Sea of Okhotsk "final and binding." Still, these technicalities shouldn't obscure the larger point: **Russia isn't only pursuing its territorial ambitions in Ukraine and other former Soviet states. It's particularly active in the Arctic Circle,** and, until recently, **these efforts engendered international cooperation, not conflict.** But the Crimean crisis has complicated matters. Take Hillary Clinton's call last week for Canada and

the United States to form a "united front" in response to Russia "aggressively reopening military bases" in the Arctic. Or the difficulties U.S. officials are having in designing sanctions against Russia that won't harm Western oil companies like Exxon Mobil, which are engaged in oil-and-gas exploration with their Russian counterparts in parts of the Russian Arctic. In a dispatch from "beneath the Arctic ocean" this week, The Wall Street Journal reported on a U.S. navy exercise, scheduled before the crisis in Ukraine, that included a simulated attack on a Russian submarine. The U.S. has now canceled a joint naval exercise with Russia in the region and put various other partnerships there on hold. This week, the Council on Foreign Relations published a very helpful guide on the jostling among countries to capitalize on the shipping routes and energy resources that could be unlocked as the Arctic melts. The main players are the countries with Arctic Ocean coastlines: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia, the United States (Alaska)—and, to a lesser extent, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. These nations have generally agreed to work together to resolve territorial and environmental issues. But some sovereignty disputes persist, including American opposition to Russia's claims to parts of the Northern Sea Route above Siberia. Here's CFR's infographic on where the Arctic's shipping and natural-resource potential is, and where the "Arctic Five" are most at odds with each other (you can even layer summer sea ice onto the map!): "Few countries have been as keen to invest in the Arctic as Russia, whose economy and federal budget rely heavily on hydrocarbons," CFR writes. "Of the nearly sixty large oil and natural-gas fields discovered in the Arctic, there are forty-three in Russia, eleven in Canada, six in Alaska, and one in Norway, according to a 2009 U.S. Department of Energy report." "Russia, the only non-NATO littoral Arctic state, has made a military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority, restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports and marshaling naval assets," the guide adds. "In late 2013, President Vladimir Putin instructed his military leadership to pay particular attention to the Arctic, saying Russia needed 'every lever for the protection of its security and national interests there.' He also ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian Arctic by the end of 2014."

Russia is strengthening its military posture to protect its arctic commercial development

Smith 14

(Rich, January 19, 2014, "Russia Builds a New Navy to Dominate the Arctic Ocean" <http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/19/russia-builds-a-new-navy-to-dominate-the-arctic-oc.aspx>)

The mightiest force on the high seas, the United States Navy boasts a fleet 283 warships strong. In comparison, Russia's navy, once America's archrival, has only 208 warships -- but Russia is closing the gap, and quickly. Just last week, in an interview with RIA Novosti, deputy commander of the Russian Navy Rear Adm. Viktor Bursuk confirmed plans to add 40 new vessels to the Russian fleet this year alone -- taking the fleet to within just 35 ships of U.S. fleet strength. Surface warships will make up the bulk of the additions, but a Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and a Varshavyanka-class diesel-electric submarine are both on order as well. An advanced search-and-rescue ship, the Igor Belousov, will further backstop Russia's submarine forces by extending the country's ability to assist submarines in distress. Building a nuclear navy Nor is this the end of Russia's expansion plans. Bursuk told RIA that Russia is working quickly to upgrade the "mothballed" Kirov-class nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and refurbishing three nuclear-powered attack submarines. Plans may even include the addition of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier -- Russia's first. Why the sudden spate of shipbuilding? President Vladimir Putin gave us a hint last year. In a statement delivered to the Russian Defense Ministry in December, Putin averred that one of Russia's "top defense priorities" going forward is to increase Russia's influence at the North Pole. And for good reason. The Cold War is over. Now we're talking global warming Global warming has opened up 1 million square miles of new navigable waters in the Arctic Ocean. Already commercial shipping companies are beginning to exploit new routes. More crucially to Russia are the mineral resources made accessible by a shrinking ice cap. Already, 95% of Russia's probable natural gas reserves are located in the Arctic, with sizable deposits found in Russia's adjacent Barents and Kara Seas. 60% of the country's believed oil reserves are located in the Arctic as well. Local oil and gas giants Rosneft and Gazprom (NASDAQOTH: OGZPY), therefore, have a vested interest in defending these deposits... and searching for new ones. Earlier this month, Russia announced plans to up the tempo of air patrols in the Arctic "significantly," flying Tu-142 and Il-38 reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The country also intends to reopen upwards of a half dozen Arctic airfields and ports, shuttered since the days of the Cold War. According to reports, many of Russia's new warships may be tasked for Arctic duty to defend these interests. And if Russia actually does build itself a nuclear aircraft carrier, Admiral

Vladimir Vysotsky, former Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet, thinks it should be sent to the Arctic to support the country's nuclear submarines.

Arctic oil development is critical to Russia

A) nationalism

Byers 13

(Michael, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, November 11, 2013, "Great Powers Shall Not in the Arctic Clash" <http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2013/11/11/great-powers-shall/>)

Russian politicians have long used Arctic exploits to stoke nationalist pride. The first people to be designated "Heroes of the Soviet Union" were the pilots who rescued the crew of the SS Chelyuskin after it was crushed by ice in the Northern Sea Route in 1934. In 2007, Artur Chilingarov was designated a "Hero of the Russian Federation" after he descended approximately 4,000 metres in a submersible to plant a Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole. Chilingarov is a notable Arctic scientist, but he was also the deputy chairman of the Russian Duma during an election campaign. One of the other scientists involved in the flag plant later admitted that the event was nothing more than a publicity stunt. In point of fact, the Russian government has explicitly acknowledged that the country's future success will depend on international cooperation, including in respect of access to foreign capital and technology to develop vast offshore reserves of Arctic oil and gas. Oil and gas rescued Russia from economic collapse in the 1990s. Today, these account for roughly 30 percent of the country's GDP. As more than two-thirds of that 30 percent comes from Russia's Arctic, continued development of the region is an objective of central national importance.

B) gas

Byers 13

(Michael, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, November 11, 2013, "Great Powers Shall Not in the Arctic Clash" <http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2013/11/11/great-powers-shall/>)

Two Arctic natural gas deposits – the Bovanenkovo field on the Yamal Peninsula and the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea – hold more reserves than the total proven conventional reserves of the US. France's Total and Norway's Statoil have been brought in to help develop the deposits through joint-venture agreements – although development of Shtokman is on hold for the moment because of the currently diminished global demand for gas. Russia is the world's largest producer of oil. However, falling production levels in Western Siberia have created an imperative to move northward – often in partnership with Western companies. In April 2013, Russian state-owned Gazprom signed an agreement with Royal Dutch Shell to cooperatively explore and develop Russia's Arctic offshore oil reserves. The importance of the agreement was underlined by the presence of both President Putin and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the signing ceremony. In June 2013, Russian state-owned Rosneft signed a similar agreement with ExxonMobil. The agreement foresees investments up to US \$500 billion should reserves meet expectations. Getting the oil and gas to markets will require improved transportation links. Much of the gas from the new fields will be shipped west through the newly opened Nord Stream pipeline, which runs along the bottom of the Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany. Much of the oil, for its part, will be shipped east to Asia via the Northern Sea Route. Russia already uses icebreakers to escort commercial vessels along its 6,600 kilometre-long Arctic coastline, and charges fees for the service. (In 2007, it launched the world's largest nuclear powered icebreaker, the Fifty Years of Victory, which is able to sail more or less at speed through 2.5 metres of ice.)

The Northern Sea has long been considered essential to Russia's interests During WW2, some 34 'lend-lease' vessels owned by the US and crewed by Soviets carried supplies from North America along the icy waterway in order to avoid German submarines. Today, the Russian government is intent on transforming the Northern Sea Route into a commercially viable alternative to the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca. Said Putin in September 2011: "The shortest route between Europe's largest markets and the Asia-Pacific region lies across the Arctic. This route is almost a third shorter than the traditional southern one. I want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes in service fees, security and quality." Washington opposes Moscow's claim that portions of the Northern Sea Route constitute Russian internal waters – a classification that requires foreign ships to seek permission to enter. However, the US has

never physically challenged that position. When the US Coastguard icebreaker Northwind approached the Vil'kitskii Strait north of Siberia in 1965, Moscow threatened to "go all the way" if the ship continued onward. Washington responded by ordering the Northwind to turn round, and has kept its ships away ever since.

Russia postering for war in the arctic over resources

Global Aviation Report 14

(May 26, 2014, "Canadians risk being pushed out of the vast Arctic Ocean while Russia reaps its rewards")

<http://globalaviationreport.com/2014/05/26/canadians-risk-being-pushed-out-of-the-vast-arctic-ocean-while-russia-reaps-its-rewards/>

Recently the world's attention has been focused on Ukraine and what Russian President Vladimir Putin's next move might be in Eastern Europe. Will he turn his attention towards the Baltics, or Poland – Romania, Hungary, nations to Russia's South? All of this time and angst being spent on Eastern Europe thereby ignoring a much bigger (and potentially more important) future problem – the Arctic! Recently, Russia has been beefing up bases and troop presence in and around the Arctic Circle. And let's not forget that Russia made its intentions very clear when they planted a white, blue and red Russian flag on that Northern ocean's resource-rich bottom. As is well known, trillions of dollars in reserves of oil and natural gas lay underneath the now-receding Arctic ice. So what does this mean for Canada, the U.S., and Northern European countries that border that resource rich area? It means that alliance nations had better get ready for Russia's next move – one that most likely is meant to militarily take the entire Arctic Ocean region and the vast wealth that lay underneath its ice-free surface. This is arguably the grand strategy Vladimir Putin has to move Russia into the "world of great nations". The means to acquire vast wealth with which to build an unstoppable military, one that will be used to threaten the entire world. But that opens up an important question for Canada. When Russian T-50 stealth fighters and from-long-range targeting MiG-31BMs with powerful Zaslon-M radars (or its follow-on MiG-41) appear in the skies over the far North, do you want to confront them with Gripen, Typhoon, Hornet, Rafale, or the stealth F-35 JSF? Which aircraft do you think Russia would rather be up against? Time for Canadians to face the new reality – we now live in a world where some nations (Russia) accept military force as a legitimate means by which to take that which they deem to be of strategic national importance. Whether that be land, ocean, or wealth-generating energy natural resources. And in the Canadian and U.S. Arctic, there is plenty of the last to be had. Now Canada, how do you want to enter the ring? Do you want to put a middleweight fighter up against a heavyweight, or do you want to make sure that your nation is well able to defend itself and its vital national interests? The U.S. too. F-35 Lightning II. Talk of anything else just invites future aggression against that which is yours. The wolf? He is out there, and you had better be ready to confront it.

Russia is pivoting military strength to Arctic region – oil and minerals

Dim 14

(Des, January 21, 2014, "Russia builds a new navy to control the Arctic Ocean" <http://www.vesselfinder.com/news/1772-Russia-builds-a-new-navy-to-control-the-Arctic-Ocean>)

Russia has plans to build more and more vessels in order to expand its fleet and to have more control over the Arctic Ocean. Global warming and melting of ice are creating new sea routes. More and more vessels will take the shorter Arctic voyage in near future. Domination of the Northern Sea Route is a key factor for economic development of Russia. The country with the largest fleet of warships is the United States with 283 vessels. Russia has only 208 warships at the moment, but is closing the gap the fastest way. Deputy commander of the Russian Navy Rear Adm. Viktor Bursuk informed in an interview that Russia plans to add 40 new ships to its fleet only in 2014. After this period the difference between the United States' fleet and the Russian fleet will be only 35 ships. The new Russian ships are: surface warships, a Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and a Varshavyanka-class diesel-electric submarine. In addition will be added also an advanced search-and-rescue ship, the Igor Belousov in order to help Russian submarines in distress. Nuclear powered navy? Russia plans to build the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in its fleet. Other ships will be upgraded like the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov. 3 nuclear-powered attack submarines will be refurbished. Why Russia is building vessels to expand its fleet? The answer to this question came from the President Vladimir

Putin from last year. He informed that one of the Russia's top defense priorities is to dominate the North Pole. Global warming created 1 million square miles of navigable waters in the Arctic Ocean. More and more companies now are interested in using this new shortcuts to transport their cargo. Mineral resources are becoming more accessible due to the disappearing of the thick ice. It is curious to know that 95% of the probable natural gas reserves of Russia (and also 60% of the country's oil reserves) are concentrated in the Antarctic. Russia has to be sure that these resources can be defended. Russia is expanding its navy, but is also intensifying the air patrols in the Arctic with Tu-142 and Il-38 reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Closed airfields and ports in the Arctic will be reopened, these bases were closed after the end of the Cold War. Many of the newly built vessels will be deployed in the Arctic to defend the new (old) military bases.

Russia cooperating on arctic oil now

AP 14

(LARA JAKES and VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, March 26, 2014, "Despite chill, cooperation between US and Russia"
<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/despite-chill-cooperation-between-us-and-russia>)

Since the Cold War ended two decades ago, Washington has considered Moscow mostly as an unreliable ally — and, at times, a stubborn adversary, in efforts to boost the global economy, curb weapons proliferation and calm other nations in tumult. At the same time, Russia's role as a key participant in international efforts to solve global crises gives it the ability to hurt the U.S. if it decides to be uncooperative or openly obstructive. Some of the tensions can be chalked up to pure competition. The range and scope of Russia's natural resources are second only to the U.S. and it is the world's largest natural-gas exporter. Moscow has stepped up diplomatic ties with China and, more recently, across the Mideast to provide a counterpoint to Western influences in countries the U.S. is trying to win over. This week, President Barack Obama downplayed Russia as a "regional power" — despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's clear desire to restore his country to the global superpower status it held as the core of the Soviet Union. The monthlong crisis in Ukraine that led to Russia annexing the strategic Crimean Peninsula has forged a new bitterness between Moscow and Washington. It's too soon to say whether relations will fully freeze over, especially in areas where both sides share a common interest. But, "given Putin shows no signs of backing down here," former Obama administration national security adviser Tom Donilon said earlier this month, "I think we're in for a very difficult time in Russia-U.S. relations." Some key areas where the U.S. and Russia are still working together

— for now. IRAN Both Russia and the U.S. have been clear about wanting to limit Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb. At last week's negotiations session in Vienna between world powers and Iran, officials said U.S. and Russian diplomats openly agreed to ignore other topics and together focus on the talks with Tehran. Iran often sought to exploit U.S.-Russian differences in the past and it may use the current tensions to resist significant nuclear cutbacks. Moscow already has an agreeable relationship with Tehran: Russia is one of Iran's main trading partners and has sold Iran arms over the years. Russia built Iran's first nuclear reactor and is drafting an agreement to build two more. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned last week that Moscow wouldn't like to use the negotiations with Iran as "an element of the game of raising the stakes" with the West amid tensions over Ukraine. But he added that, "if they force us into that, we will take retaliatory measures." However, the U.S. has developed much of the negotiation strategy against Iran. Harsh U.S. and European Union sanctions against oil exports and threat of U.S. or Israeli military action has, says former U.S. Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, largely been the driving force behind Iran's willingness to negotiate. "These tools remain with or without Russian cooperation," says Jeffrey, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. SYRIA Russia and the U.S. have been at odds over Syria, where Washington and the West want to see opposition forces succeed in their three-year battle against Syrian President Bashar Assad, who has Moscow's support. Russia has sold weapons to Syria's military and repeatedly blocked United Nations resolutions to condemn or sanction Assad's government. If Russia chooses to play a spoiler on Syria, it may boost financial aid and weapons supplies to Assad. However, Russia has agreed to help broker a cease-fire and a transitional government, and over the last year has worked with the U.S. to bring Assad officials and rebel leaders to negotiate. But those efforts have failed to yield any breakthroughs. Russia is also vital in leaning on Assad's government to give up its chemical weapons stockpile — less than half of which has been shipped out against a June 30 deadline. "It's not that we need something from Russia — it's that the Syrian people need the Russians and the Iranians and anyone else with influence over the regime to keep pushing them," State Department deputy spokeswoman Marie Harf said Wednesday. "Quite frankly, we have been able to work together on Syria, on things like chemical weapons, even when we very strongly disagree with other parts of their Syria policy, certainly." AFGHANISTAN Russia has played a key role in providing air and land corridors for supplying the U.S. and other coalition troops in Afghanistan. It has provided an alternative to a route through Pakistan, which has been unstable amid local protests. If Russia chooses to shut the transit route, it would swell U.S. costs and may cause major logistical challenges as the U.S. and its allies pull their forces out of Afghanistan this year. Putin appeared to signal last week that Russia wants to continue to cooperate on Afghanistan. He said that Russia will keep funding a program run jointly with NATO to service Afghan helicopters and train their crews. MILITARY RELATIONS U.S.-Russian military cooperation has included joint exercises, bilateral meetings, port visits and planning conferences. Atlas Vision, for example, is an annual exercise aimed at improving the two nations' ability to operate together in areas of mutual interest, such as joint peacekeeping tasks, coalition and regional stabilization operations, crisis-response, illegal weapons trafficking, search and rescue capabilities, counter-trafficking, and combating terrorism. But the relationship has been an off-again, on-again affair. The Pentagon announced early this month that it had put on hold all military-to-military engagements in light of events in Ukraine. Washington similarly suspended military cooperation following the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Bilateral activities

resumed in July 2009. Pentagon officials have stressed that despite the current break in programs, they are trying to keep lines of communication open. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has spoken to Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu to tell him about U.S. concern about the intervention in Ukraine and warn that Moscow's action risk further instability in the region and isolation from the international community. NASA Since the retirement of the U.S. shuttle fleet in 2011, the Russian Soyuz spacecraft has been the sole means to fly crews to and from the International Space Station. NASA is paying nearly \$71 million for a seat in Soyuz, and it will have to rely on Russia through 2017 before American companies provide an alternative crew transport capacity. That included a blast-off early Wednesday from Kazakhstan carrying one NASA astronaut and two Russian cosmonauts. Russian officials have given no indication that they could curb cooperation with NASA amid the tensions, and it appears unlikely they would ever do so. For NASA, rejecting Russia's launch services would mean putting its presence on the station on hold, something that is hard to imagine. AGRICULTURE Russia has been an important importer of U.S. meat and it has banned imports amid periods of tensions, citing technical reasons. Russia in 2013 banned imports of U.S. pork, though it is now accepting a few shipments that the USDA has certified are free of a growth hormone called ractopamine. Russia has said the existing U.S. system of checks don't guarantee its safety. Similarly, Russia shut off all beef imports in 2013. Russia also banned the imports of U.S. dairy products in 2010 over in a spat over customs requirements. The disagreement even played a role in the Sochi Olympics, when Russia refused to allow the United States to ship Chobani yogurt to its athletes in the Olympic village. If tensions continue, bans on U.S. products will likely expand. TRADE America's economic ties to Russia are relatively small, but analysts said economic retaliation by Russia could have an impact on particular U.S. companies and on the overall U.S. economy more generally. Russia-U.S. trade stood at about \$30 billion a year, a fraction of Russia-EU trade exceeding \$400 billion. Russia, however, has been an important market for many major U.S. companies — from Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble to General Electric and Boeing. In 2013, Russia was America's 28th-largest export market, buying \$11.2 billion in goods, including \$1.9 billion in civilian aircraft and aircraft parts and \$1.3 billion in motor vehicles and parts. Other exports to Russia included everything from oil field drilling equipment to heavy machinery and medical instruments. Leading agricultural exports included meat and poultry products and soybeans. U.S. imports from Russia totaled \$27 billion in 2013, led by \$16.2 billion in fuel oil imports. That gave the United States a \$15.8 billion trade deficit with Russia last year. Should the Obama administration impose additional sanctions, the risk of Russian retaliation against U.S. businesses would grow. "There are American jobs at stake, there are American business interests at stake," said Cliff Kupchan, senior Russia analyst at the Eurasia Group. OIL AND GAS Exxon Mobil Corp. has signed a deal with Russia's Rosneft that gives the U.S. company access to some of the world's richest sources of oil and other hydrocarbons in the Black Sea and the Russian Arctic. The two companies are set to start exploration this year. The alliance that also envisages multibillion dollar investments in energy projects in the Black Sea, Siberia and Russia's far east, seems too big to be shaken by political storms. Kupchan said U.S. companies currently doing business with Russia probably won't be harmed, but if "competition began for a major new oil deal, a U.S. company probably wouldn't be included."

Competition in arctic now

CFR 13

(June 19, 2013, "The Global Oceans Regime" <http://www.cfr.org/oceans/global-oceans-regime/p21035/>)

But new opportunities in the Arctic also portend new competition among states. In August 2007, Russia symbolically planted a flag on the Arctic floor, staking a claim to large chunks of Arctic land. Other Arctic powers, including the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark, have also laid claims. The European Union crafted a new Arctic policy, and China sent an icebreaker on three separate Arctic expeditions. Each country stands poised to grab new treasure in this increasingly important geostrategic region. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a solid foundation on which to build and coordinate national Arctic policies, especially articles 76 and 234, which govern the limits of the outer continental shelf(OCS) and regulate activities in ice-covered waters, respectively. However, there remains a formidable list of nagging sovereignty disputes that will require creative bilateral and multilateral resolutions. The Arctic Council, a multilateral forum comprising eight Arctic nations, has recently grown in international prominence, signing a legally binding treaty on search and rescue missions in May 2011 and drawing top level policymakers to its meetings. While these are significant first steps, the forum has yet to address other issues such as overlapping OCS claims, contested maritime boundaries, and the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route.

Russia postering for war in the arctic over resources

Global Aviation Report 14

(May 26, 2014, "Canadians risk being pushed out of the vast Arctic Ocean while Russia reaps its rewards")

<http://globalaviationreport.com/2014/05/26/canadians-risk-being-pushed-out-of-the-vast-arctic-ocean-while-russia-reaps-its-rewards/>)

Recently the world's attention has been focused on Ukraine and what Russian President Vladimir Putin's next move might be in Eastern Europe. Will he turn his attention towards the Baltics, or Poland – Romania, Hungary, nations to Russia's South? All of this time and angst being spent on Eastern Europe thereby ignoring a much bigger (and potentially more important) future problem – the Arctic! Recently, Russia has been beefing up bases and troop presence in and around the Arctic Circle. And let's not forget that Russia made its intentions very clear when they planted a white, blue and red Russian flag on that Northern ocean's resource-rich bottom. As is well known, trillions of dollars in reserves of oil and natural gas lay underneath the now-receding Arctic ice. So what does this mean for Canada, the U.S., and Northern European countries that border that resource rich area? It means that alliance nations had better get ready for Russia's next move – one that most likely is meant to militarily take the entire Arctic Ocean region and the vast wealth that lay underneath its ice-free surface. This is arguably the grand strategy Vladimir Putin has to move Russia into the "world of great nations". The means to acquire vast wealth with which to build an unstoppable military, one that will be used to threaten the entire world. But that opens up an important question for Canada. When Russian T-50 stealth fighters and from-long-range targeting MiG-31Bs with powerful Zaslon-M radars (or its follow-on MiG-41) appear in the skies over the far North, do you want to confront them with Gripen, Typhoon, Hornet, Rafale, or the stealth F-35 JSF? Which aircraft do you think Russia would rather be up against? Time for Canadians to face the new reality – we now live in a world where some nations (Russia) accept military force as a legitimate means by which to take that which they deem to be of strategic national importance. Whether that be land, ocean, or wealth-generating energy natural resources. And in the Canadian and U.S. Arctic, there is plenty of the last to be had. Now Canada, how do you want to enter the ring? Do you want to put a middleweight fighter up against a heavyweight, or do you want to make sure that your nation is well able to defend itself and its vital national interests? The U.S. too. F-35 Lightning II. Talk of anything else just invites future aggression against that which is yours. The wolf? He is out there, and you had better be ready to confront it.

Most likely location for war

Francis 14

(David, Writer for Financial Times, February 27, 2014, "The race for Arctic oil: Russia vs. U.S." <http://theweek.com/article/index/256908/the-race-for-arctic-oil-russia-vs-us>)

The United States and Russia are at odds over a host of issues, from Ukraine to Syria to Edward Snowden,

prompting talks of a new Cold War. **Their next confrontation could take place on the coldest place**

on earth. Last week, a Russian military official told Russian media that the Kremlin was forming a new strategic military command to protect its interests in the Arctic. It's part of a broader push from Moscow to establish military superiority at the top of the world. "The new command will comprise the Northern Fleet, Arctic warfare brigades, air force and air defense units as well as additional administrative structures," a source in Russia's General Staff told RIA Novosti last Monday. The formation of the new command follows a December 2013 order from Russian President Vladimir Putin to ramp up Russia's military presence in the Arctic. Putin said Russia was returning to the Arctic and "intensifying the development of this promising region" and that Russia needs to "have all the levers for the protection of its security and national interests." These interests are primarily energy related. As Arctic ice has melted, companies from Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States — the five countries that have a border with the Arctic — have been rushing to secure rights to drill for oil and natural gas in places that are now accessible. Hundreds of billions of dollars are at stake. Experts estimate that the Arctic holds some 30 percent of the world's natural gas supply, and 13 percent of the world's oil. That's why companies like Royal Dutch Shell, the U.S.-based Arctic Oil & Gas Corp. and Russia's Gazprom have all been making exploration claims on land in the Arctic. Countries are making new claims in the Arctic as well. Each of the five nations with Arctic borders is allotted 200 nautical miles of land from their most northern coast. Putin's military expansion was in direct response to a claim of additional land by Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird, who last year asked scientists to craft a submission to the United Nations arguing that the North Pole belongs to Canada. The Canadian claim also asserts that it owns the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range located between Ellesmere Island, Canada's most northern border, and Russia's east Siberian coast. In 2007, Russian scientists planted a flag on the ridge to claim it as Russian territory. Russia created the Northern Fleet-Unified Strategic Command to protect oil and gas fields on the Arctic shelf. Unfortunately for American companies, the Pentagon has fallen behind, having only two of the icebreakers necessary to navigate Arctic waters. According to the Congressional Research Service, Russia has 25, with six powered by nuclear energy. Part of the problem is costs; a new icebreaker costs \$800 million, and the Coast Guard says it doesn't need new ones. But Alaska Democratic Sen. Mark Begich said that the Obama administration should

make the Arctic more of a priority. "It's like they've never heard of it," Begich said in a recent interview with Fox News. "With the Obama administration we've had to push back pretty hard to convince them and show them why they need to invest in not only icebreakers, but forward operating bases for the Arctic."

Russia will fight over the Arctic

Koren 14

(Marina, staff correspondent at National Journal, March 27, 2014, "Is Vladimir Putin Coming for the North Pole Next?"

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/is-vladimir-putin-coming-for-the-north-pole-next-20140327>)

Crimea wasn't the only territory Russia claimed as its own this month. Just three days before Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his plan to annex Ukraine's peninsula, a U.N. commission gave him sovereignty over the Sea of Okhotsk, located off Russia's southeastern coast near Japan. Those waters, it was decided, are part of Russia's continental shelf. Russia's Environment Minister Sergey Donskoy called the 20,000 square miles of once-international waters a "real Ali Baba's cave" because of its natural-resource reserves. "It took Russia many years to achieve this success," he said, logic that rings true for the acquisition of Crimea. But Russia's appetite for territory does not end at its southern shores. The country is hungry for more control over the top of the globe, and has been for a long time. Five countries stretch into the region called the Arctic: Russia, Canada, and the United States, by way of Alaska; and Norway and Denmark, through Greenland. No country has yet laid full claim to the entire region, which includes the North Pole and is home to 15 percent of the world's oil, a third of its undiscovered natural gas, and, depending on your age, Santa Claus. But several nations have tried to extend their sovereignty there, which requires proving that their continental shelves extend more than 230 miles into the Arctic Ocean. (For a visual of who currently owns what, check out this map from The New York Times.) The Arctic is not a lawless free-for-all, however. The five nations, along with Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, are members of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum created in 1996 to facilitate cooperation among Arctic states, as well as communities indigenous to the area. The council is far from a military or economic alliance. Focused on subjects like environmental protection, pollution, trade routes, and fisheries, the group prides itself on keeping political and military issues out of the discussion. This week, the council is meeting in Yellowknife, the capital city of Canada's Northwest Territories. Russia, already cut out of other international summits, is in attendance. Arctic Council Chairwoman Leona Aglukkaq, who represents Canada, said Tuesday that barring Russia from this week's summit "serves no constructive purpose." But the Canadian government is keeping a close eye on what the Russians say there, she said. It appears the northern part of the globe can't ignore the southern tensions forever. Thanks to global warming, the Arctic has become a hot spot for economic development in recent years. The more sea ice melts away, the more water there is for cargo ships to cross and for rigs to drill into to reach vast untapped natural gas and oil reserves. Last year, China, India, Italy, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the European Union, Greenpeace, and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, all applied for a seat at the Arctic Council. The race for the Arctic is quietly underway, and Russia seems to be winning so far. This is especially troubling for the rest of the North Pole. The region is already locked in what's known as a security dilemma, explains Kristian Atland, a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. World powers have a tendency to assume the worst about their neighbors, and any measure taken by one nation to increase its sovereignty or security could be perceived by another as a threat. It also doesn't help that all of Russia's Arctic neighbors are NATO members. If the other

Arctic states have learned something from the Ukraine crisis, it's that the **Russians will protect what they feel is**

rightfully theirs. Russian territory accounts for about half of the Arctic region, but there's a lot more to the country's lead in the game than size. In 2001, Moscow sent the first-ever territorial claim for the North Pole to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which defines nations' rights in the world's oceans. The commission told Russia that it needed more scientific evidence that the Arctic shelf is part of the country's landmass, and a decision has not yet been made. Russia has previously employed a fairly friendly polar policy, The Guardian's Luke Harding explains. Under Dmitry Medvedev, Moscow resolved a territorial dispute with Norway and worked out policy issues with other Arctic powers, but "Putin's Arctic rhetoric has been hawkish." Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has also been known to turn up the rhetoric on his country's right to the Arctic, but he's not the one who just annexed another country's territory. Moscow's tough foreign policy has also leaked into research interests in the region. During the International Polar Year program in 2007—an international effort to explore the polar regions—Russia isolated itself from other participants. When Russian explorers reached the North Pole's seabed that summer, a first in history, they stuck a Russian flag in it, staking a claim in an arctic ridge that Canada and Denmark have also said is theirs. Russia also denied logistical support to a French expedition, which prevented its crew from leaving the Siberian port of Tiksi for two weeks. Two years later, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed that "the United States, Denmark, Norway, and Canada are conducting a common and coordinated policy to deny Russia access to the riches of the [Arctic] shelf." So much for teamwork. If there's another thing the Arctic states have

learned from the Ukraine crisis, it's that Moscow will risk political isolation to preserve its domestic influence. The Russian president said he sent troops into Crimea to protect its ethnic en Canada, Russia's Arctic rival, announced in December that it plans to submit its own claim for additional Arctic territory, including the North Pole, Putin responded immediately. The next day, Putin ordered an increased military presence in the region, including troops and infrastructure. Russia lost some of its Arctic power after the Cold War, when the region served as a nuclear battlefield. Now, Russia plans to restore abandoned Soviet-era airfields in the Arctic and turn the region into a strategic natural-resource base by 2020. The country's naval presence there is already greater than it was in the 1990s. And as we learned from Moscow's protection of the Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea, maritime power is key.

Crimea means Russia won't cooperate over the Arctic

Weber 14

(Bob, Canadian Press, March 10, 2014, "Tension in Crimea could be felt in the Arctic: Icelandic PM" , I/n)

Russia's actions in Ukraine could cause problems for international co-operation in the Arctic, says Iceland's prime minister. Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson said Russia's strong-arm tactics in its former satellite could make it harder for the eight nations on the Arctic Council to reach agreements at a time when the region faces a series of critical issues. "This has a ripple effect, even though the actual events are far from the Arctic," said Gunnlaugsson, in Edmonton on a trade mission. "Clearly, it has made many players in the Arctic quite worried about developments and whether they might be a sign of what is to come." In fact, former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton echoed his sentiments earlier this week while delivering a speech in Calgary. Clinton said it is in the best interests of Russia, Canada, the U.S. and the five other Arctic Council members to find ways to reach agreements on how to handle resource development in the Arctic. Meanwhile, northern nations are involved in discussions over which country will control which parts of the Arctic. Shipping and exploration rules for the North are being negotiated, as is an agreement to delay Arctic fishing until more is known about the resource. Gunnlaugsson, whose country sits on the Arctic Council, said Russia's actions are going to make agreement on those and other environmental and economic issues in the Arctic even harder. "It makes other governments more worried about what might happen in the future, so it creates a sense of insecurity and maybe lack of trust. If what we see in Ukraine turns out to be an exception and Russia goes back to friendly relations with its neighbours, then it shouldn't have an effect."

Gunnlaugsson's country is banking a good part of its economic future on Arctic development. It is planning to build a major seaport in northeast Iceland to service growing traffic through gradually opening Arctic sea lanes. It has signed offshore oil exploration deals with CNOOC, the Chinese company that also owns Canadian energy company Nexen. The country has also been active diplomatically. It raised eyebrows when it formed the Arctic Circle, an international forum that included non-Arctic countries such as China before they were granted observer status at the Arctic Council. But Iceland sometimes feels snubbed by some other Arctic countries, such as when Canada, the U.S., Russia, Norway and Denmark recently concluded an interim agreement on fisheries. "We felt it was almost peculiar that the Arctic Five have decided to negotiate regarding the fish and leave Iceland out of it," Gunnlaugsson said. Canada has a lot to gain from working with Iceland on opening the Arctic, said Gunnlaugsson. Canadian companies could use the country as a bridgehead to burgeoning resource plays in Greenland, for example. "With the location of Iceland and the infrastructure we already have in place and additional know-how from Canadian companies, I think we could do a lot of good in Greenland." Gunnlaugsson said his government has already opened discussions with provincial governments in Manitoba and Alberta on increasing business ties. He was in Edmonton to help inaugurate expanded air service between Edmonton and the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik.

Link – Oceans

Russia backlashes at the plan – they view the ocean as a source of national pride and a sphere of influence

Yeltsin 97

(Boris, Former President of the Russian Federation, January 11, 1997, “THE WORLD OCEAN”

<http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/CDONEW22.htm>)

The necessity of the exploration and rational use of World Ocean resources and potential is economically justified. The World Ocean is an additional source of mineral, biological and other resources required for the social and economic development of nations. The Ocean in many respects affects the climate and weather on our planet. Sea communications and transportation systems are the most powerful and developed in the world. Military and strategic importance of the World Ocean stems from: Location in it of a considerable part of the strategic nuclear forces of maritime powers. Modern battle fleets equipped with aircraft and long range missile systems are capable of controlling the situation in the World Ocean and considerably affecting military and political stability in the world. Dependence of the world economy on sea communications. Concentration of 75% of the world's industrial potential and population in the 500 km wide coastal zone. The World Ocean is a very promising region for economic activity on one side, and the most important factor in geopolitics, **as well as**

a region of inevitable rivalry and potential division into spheres of influence.

Traditionally, Russia is considered to be one of the great maritime powers that play an important role in the exploration and use of the World Ocean. For the economic and social life of Russia, the World Ocean, and the seas surrounding the country in the first instance, is of paramount importance. There are objective considerations for that: the length of the sea border of Russia is 38800 km (the length of the land border is 14500 km); the shelf area is 4.2 million square kilometers, of which 3.9 million square kilometers are prospective for hydrocarbons (at least 80% of Russia's oil and gas reserves are in the shelf of its northern seas); the vital activity of Russia, especially of its coastal regions, depends on uninterrupted operation of the sea transport and the proper support of cargo and passenger traffic. Currently Russia is in a completely new situation in terms of the establishment of the bases for sea policy as well as the realisation and protection of its interests in the World Ocean. The crisis in the national economy has seriously deteriorated the opportunities for Russia to keep its presence in the World Ocean at its former level. Forced curtailment of activities in the World Ocean goes without any order, which aggravates the negative consequences of this process, and decreases the efficiency of the use of allocated resources. **Restoration of Russia's position in the World Ocean is a task of**

national importance.

Activities of state, economic, scientific and defense-oriented organizations in exploration and use of the World Ocean shall be performed as an essential part of the integrated national policy in the economy, finance, defense, ecology, science and technology, international relations and utilization of natural resources. Russia's activities in the World Ocean can considerably affect its competitive power in defense, financial, commercial, scientific and social spheres, since economic activity on the territory of Russia, due to its geographic position and objective natural and climatic factors, with all other conditions equal, calls for significant expenses and investments.

Link – LNG

Russia will fight to protect its monopoly over natural gas – Crimea proves

Sharpe 14

(Eric, April 25, 2014, “How To Stop Russian Aggression in Ukraine” <http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/833-how-to-stop-russian-aggression-in-ukraine>)

Russian aggression in the Ukraine’s Crimea region appears to be a repeat of bad behavior. But the implications for the United States are far different than past episodes of the Russian military bullying its neighbors. This time it’s different. This time it’s about power—not ideological but energy—and natural gas to be specific. Russian efforts at muscling Ukraine is designed to ensure Russia’s natural gas empire flows freely via Russia’s state owned powerhouse Gazprom—the world’s largest natural gas producer and fourth largest energy company on the planet. Protecting its estimated \$360 billion in assets is just part one of the goal in Russia’s attempts to control Ukraine. The other goal: expanding its related assets to the trillion dollar valuation that Russian leader Vladimir Putin promised in 2009. Military and political control is certainly part of the goal as well, but the mainstream media appears to view Russian military and political control as the single driver of the Russian invasion of Crimea—a vital strategic marker in the Black Sea. But make no mistake, Russian military action is about natural gas. Sabre rattling by American politicians means little to Russia. However, calls to begin widespread U.S. exports of natural gas to Europe to offset Russia’s stranglehold on regional natural gas assets carries significant meaning for both Russia and American natural gas producers.

US LNG exports crowds out Russia’s

WashPost 14

(March 22, 2014, “Using U.S. natural gas as an energy wedge against Russia” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/using-us-natural-gas-as-an-energy-wedge-against-russia/2014/03/22/634ae586-b13b-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a48b_story.html)

For years, Mr. Putin has used his nation’s wealth of oil and natural gas as a cudgel to bully his neighbors. At present, the European Union’s large imports of Russian natural gas discourage a forceful Western response to Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the United States is tapping massive reserves of unconventional natural gas. That has not only made the U.S. self-sustaining in gas, but also driven down the price of U.S. gas to a point well below what Europeans are paying for the Russian stuff. If the federal government allowed more of it to be liquefied and exported, would the Russians lose a share of the European market? The story is more complicated than that. Russian gas, which doesn’t need to be liquefied to move (by pipeline) into the European market, would enjoy significant price advantages over imported U.S. gas. The interaction of private buyers and sellers would probably direct U.S. exports to places where gas is more profitable to sell, such as Japan and Korea. The result would be a bounty for the U.S. economy and an improved American trade deficit — but not much direct displacement of Russian gas in Europe. But that’s also not the end of the story. The U.S. entry into the Asian market would diminish Russia’s opportunity to profit there, as it aims to do. Contributing to an already widening and more diverse global supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) would also give European importers more flexibility in sourcing their fuel — from the United States, Qatar, or others — the sort of market conditions that have already enabled Europeans to renegotiate gas contracts with Russia. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Michael Levi points out that Mr. Putin might end up with an uncomfortable choice between maintaining market share in Europe and slashing his prices more. Ramping up U.S. exports would take years, but the effects would not only be long-term, as some critics charge. Action that communicates a certain intent to allow more LNG exports would send a signal that “the U.S. is open for business,” as the Eurasia Group’s Leslie Palti-Guzman puts it. That could deter Mr. Putin from playing the energy card and help many buyers in negotiating long-term contracts.

Russia is uniquely threatened by US LNG Exports

Choi and Robertson 13 *Tom, Natural Gas Market Leader @ Deloitte MarketPoint **Peter, Independent Senior Advisor, Oil & Gas @ Deloitte

("Exporting the American Renaissance Global impacts of LNG exports from the United States" http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/us_er_GlobalImpactUSLNGExports_AmericanRenaissance_Jan2013.pdf)

Gas exporting countries could suffer a decline in trade revenue due to price erosion and/or supply displacement. Entry of new supply clearly benefits consumers, but negatively impacts suppliers through price reductions and/or direct displacement of their export volumes. Even if gas supply in a region is not directly displaced by U.S. LNG exports, its producers might suffer decline in revenues due to lower prices affecting the region. Furthermore, gas exporting countries could face increased pressure to adopt market-based gas prices in lieu of oil-indexed prices. As the world's largest gas exporter by both volume and revenue and a high cost gas provider into Europe, Russia appears to be particularly vulnerable, especially if U.S. LNG exports are sent to Europe.

U.S. LNG exports decimates Russian natural gas prices

Choi and Robertson 13 *Tom, Natural Gas Market Leader @ Deloitte MarketPoint **Peter, Independent Senior Advisor, Oil & Gas @ Deloitte

("Exporting the American Renaissance Global impacts of LNG exports from the United States" http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/us_er_GlobalImpactUSLNGExports_AmericanRenaissance_Jan2013.pdf)

Russia, the leading gas exporter to Europe, appears to be especially hard hit by U.S. LNG exports. Because of its huge volumes of gas exports, primarily to Europe, and their high cost to markets, Russia is vulnerable to supply competition. In Figure 3.4, Russian supplies are estimated to be the high-cost source into European markets and therefore Russian contract supplies above the minimum-take volumes would be the first to be displaced by incremental lower cost supply. With current slack European demand, there is already some displacement of Russian imports, as flexible volumes indexed to oil price have not been utilized by European buyers. U.S. LNG exports to Europe are projected to obviate the need for Russian and some other oil-indexed flexible supplies. Maintaining market share and oil-indexed prices are major concerns for Russia. Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves and was the largest producer until the U.S. overtook it in 2011 with the growth in U.S. shale gas production. Gas export is vital to the Russian economy, contributing about \$64 billion in revenues in 2011. 7 Russia has jealously guarded its European market share through control of its pipeline transit capacities. By restricting access to its transit pipelines, Russia is able to prevent supplies from other countries, such as Turkmenistan which holds an estimated 500 Tcf of proved reserves, from reaching lucrative European markets and competing with Russian supplies. The strategy was working well until several years ago when economic recession caused European gas demand to stagnate and at the same time more LNG supplies, particularly from Qatar, became available. Qatar had increased its LNG liquefaction capacity in anticipation of exports to the U.S., but its plans were stymied by U.S. shale gas production which eliminated the need for imports. As a consequence, European prices fell and Russians were pressured to offer more competitive prices than the contractual oil-indexed prices. During the past year, several European companies successfully renegotiated their contracts and extracted discounts from Russia. U.S. LNG exports will likely apply greater pressure on Russia and other gas exporters to transition to competitively set prices. Based on WGM projections using the two market scenarios,

Russian revenues from exports to Europe are estimated to be significantly impacted by U.S. LNG exports, which will both displace some amount of Russian exports to Europe and reduce the price Russians receive in Europe.

The table in Figure 3.5 shows the projected impact of U.S. LNG exports on Russian revenues (in 2012 U.S. dollars) from exports to Europe. Of course, the impact is higher when U.S. LNG exports are sent to Europe instead of Asia since there is direct competition with Russian supply and greater European price impact. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the impact is higher under the Competitive Response case than in the BAU scenario. The reason is that under the BAU scenario, in which Russia and other major current gas exporters adhere to oil-price indexation, Russian exports to Europe are reduced down to the minimum take volumes as competitively priced supplies displace the oil-indexed flexible volumes. Hence, U.S. LNG exports have little impact on Russian volumes and most of the impact is through lower prices it receives in European markets for their exports. In the Competitive Response scenario, Russia is assumed to price more of its supplies on a competitive basis and therefore more Russian volumes are

exported to Europe than under the BAU market scenario. With U.S. LNG exports, some of these non-minimum take volumes are displaced. Therefore, Russia is hit by both loss of volume and erosion of price under the Competitive Response scenario. These scenarios indicate that U.S. LNG exports may lead Russia to price its supplies on a competitive basis or be relegated to just selling its minimum take contracted volumes

Link- Oil/Gas Exploration

Plan legitimates Russia's land grab in Crimea- justified with the same expansion for resources motive

Broad 5/17

[WILLIAM J. BROAD](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html?_r=0), New York Times, MAY 17, 2014, In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html?_r=0

When Russia seized Crimea in March, it acquired not just the Crimean landmass but also a maritime zone more than three times its size with the rights to underwater resources potentially worth trillions of dollars.

Russia portrayed the takeover as reclamation of its rightful territory, drawing no attention to the [oil](#) and gas rush that had recently been heating up in the Black Sea. But the move also extended Russia's maritime boundaries, quietly giving Russia dominion over vast oil and gas reserves while dealing a crippling blow to [Ukraine's](#) hopes for energy independence.

Russia did so under an international accord that gives nations sovereignty over areas up to 230 miles from their shorelines. It had tried, unsuccessfully, to gain access to energy resources in the same territory in a pact with Ukraine less than two years earlier.

"It's a big deal," said Carol R. Saivetz, a Eurasian expert in the Security Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "It deprives Ukraine of the possibility of developing these resources and gives them to Russia. It makes Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian pressure."

Gilles Lericolais, the director of European and international affairs at France's state oceanographic group, called Russia's annexation of Crimea "so obvious" as a play for offshore riches.

Plan locks in oil arms race with Russia- that escalates Ukraine crisis

Broad 5/17

[WILLIAM J. BROAD](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html?_r=0), New York Times, MAY 17, 2014, In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html?_r=0

Oil analysts said that mounting economic sanctions could slow Russia's exploitation of its Black and Azov Sea annexations by reducing access to Western financing and technology. But they noted that Russia had already taken over the Crimean arm of Ukraine's national gas company, instantly giving Russia exploratory gear on the Black Sea.

"Russia's in a mood to behave aggressively," said Vladimir Socor, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a research group in Washington that follows Eurasian affairs. "It's already seized two drilling rigs."

The global hunt for fossil fuels has increasingly gone offshore, to places like the Atlantic Ocean off Brazil, the Gulf of Mexico and the South China Sea. Hundreds of oil rigs dot the Caspian, a few hundred miles east of the Black Sea.

Nations divide up the world's potentially lucrative waters according to guidelines set forth by the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty.

The agreement lets coastal nations claim what are known as exclusive economic zones that can extend up to 200 nautical miles (or 230 statute miles) from their shores. Inside these zones, countries can explore, exploit, conserve and manage deep natural resources, living and nonliving.

Increased US production lowers the global price of oil

Blackwill and O'Sullivan 14 *Robert, Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations **Meghan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and Director of the Geopolitics of Energy Project at Harvard (March/April 2014, "America's Energy Edge: The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Revolution" Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140750/robert-d-blackwill-and-meghan-l-osullivan/americas-energy-edge>)

The most dramatic possible geopolitical consequence of the North American energy boom is that the increase in U.S. and Canadian oil production could disrupt the global price of oil -- which could fall by 20 percent or more. Today, the price of oil is determined largely by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, which regulates production levels among its member states. When there are unexpected production disruptions, OPEC countries (primarily Saudi Arabia) try to stabilize prices by ramping up their production, which reduces the global amount of spare production capacity. When spare capacity falls below two million barrels per day, the market gets jittery, and oil prices tend to spike upward. When the market sees spare capacity rise above roughly six million barrels a day, prices tend to fall. For the past five years or so, OPEC's members have attempted to balance the need to fill their public coffers with the need to supply enough oil to keep the global economy humming, and they have managed to keep the price of oil at around \$90 to \$110 per barrel. As additional North American oil floods the

market, OPEC's ability to control prices will be challenged. According to projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, between 2012 and 2020, the United States is expected to produce more than three million barrels of new petroleum and other liquid fuels each day, mainly from light tight oil. These new volumes, plus new supplies coming on line from Iraq and elsewhere, could cause a glut in supply, which would push prices down -- especially as global oil demand shrinks due to improved efficiency or slower economic growth. In that event, OPEC could have a hard time maintaining discipline among its members, few of which are willing to curb their oil production in the face of burgeoning social demands and political uncertainty. Persistently lower prices would create short falls in the revenues they need to fund their expenditures.

Link- Drilling

Overreliance on fossil fuels causes major increased risk with Russia

CT '14

Sonja van Renssen, CleanTechnica, 3/27/2014, Ukraine wouldn't be as much a Crisis if Europe had adopted Green Energy Faster, <http://www.juancole.com/2014/03/ukraine-wouldnt-adopted.html>

In contrast to policymakers, many businesses and NGOs are making explicit the connection between climate and energy, and indeed industrial policy, and Ukraine. “The **tense relations with Russia** – the largest importer to the EU of primary energy – should act as a catalyst for progress towards a more consistent and effective approach to Europe's industrial renaissance and energy ambitions,” said Richard Weber, President of Eurochambres, representing chambers of commerce and industry across Europe. A 30% renewables target for Europe for 2030 would cut Europe's reliance on gas imports by almost three times as much as the Commission's proposal for 27%, pointed out the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) – citing the Commission's own figures. “The situation in Crimea is a wake-up call: Europeans rely on the most unstable and volatile parts of the world for energy security. **For each new fossil fuel fired plant we build, we commit to buying the fuel abroad for years to come without security**”

Link – Indian Ocean

Russia wants expand influence in the Indian Ocean – lack of US presence means they'll expand

Mendiola and Saxon 13 *Gustavo, FDI Research analyst **Zamaris, FDI research assistant

(June 28, 2013, "Russia: National Involvement in the Indian Ocean Region" <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/1134-russia-national-involvement-in-the-indian-ocean-region.html#sthash.RabqM1OQ.dpuf>)

Moscow enjoys the good fortune of being one of the world's largest suppliers of hydrocarbons, while simultaneously having an energy supply monopoly over its southern neighbours. Moscow's influence in the capitals of the Central Asian republics is diminishing, however, as they emerge as important energy transit states. With inequities between Russia and Central Asia creating resentment, Moscow will need to be pro-active to ensure success in its long-term objective to expand its sphere of influence. Moscow's influence has been greatly enhanced in recent years by an increase in foreign direct investment and greater global integration. Russia's acceptance into the World Trade Organization in 2012 will allow greater trading opportunities and economic influence, with Moscow becoming more accessible to foreign markets. The flow of capital, and resources like hydrocarbons, play a large part in Russia's capacity to influence the world. Increased foreign investment in Russia could improve its economic influence, allowing it to extend more successfully into the Indian Ocean. A 2009-10 World Economic Forum analysis stated that Russia is lagging behind the other BRICS countries in financial market sophistication. Russia is, however, leading in some areas of international business, including exports of goods and services and net inward flows of foreign direct investment. Russia is relatively well integrated into the world economy, but could improve if higher standard institutions can be developed, with greater corporate transparency and less state manipulation. The desire for self-sufficient export infrastructure and the need for greater national security planning on economic and military issues, have produced different ideas of how to further develop Russia's economy. Moscow has been developing strong economic links with China, based principally on its energy market. This may change as new gas markets in Asia emerge, with energy company Gazprom considering moving its European gas exports to China, thus illustrating the growing relationship between China and Russia, which has been steadily expanding since 1991. The Sino-Russian relationship has further improved over the last decade, as China has become a major global power in its own right. Some divergence in the relationship may occur in the near future, however, as Russia and China become competitors in several fields. Moscow has perceived Chinese actions on energy sales to the Central Asian states, as a means of bypassing competition from Russia and securing its own energy resources. So long as China continues to rise and remains susceptible to threats to its energy security, however, it will rely to a certain extent on Russia. Military Aspects Russia's military capability is perceived to be a key driver behind its objectives in expanding its influence. Coupled with that military capability is Russia's ability to secure its national interests, which, much like other great powers, encompasses relations with its neighbours to a great degree. Moscow views having room to strategically manoeuvre as critical and, in part, this shapes its foreign policy in the Caucasus region, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. US intervention in the affairs of the Middle East during the first decade of the twenty-first century, and an increased presence in East Asia for the foreseeable future, may greatly enhance Russian political influence in what Mackinder referred to as the inner crescent. Russian pre-eminence within the region will have to contend with an expanding Chinese presence, as each vies for influence, with India and the US playing supporting roles based respectively on their capability or interests. Since July 2012, there has been speculation about new Russian overseas naval bases, the first since the collapse of the Soviet Union. One suggestion is that a base will be located in the Seychelles, in the western Indian Ocean. This speculation stemmed from talks between the Russian Deputy Commander of the Main Staff of the Navy, Rear Admiral Vasily Lyashok, and the President of the Seychelles, James Michel. Many Russian naval bases have closed since the early 1990s because of a lack of stable financing. Despite denials from the Defence Ministry, President Putin has, in the past, expressed a desire to increase naval activities and restore Russia's military power. The Indian Ocean has increased in importance in recent years, with its sea lines of communication facing potentially heightened risks of maritime confrontation between India and China, along with other support/client states. The prospect of Russia maintaining a naval base in the Indian Ocean would complicate matters; it would simultaneously be both symbolic and of strategic importance. Further, as part of its emerging role in the Indian Ocean, Russian warships are operating in co-operation with those of other states around the Seychelles and in the Arabian Sea to counter the threat of piracy.

Link- Energy Independence

Energy independence debates are the core of Ukraine policy

CT '14

Sonja van Renssen, CleanTechnica, 3/27/2014, Ukraine wouldn't be as much a Crisis if Europe had adopted Green Energy Faster, <http://www.juancole.com/2014/03/ukraine-wouldnt-adopted.html>

"This is not only a summit about Ukraine," EU council president Herman Van Rompuy told journalists at half past midnight on Thursday 20 March in Brussels. Yet what was originally intended to be a summit where EU leaders agreed the main tenets of a new EU climate and energy policy for 2030 became instead an urgent discussion on what the EU should do about Ukraine and Russia after President Putin's annexation of Crimea. The 2030 debate became an energy security debate, yet diplomats did not look much to the former to deliver on the latter.

"It [the Crimean crisis] will catalyse a much stronger debate on energy independence, security, foreign policy and Europe's strategic relationship with Russia," one EU diplomat said in the run-up to the summit. He did not suggest that the European Commission's 2030 package could be a vehicle for aspects of this debate. Van Rompuy did slightly better on Thursday night, predicting "a strong focus on reducing energy dependence" for Friday morning's discussion on climate and energy proposals that are "also essential".

Link- Cooperative Sovereignty

Any appeasement fails – strength key to deter further Ukraine incursion Fund 2/28/14

John Fund is a national-affairs columnist for National Review Online.

<http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/372274/russian-bear-growling-will-west-appease-or-deter-it-john-fund>

The Russian Bear Is Growling: Will the West Appease or Deter It? By John Fund February 28, 2014 3:51 PM

Comments 256 Print Text Russia is certainly flexing its military muscles. Masked pro-Russian gunmen have seized two airports in Crimea, in the south of Ukraine. They are being protected by Russian military personnel from nearby bases Ukraine has leased to Russia. Jets from Russia's air force are invading Crimean airspace, which has now been shut to commercial traffic. "I can only describe this as a military invasion and occupation," Ukraine's interim interior minister, Arsen Avakov, writes on Facebook. At a minimum, the tactics being used are right out of an old Russian playbook. Russia taunts an adversary, hoping to provoke some verbal or physical response that could justify further "intervention." For the West, the time to deter a further escalation is now. Leading representatives from the European Union, including Poland, should fly into Ukraine immediately and accept an invitation to tour all of the trouble spots and file a report. Among the areas that should be highlighted is the port city of Odessa, a heavily pro-Russian area but one that's Western in its orientation because of its extensive trade ties. Business and political figures from the Odessa area are completely opposed to Russia's machinations and their voices need to be heard. Ukraine is now a test of the West's ability to stand up and deter aggression. If its response is weak, you can bet an emboldened Vladimir Putin will only step up his efforts to destabilize the new Ukrainian government.

Compromise is appeasement – we must stare down Putin to avoid global war Saakashvili 3/6/14

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mikheil-saakashvili-the-west-must-not-appease-putin/2014/03/06/db9e0c82-a4a9-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

Mikheil Saakashvili was president of Georgia from 2004 to 2013. He is a senior statesman at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

There are striking similarities between the early stages of Russian aggression against Georgia and what is happening in Ukraine. Watching recent events and the global response, I keep thinking about history repeating itself — and other instances of aggression in Europe. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany occupied part of neighboring Czechoslovakia under the pretext of protecting ethnic Germans. Today, Russia is claiming to protect ethnic Russians — or people with hastily distributed Russian passports — in Crimea or Georgian territories. In September 1938, when Germany annexed the Sudetenland, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain called the situation "a quarrel in a far-away country, between people of whom we know nothing." Similarly, some today question whether the West should bother about Ukraine, saying Russia

has more at stake than the West. Many in the West are talking about the need to reach some kind of compromise with Russia, an option that smacks of Munich 80 years ago. They claim to be motivated by such common strategic interests as nonproliferation and the fight against terrorism; by the same token, under the guise of needing to contain the Soviet Union and stop the spread of communism, Chamberlain reached a deal with Hitler. Now, of course, we know that all attempts to appease

the Nazis led the big European powers to feed one country after another to Hitler and, ultimately, led to World War II. Such

global catastrophes are what happens when the established international order collapses and rules no longer apply.

Ukraine is just the most vivid recent demonstration. Imagine if Ukraine hadn't given up its considerable nuclear arsenal in the 1990s. To persuade the Ukrainians to do so, the United States and Britain, together with Russia, signed agreements guaranteeing Ukraine's territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine giving its weapons to Russia. And yet, here we are. But then, the European Union and Russia signed an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia in 2008. Russia never complied — something our European guarantors seldom mention. Putin's motivations are similar to those of prewar Germany: He wants to rectify what he sees as unjust treatment and humiliation by Western powers after the Cold War. He is trying to reconquer lost lands and grab natural resources. Little has been said about the offshore oil resources in Abkhazia that the Russian state monopoly Rosneft confiscated in 2009. U.S. companies have invested considerably in shale gas fields off Crimea. But Ukraine's emergence as self-sufficient in energy, and even a major gas exporter to Europe, would be Putin's ultimate nightmare. Putin destabilizes his neighbors in an effort to kill any NATO and E.U. appetite for further expansion. He also sees periodic land grabs as, somehow, the route to his domestic political rejuvenation. There is a logic to his perception of ideological threats: If Ukraine ceased to be a corrupt oligarchy and became a real European democracy, Putin's opponents would see the contrast — and potential benefit to fighting their own

reality. Why should the West care about what happens in Ukraine? We are seeing not just the slicing up of Europe's largest country but also the destruction of post-Cold War order in Europe. This order was based on clear rules that not only protect small countries but also ensure stability and prosperity for the bigger ones, protect minorities and settle conflicts by peaceful mechanisms. Think of the ramifications **if borders across the continent were to revert to ethnic lines**. If there are no longer any rules,

a spiraling cycle of violence and destruction is inevitable. Such an outcome could still be

avoided. The U.S. sanctions announced Thursday are a good first step. They should be implemented immediately, and Europe needs to strengthen its own response. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova should be put on fast-track accession to the European Union and granted membership action plans for NATO to demonstrate that Russia cannot seize its ends through illegal means. We don't need another visionary like Churchill to know what to do next. Today's democracies have enough experience; applied with common sense and a modicum of **courage**, we can avoid the worst.

Link- Any Negotiation With Russia

Must focus on deterrence – all diplomatic gestures fails

Weiss 3/14/14

Andrew S. Weiss, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs on the National Security Council staff from 1998 to 2001

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page7.html#ixzz2x0weUdkL

All roads in the Ukraine crisis lead back to one man: Vladimir **Putin**. Unfortunately, our ability to understand just what is driving him or what he actually wants to achieve is far weaker than it should be. A big part of the problem is that Putin has retreated into a war cabinet that, by design, lacks connectivity to the outside world. Putin is also far more isolated from major foreign counterparts than at any point in his tenure. After nearly 15 years at the helm and lately at the center of the world's attention, Putin sees himself as a giant among weaklings who don't measure up to him and can't compete with him. While attention has focused on Angela Merkel's dogged attempts to broker a solution on Crimea, her relationship with Putin has none of the coziness that other German chancellors enjoyed in the recent past. And it's practically impossible to imagine U.S. President Barack Obama showing Putin the kind of hospitality that George W. Bush did at his Texas ranch and the Bush family compound in Kennebunkport. Where does that leave us? Western leaders from Obama on down have relied on calling Putin at regular intervals in the hope of deescalating the crisis. But at practically every turn, Putin has responded to these entreaties by escalating the situation and demonstrating his knack for throwing Western leaders off-balance. In the absence of meaningful diplomatic channels, Western governments have resorted to a far less effective tool—megaphone diplomacy. Anyone who reads the endless series of press releases issued after presidential-level phone calls, let alone the line in the sand drawn by G-7 heads of state on March 12 about Moscow's possible annexation of Crimea, is struck by two things. First, there is the repetitive tone and the endless articulation of "core principles" (e.g., respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity) that clearly have gone out the window. Then, there is Moscow's public line, which is equally strident in response and suggests that there is practically zero ground for compromise. **The immediate challenge for Western officials is not to spend more time pleading on the phone** with Putin or banging out yet another press statement. Better to **craft a long-term strategy that** reckons with the immense challenge of deterring further overreach or provocative moves by Moscow in eastern Ukraine and beyond; patiently narrows the differences between the United States and Europe on sanctions and other punitive measures; and shores up the rickety interim government in Kyiv.

Beware the bear – empirics proves Russia only pockets concessions

Fund 3/3/14

<http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372352/beware-russian-bear-john-fund>

John Fund is a national-affairs columnist for National Review Online.

So what must the U.S. and the West do now to deter further Russian aggression in Ukraine? Clearly **they** **have an obligation to take some action**. In 1994, the U.S., Great Britain, and Russia guaranteed Ukraine's territorial inviolability in exchange for the new state's agreement to destroy the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union after its breakup. Timothy Snyder, an Eastern Europe scholar and author of *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, urges the West to exploit its soft power. Snyder wrote in this week's *New Republic*: Russian propaganda about depraved Europe conceals an intimate relationship. Tourism in the European Union is a safety valve for a large Russian middle class that takes its cues in fashion and pretty much everything else from European culture. Much of the Russian elite has sent its children to private schools in the European Union or Switzerland. Beyond that, since no Russian of any serious means trusts the Russian financial system, wealthy Russians park their wealth in European banks. In other words, the Russian social order depends upon the Europe that Russian propaganda mocks. And beneath hypocrisy, as usual, lies vulnerability. The U.S. should immediately move to expand its existing Magnitsky Act, which prohibits Russians engaged in illegal activity from entering the U.S. If it were extended to the regulation of bank accounts and property ownership in the U.S., we'd hear howls of outrage from many Russian officials and oligarchs. Senator Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), for one, supports this kind of restriction: "Living in Miami, I have seen in recent years the wave of Russian tourists coming to our city and state to spend money and buy property. Many are government officials or allies whose wealth stems from allegiance to Putin, and we should limit their ability to travel here." Kerry will travel to Kiev on Tuesday for a firsthand look at the crisis. On Sunday, as the *New York Times* reported, he warned that if Russia doesn't curb its territorial appetites, Putin "is not going to have a Sochi G-8," a reference to the meeting of the top world economies that Putin is slated to host in June this year. "He may not even remain in the G-8 if this continues," Kerry continued. After all, Russia's weak and underdeveloped economy was admitted to the G-8 only in 1998 as a gesture of friendship after Russia's devastating currency collapse. **It's time to put signs of friendship on hold,** and if Russian troops advance deeper into Ukraine, it might also be time to reassess Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization. The old adage says, "Fool me once, shame on you – fool me twice, shame on me." The earlier version of the saying, attributed to the most famous clown of

the Elizabethan era, Richard Tarlton, offers further wisdom: For who deceives me once, God forgive him; if twice, God forgive him; but if thrice, God forgive him, but not me, because I could not beware.

The U.S. is now on its third Putin-inspired pratfall, and the routine is getting stale.

The lesson is now clear: Beware the Russian Bear. As Indiana governor Mike Pence, a former member of the House leadership, told me this weekend: “History shows the Russian Bear’s ambitions never die, they just go into hibernation.”

Any negotiation fails – Russia has no respect for rules – pure bareknuckle realism Stephens 3/6/14

Philip Stephens is an English journalist and author.

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2af01996-a47e-11e3-b915-00144feab7de.html#axzz2x01O9LYi>

Yet, even if Europeans were to agree eventually to travel some distance along the sanctions road, piecemeal retaliation is only part of the necessary response to Russia’s territorial grab. The seizure of Crimea – and Mr Putin’s threat of a march into eastern Ukraine –

requires a **fundamental change in mindset.** The so-called reset in western ties with Russia needs to be reset, and the

boundaries of engagement redrawn. The albeit rather threadbare premise behind the west’s approach has hitherto been that Moscow wants to be included, if with some exceptions, in a rules-based order. That, however much he rails against cruel history, Mr Putin wants to remain a member of the club. Hence Russia’s participation in the G8, its “strategic partnership” with the EU, the Nato-

Russia Council in Brussels, membership of the World Trade Organisation and so on. We know now that **this is a charade.** The

march into Ukraine confirmed what should have been recognised some time ago: that Mr Putin’s regime has no respect for international rules and norms. When the game is going against it, its answer is to put tanks on to the chessboard. Rules are for weak westerners, not for resurgent Russia. Mr Putin’s performance since the weekend – one perfectly mimed by Sergei Lavrov, the weather-beaten cold warrior in charge of the foreign ministry – has been almost as illuminating as the invasion itself. There are no Russian troops in Crimea, Moscow insists, even as its forces (albeit without insignia) appear on our television screens seizing Ukrainian military bases. “We have no control over them”, Mr Lavrov declares, without so much as a blink of the columns of heavily armed soldiers. The idea is cynically simple: night can become day and white become black if only you say so often enough. **This is the strategy of a regime that has taken itself out of the international system.** In its own mind Moscow can break any rule it likes and then deny the fact of the transgression.

If Mr Putin can be so dismissive of law and treaties in matters of war and peace, why should he respect any of the other rules of the game? Some wonder whether western governments should boycott the next meeting of the G8 in Sochi. The more apposite question is why on earth they should continue with the pretext that Russia is part of the club. The same can be said of other agreements – on trade, investment and energy – under discussion with Moscow. Why sign accords that one side feels no obligation to respect? Of course, **there will always be business**

to be done with Mr Putin. **Russia is an important power** But the west should shed its illusions in

favour of a **transactional approach.** Interests will sometimes coincide and sometimes collide. There may be bargains to be struck and trade-offs to be made when it suits both sides. **But Europe should not imagine the Kremlin leadership is playing on the same board.** Oddly enough, hard-nosed realpolitik could over time promote a better relationship.

Dip Cap finite

Dip cap is finite – distractions matter

Atal 03

(Subodh, Washington, D.C.-based analyst specializing in South and Central Asian Affairs, September 11, 2003, “The War on Terror: Two Years Hence” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/war-terror-two-years-hence>)

The international consensus on the war on terror has been replaced by acrimony over Iraq, and counter-balancing moves by other nations. Russia continues to support the Iranian nuclear program. With the United States preoccupied in Iraq and burning considerable diplomatic capital in the process, North Korea was free to begin processing nuclear fuel and is now in a much stronger position to negotiate. China’s interests in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula have been overridden by a need to counter regional US influence. India, smarting from American coddling of Pakistani President Musharraf, is making overtures to China and has refused to help in Iraq.¶ The pre-emptive strike concept, theoretically an important tool to deter future attacks on the United States, now stands largely discredited around the world after the wanton exaggeration of the Saddam threat. And with the United States now looked upon as the mediator of first resort, its strategic priorities are threatened by distractions—Liberia being the latest example.

ONLY Military Models Work

Putin's a rational actor, he'll back down

Kuchins 3/3/14

<http://csis.org/publication/us-credibility-stake-ukraine>

Andrew C. Kuchins is a senior fellow and director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. He is an internationally known expert on Russian foreign and domestic policies who publishes widely and is frequently called on by business, government, media, and academic leaders for comment and consulting on Russian and Eurasian affairs. His more recent scholarship has been devoted to issues including U.S.-Russia relations and the "reset," Russia's Asia strategy, and the role of energy in the Russian Far East. His recent publications include "Perspective: What's to Follow the Demise of the US-Russian 'Reset'" (Current History, October 2012); "The End of the 'Reset'" (Foreign Affairs, March 2012); "Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change," coauthored with Igor Zevelev (Washington Quarterly, Winter 2012); "Laying the Groundwork for Afghanistan's New Silk Road" (Foreign Affairs, December 2011); "Putin's Return and Washington's Reset With Russia" (Foreign Affairs, September 2011); "A Durable Reset" (International Herald Tribune, September 2011); "Reset Expectations: Russian Assessments of U.S. Power," in Capacity and Resolve (CSIS, June 2011); The North Caucasus: Russia's Volatile Frontier, coauthored with Sergey Markedonov and Matthew Malarkey (CSIS, March 2011); and Russia after the Global Economic Crisis, coedited with Anders Aslund and Sergei Guriev (Peterson Institute, June 2010). From 2000 to 2006, Kuchins was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he previously served as director of its Russian and Eurasian Program in Washington, D.C., from 2000 to 2003 and again in 2006. He was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center in Russia from 2003 to 2005. He has also held senior management and research positions at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Stanford University, and the University of California at Berkeley. Kuchins currently teaches at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has also taught at Georgetown and Stanford Universities. He holds a B.A. from Amherst College and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins SAIS.

Directly confronting Putin would not be as risky as many fear – Putin is, after all, a calculating opportunist who will take advantage of weakness where he sees it. He is extremely unlikely, therefore, to risk war if he clearly understands the "cost" of crossing a real red line. The question is whether he has any belief that the United States and its allies will step up. I hope, for the sake of Europe's security, that President Obama proves him wrong.

Putin's a pure realist – ONLY FORCE

Rumer 3/14/14

Eugene Rumer, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council from 2010 to 2014.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page6.html#ixzz2x0uQNBWU

The Ukraine crisis is only the latest episode that sheds light on the hard, unsentimental view of the world underlying Vladimir Putin's foreign policy: **might is right, the weak get crushed**. That was Russia's fate in the 1990s, when the West pushed deep into Russia's former empire, waged wars in the Balkans and interfered in Russian domestic affairs. Then Russia recovered, pushed back and restored balance to its relations with the West. The Georgia war was a signal to the West to keep out of Russia's sphere of influence, and to its neighbors to remember that Russia again had the means and the will to patrol its neighborhood.

Putin's view of Ukraine is apparently similar to Zbigniew Brzezinski's argument that, without Ukraine, Russia cannot be an empire. What Brzezinski wants to prevent, Putin seems determined to achieve. He is prepared to pay the price of keeping Ukraine in Russia's orbit. **Putin the realist** almost certainly is aware of the toll his actions have taken on Ukrainian attitudes toward him and Russia. But tethering Ukraine to Russia is more important than Ukrainian public opinion. **Putin has**

probably calculated that the West's military option is off the table, that its sanctions will be more bark than bite, and that after a cooling-off period **there will be a new "reset."** He is poised to annex Crimea, and, with that new reality in hand, he will look for an opening in Kyiv. After all, much of the new team there looks like the old team, and Putin probably thinks he can find a common language with them just fine. How successful will he be?

Puton's primary orientation is realism

De Waal 3/14/14

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page4.html#UzHz-IWTIac

Thomas de Waal, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has reported from across Russia and the Caucasus.

I believe Vladimir Putin's motto is extreme self-reliance—that you can trust no one but yourself and a few people close to you. He served a state, the Soviet Union, that came crashing down round his ears, but managed to pick himself up. He served a president, Boris Yeltsin, whose wayward behavior, he believes, almost destroyed Russia a second time. He believed that the economic successes and stabilization of his early years in power had a lot to do with himself personally. He gets angry when the power vertical in Russia does not deliver the results he wants—and it rarely does. He believes that the whole world lives by varying degrees of “double standards” **and that talk of “values” is just a smokescreen for asserting realpolitik interests**

by other means. He despises almost every other foreign head of state, though perhaps he has a grudging respect for Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan. Like too many Russian leaders, he finds himself surrounded by courtiers who want to give him only good news. That makes him lonely. He was not formerly an ideas man, but now, after 14 years at the top, he is looking for ideas that will crown his legacy. Finally, like many other leaders in Russia, and not only in Russia, he spends too much of his time tending and repairing an inherently unstable political system. He does not know how it is going to end, but he knows he needs some base of public support to keep it going. Putin's triumphalism in Ukraine hides a deep pessimism. He believes he has found a smart move in Crimea in the middle of a losing game. He will look for other moves, but may not find them.

Deterrence Key

Firm deterrence key to check further Russian aggression

Holmes 3/6/14

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/is-ukraine-a-watershed>

Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the think tank's defense and foreign policy team for more than two decades.

Holmes was Heritage's vice president for foreign and defense policy studies and director of the Davis Institute for International Studies from 1991 through 2012 except for his service, during most of the first term of President George W. Bush, as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. Holmes' priority is writing a book, due in fall 2013, in which he hopes to lay out a compelling vision for America's future by uniting Heritage's domestic and foreign policy ideas. "Few people bring greater clarity and historical wisdom to thorny issues than Kim Holmes," Heritage President Edwin J. Feulner said in announcing the new role on Dec. 5, 2012. Holmes previously directed Heritage's team of foreign and defense policy experts in four centers on the front lines of international affairs: the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Asian Studies Center, the Center for International Trade and Economics and the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Davis also includes the Washington Roundtable for the Asia-Pacific Press (WRAPP). Holmes joined Heritage in 1985 and rose to vice president in 1991. He was a founding editor of the annual Index of Economic Freedom, which has become a signature Heritage publication. He led the think tank's efforts to convince the United States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He launched Heritage's widely respected homeland security program after September 11, as well as its program on international trade, and expanded the missile defense program to what it is today. Holmes left Heritage in late 2001 to serve as an assistant secretary of state. After rejoining the think tank in 2005, he authored the book "Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century." Recognized around the globe as one of Washington's foremost foreign and defense policy experts, Holmes is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the Washington Advisory Committee. Previous appointments include the Defense Policy Board, which is the U.S. defense secretary's primary resource for expert outside advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for International Private Enterprise; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Important goals achieved at that time included the U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to make the transition to democracy; the Security Council's first binding nonproliferation resolution; the U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office of Internal Oversight Services to release reports to member states; an international outcry over Libya's assuming chairmanship of the Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's refashioning; and establishment of the U.N. Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral and master's degrees in history from Georgetown University. He received a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Central Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for European History in Germany and adjunct professor of European security and history at Georgetown University. His other published works include Defending the American Homeland, a post 9-11 task force report; Defending America: A Near and Long Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses; and Restoring American Leadership: A U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Blueprint. His scholarly articles have appeared in such journals as National Interest, Journal of American Studies, Harvard University's International Security, and Columbia University's Journal of International Affairs. His opinion articles, commentaries and other publications may be found below.

What would a different course look like? What if the Administration learned the right lesson from Ukraine? The first obvious sign would be to **hold firm in Ukraine**. There is a good chance that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, will offer some face-saving device for Putin. There is already talk of holding back on sanctions and settling for sending in some monitors to prove that Putin's charges of fascism and thuggery are false. In other words, the West is already showing signs of defensiveness. The U.S. should continue threatening sanctions, particularly against individuals involved in military actions against Ukraine, and it should work with Europe to provide an economic aid package to Ukraine conditioned on real economic reforms. The U.S. should take a hard look at pulling out of the New START treaty and publicizing more Russia's violations of the INF Treaty. And it should step up NATO plans for reassuring the Baltic States, particularly Latvia, so it is absolutely clear that trying to apply Putin's logic of aiding ethnic Russians will not fly against NATO members. In the long run, however, the most important thing the United States can do is to signal that the retrenchment of American power is over. This means two things: We would have to accept (1) that in fact power rivalries remain, with Russia and China and even Iran, and the Administration's view that somehow history has left all that behind is—well—a fundamental misreading of history and (2) that the drawdown of America's armed forces has gone too far and it's time to reverse course. Time to "Face the World as It Is" The purpose of the balance of power, regardless of the time or the circumstances, is peace, not war. The strategic goal of deterrence is to avoid having to use force, not to go to war. The point of strength is to avoid crises like the one in Ukraine, not to fight Russia after the fact. History shows time and time again that weakness invites aggression, but for some reason, we have to relearn that lesson over and over again. We simply have got to better understand the psychology of the balance of power, or we will be condemned to finding ourselves and our friends pushed back from influence in world affairs. To do this, though, we need to stop thinking of military power as a metaphor for military intervention. Talking tough is immediately seen as tantamount to a declaration of war. That was not how military strength was seen by Ronald Reagan. He actually used force very little, but he understood the deterrent power of a large military force very well. Today, much of that wisdom is lost, partly because of the legacies of the Iraq and Afghan wars and partly because a lot of people would rather spend money on health care subsidies than tanks and airplanes.

AT “N/U - Ukraine is lost”

Even if Crimea’s lost, resolve can deter further incursion

Kaplan 3/19/14

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/03/vladimir_putin_s_ukraine_invasion_how_to_stop_the_russian_president_t_hrough.html

Fred M. Kaplan is an author and journalist who most frequently contributes to Slate magazine. His "War Stories" column for Slate covers international relations and U.S. foreign policy

Is the crisis in Ukraine almost over or just beginning? **The answer depends on what** Vladimir Putin really wants and what **the West does next.** Did Putin want nothing more than to seize Crimea, to turn Russia’s control of the republic from de facto to de jure—**or does he want to creep deeper** into southern and eastern Ukraine on the pretext of “fraternal assistance” to ethnic Russians? Either way, two things should be understood. First, Putin’s actions have been driven less by a belief that the West is weak than his knowledge that Russia is. Second, he dreams of restoring Russia’s empire—his March 18 Kremlin speech is, at heart, a cry of resentment against the West for its humiliation of his country during the early years after the Soviet Union’s collapse. A bitter autocrat with a head full of grandiose daydreams can be a dangerous creature. This crisis began, after all, when Putin took notice that Ukraine—which he and every other Russian leader in history have regarded as deeply tied to Russia—was drifting into the West’s orbit. Then-President Viktor Yanukovich had taken steps toward an affiliation with the European Union. Putin feared, correctly, that this development could wreck his plans for a “Eurasian Union” (which he saw as the basis for a revived Russian empire), and so he offered Yanukovich \$15 billion in exchange for backing out of the Western league. Yanukovich took the bribe. Demonstrations broke out in Kiev, prompting crackdowns, prompting a widening of the protests ... and the rest, we all know. Lawrence Freedman, the pre-eminent scholar of strategy, has a long blog post in Wednesday’s War on the Rocks, noting that the “basic challenge of crisis management is to protect core interests while avoiding major war.” Part of this challenge, he adds, involves “a sense of knowing when to exercise restraints and respect limits,” as well as “a grasp of what the adversary needs to enable it to de-escalate or at least to desist from further escalation.” The first step to take in following this idea—a step that many pundits and politicians have skipped—is to define what our “core interests” are. Crimea is not a core interest to the United States or the West; it is a core interest to Russia. Cold as it may seem to say, **Crimea is gone**; there’s nothing we can do to get it back, and we—however you define “we”—never really had it to begin with. However, the forcible annexation of Crimea did violate international law. Specifically, it broke the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, which—while it didn’t have the binding effect of the North Atlantic Treaty that established NATO—did offer Ukraine security assurances in exchange for giving up the 2,000 nuclear weapons left in its territory as a remnant of Soviet days. So, yes, it’s worth getting upset about the seizure of Crimea. The things that President Obama and the European Union have done—relatively mild sanctions, the exclusion of Russia from an upcoming G-7 (formerly G-8) meeting, the shoring up of defenses in Poland and the Baltic nations, and presumably more actions of this sort to come—are proportional steps worth taking. But no one should suffer the illusion that any of this will prod Putin to send the troops in Crimea home (most of them were already stationed there) or give the land back to Ukraine. To pretend that it might—as some of Obama’s rhetoric about “costs” and “consequences” has implied—works only to Putin’s benefit; it makes him seem stronger (he’s withstood the American sanctions!) than he really is. **However,** if Putin starts moving troops into southern and eastern Ukraine, the story changes. It doesn’t change quite so drastically as some contend. Ukraine, after all, is not a member of NATO, and for good reason. (During George W. Bush’s presidency, there was talk of fast-tracking Ukraine for NATO membership, but it turned out few Ukrainians wanted to join, and few NATO allies valued Ukraine enough to go to war in the event of an attack.) Still, if Putin did make further incursions, it would be a sign that he was acting on **his dreams of** **revivified empire**, trying to make them come true. And in that, **he must be resisted,** not just for the sake of Ukraine but **for the stability of Europe** and the preservation of what little orderliness there is in the world today. For if Russia can get away with chopping up Ukraine, in the heart of what was once hoped to be a united Europe, then other leaders who crave neighbors’ land might be emboldened to act on their dreams, too. And in any case, American warnings—perhaps the deterrent power of the U.S. military generally—would lose all potency. And so the main goal of the United States, the EU, and NATO should be to deter and dissuade Putin from moving his troops deeper into Ukraine. There are two ways to do this, seemingly contradictory but actually (if well-managed) complementary. First, ratchet up the penalties. Second, leave room for diplomacy. The penalties should include—right now—stepping up military deployments to the NATO allies, especially to Poland and the Baltic nations, which were once tied to the Soviet Union. Another: Draw up plans for containing and countering Russian troops in the event of an incursion into Ukraine—not sending U.S. or NATO troops, but shipping arms, maybe some advisers and black-bag Delta forces—and talk about these plans with the allies, and Ukrainian officials, on open phone lines. Putin surely knows the limits of his army. The ground forces in that sector of Russia could invade Ukraine, but they lack the resources and logistical lines to sustain an occupation for very long, especially in the event of even slight resistance. We have to make him realize we know these limitations, too.

Ukraine incursions can still be solved

Ignatius 3/20/14

David R. Ignatius, is an American journalist and novelist. He is an associate editor and columnist for The Washington Post. He also co-hosts PostGlobal, an online discussion of international issues at Washingtonpost.com, with Fareed Zakaria.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-americas-challenge-in-ukraine/2014/03/20/8812b15c-b05d-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a48b_story.html

Honest students of history should admit that the United States, like Russia, has embraced a “sphere of influence” near its borders, as expressed by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 . Two modern examples of intervention in our region are the U.S. invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. So while we assert the illegality of Russia’s recent actions, we should understand that they are not unique — and may be remediable.

AT “putin will stop”

Putin doesn't realize his miscalculation, making war possible

Motyl 3/1/14

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/01/putin_russia_ukraine_intervention_war

Alexander John Motyl is a Ukrainian-American political scientist, writer, artist-painter, and poet.

Alexander John Motyl (born October 21, 1953 in New York City) is a professor, writer, and fine artist living in New York City. He studied at Columbia University, graduating with a BA in History in 1975 and a Ph.D. in Political Science in 1984. Motyl has taught at Columbia University, Lehigh University, and Harvard University and is currently professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.[1]

If one considers Russia's interests, **none of this** -- the armed intervention in Crimea, the claimed right to intervene anywhere

in Ukraine -- **makes sense**. Putin's arguments simply do not hold water. As objective observers will confirm, there is absolutely no threat to Russian citizens anywhere in Ukraine. There may have been a diminution of overall law and order following the collapse of Viktor Yanukovich's regime, but that affects all Ukrainian residents equally. Nor is the Kremlin's claim that putative "fascists" from Western Ukraine are about to descend on Crimea and the southeast even remotely true. By the same token, intervention, war, international isolation, and the like will not enhance Russians' living standards or their sense of well-being. There may be a temporary spurt of excitement at seeing the Russian tricolor hoisted in Donetsk, but that enthusiasm will quickly fade when Russians realize that these regions will impose an enormous economic liability. And, finally, there is no way that a truncated Ukraine's transformation into a hostile anti-Russian state and a permanent occupation by Russian troops of potentially rebellious provinces -- after all, there are also large numbers of pro-Western Ukrainians in the southeast -- could possibly serve Russia's interests. There is only one reason Putin has embarked on what Russian democratic opposition leader Boris Nemtsov calls "folly": flexing his military muscle enhances Putin's authority as a strongman who will reestablish Russia's grandeur and brook no people-power in former Soviet states. Putin's incursion suggests that he must fear Ukraine -- so much so that he is willing to risk Russia's prosperity and stability. Putin the rational Bismarckian geostrategist has clearly given way to

Putin the **irrational and impulsive** leader -- possibly as a result of the triumph of the democratic revolution in Ukraine. This may be the only ray of light in an otherwise catastrophic picture. Bad leaders make bad mistakes and, when they do, their power often disintegrates. Unfortunately, thousands of Ukrainians and Russians may have to die before that happens.

Perception Key

Perception key – makes now a WINDOW of crisis

Friedman 3/19/14

<http://warontherocks.com/2014/03/ukraine-and-the-art-of-crisis-management/>

Lawrence Freedman has been Professor of War Studies at King's College London since 1982. His most recent book is *Strategy: A History* (OUP, 2013).

For the same reason the political economy of Ukraine is at the heart of this dispute. This is an area where the West has levers which it can deploy, to enable Kiev to address its major problems of debt, corruption, good governance and economic reform.

Words matter. It is easy to dismiss talking shops when tough actions are being taken on the ground. **During crises** government statements and the speeches of leaders are studied far more intensively than at other times, precisely because there is an intense interest in what is being said as the main source of evidence about current concerns and future intentions. It is through words that crises are framed and their salient points identified. The inability of Russia to construct a case that gained any support in the UN was undoubtedly a blow and left it on the defensive internationally.

In the internet age, when news comes quickly through from many sources on the front-line and is rapidly transmitted, governments will struggle to control a poorly constructed story. Fabricated claims can catch out governments when they start unravelling as they are checked by those on the ground. This is a hard factor to measure, but one indicator of its impact may be Putin's determination to eliminate independent media outlets within Russia, another disturbing consequence of this crisis.

I suggested earlier that certain lessons had emerged out of the Cold War for crisis management: clarity over core interests; a sense of both the possibilities and limits of coercive instruments, including where the actual use of armed force might be appropriate; control over armed forces to prevent inadvertent or deliberate military escalation; sustained communications with the adversary; a grasp of what the adversary needs to enable it to de-escalate, or at least to desist from further escalation. These remain relevant. Writing this during the first month of what could be a prolonged period of tension provides a reminder of those areas of interest and intention that remain uncertain, and the difficulties of shaping policies in national capitals and in multi-national settings when events are still unfolding. These dangers and uncertainties have led some to talk of a new Cold War.

SMALL signals matter – link threshold is low

Dovere 3/3/14

<http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/barack-obama-ukraine-crimea-russia-104203.html#ixzz2wdk7y0yj>

Edward-Isaac Dovere is a senior White House reporter. Before coming to POLITICO in April 2011, Dovere was the founding editor and lead writer of City Hall and The Capitol, where his coverage of New York City and state politics was recognized by the New York Press Association, the New York Press Club, the Daniel Pearl Award for investigative journalism. At POLITICO, he oversaw the day to day coverage of the Republican presidential primary campaign before joining the White House team for the 2012 campaign coverage. A native New Yorker, he graduated from Johns Hopkins before he had a driver's license, and from an MA program at the University of Chicago before he learned how to ride a bike.

Even **small developments** like that matter in Moscow, where the Russian leader **is gauging his next move** based on what kind of international response he thinks he's likely to get. "Putin is a power player. If he sees power and things not going his way, he moves," Richardson said. "He caves when he knows he's on the losing end." But Putin also knows there's nothing that plays better in Russian domestic politics than precisely the kind of butting of heads that Obama is trying to organize. "A domestic conflict in Ukraine became yet another instance of an alleged plot of Russia's enemies against it," said Leon Aron, a Russia scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, "once this was framed as a contest between Russia and the West."

Perception key – a2 “plan doesn’t affect ukr”

This is a LINK – SIGNALS of weakness but the REALITY of strength worst odds of conflict

Levy 3/26/14

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/26/ukraine_tip_balance_mired_transatlantic_trade_deal

Phil Levy is senior fellow on the global economy at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Previously he was associate professor of business administration

As to whether national measures such as the recent U.S. sanctions will suffice, this depends in large part on what objective they are meant to achieve. The broader strategy has not been clear. If the goal is to prompt a Russian withdrawal from Crimea, they almost certainly will not suffice. If the goal is to show Russia that its actions will be costly, they might. The latest estimates are that Russia is suffering significant capital flight. Investors are likely afraid of an escalation. If harsher measures do not follow, it is unclear whether this cost to Russia will persist. Putin surely recalls the way the Georgia invasion led to few lasting consequences. The fourth point is, perhaps, the most disturbing.

Ideally, in this sort of contest, the West would like to exaggerate its resolve early as a means of deterring Russia. The outcome in which the West appears weak and divided, but really intends to fight hard, is one with the highest odds of ending up in dangerous and avoidable conflict.

Ukraine Timeframe

Resolve window is now – Russian troops are massing at the border

Gardiner 3/8/14

<http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/3/the-crisis-in-ukraine-america-can-be-deferential-no-more>

Nile Gardiner is Director of The Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. His key areas of specialization include: the Anglo-American “special relationship,” the United Nations, post-war Iraq , and the role of Great Britain and Europe in the U.S.-led alliance against international terrorism and “rogue states,” including Iran . He was recently named one of the 50 most influential Britons in the United States by the London Daily Telegraph . As a leading authority on transatlantic relations, Gardiner has advised the executive branch of the U.S. government on a range of key issues, from the role of international allies in post-war Iraq , to U.S.-British leadership in the War on Terrorism. His policy papers are read widely on Capitol Hill, where he is regularly sought after for advice on major foreign policy matters.

The Kremlin has also successfully enticed the United States to enter into futile, direct negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. This buys the mullahs valuable time to advance their nuclear ambitions while building their long-range missile capability. And now Mr. Putin is massing his forces on the border of Ukraine, threatening the new government in Kiev, convinced that the free world is too weak to stand in his way. Thousands of his soldiers are already on the ground inside the Crimea, a de facto

occupying army, hiding under the guise of pro-Russian “self-defense” forces. In many respects **this is a defining moment for**

the free world in the 21st century and for American leadership in particular. There are those who say this isn't the West's fight, that we have no vital interests at stake. They are wrong. Ukraine is at the heart of Europe, bordering four NATO member states. Its 50 million inhabitants share an aspiration to be part of the West. Allowing Russian tanks to roll into the Crimea with impunity will set an extremely dangerous precedent. Moscow will feel emboldened to enter into other parts of its “near abroad,” intervening under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. The Baltic States, with their large Russian-speaking minorities, could be next. This is no time for a deer-in-the-headlights response from the White House. The world's superpower must do all it can to warn Russia against an invasion of Ukraine, while bolstering NATO allies in the region.

Ukraine Brink

Russia's stop but teetering on edge of full Ukraine invasion

News.com.au 3/4/14

<http://www.news.com.au/world/europe/what-happens-next-in-ukraine-four-scenarios-experts-say-could-happen-next-as-crisis-escalates/story-fnh81p7g-1226844023987>

The conflict is on **a knife edge**. The deployment of Russian troops in Crimea has **not yet** led to bloodshed. But if that **widens** into a **Russian military intervention** into other parts of Ukraine, it is hard to see how violent clashes could be avoided. In other southern and eastern towns pro-Russian protesters have already called for Russian intervention, writes Alexander Motyl from ForeignPolicy.com : Adding fuel to the fire is the fact that pro-Russian forces have seized administrative buildings and called for Russian assistance in a variety of Ukraine's southern and eastern provinces: Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk.. Both Moscow and Kiev know that Russia's military is superior to Ukraine's. Russian armed forces number about 750,000 troops; Ukraine's about 150,000. Russia has been aggressively spending on its military in the last decade, while Ukraine has actually been cutting back. In any armed conflict, Russia would win.

Nagorno-Karabakh spillover

Spills over to Nagorno-Karabakh

De Waal 3/26/14

De Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, specializing primarily in the South Caucasus region comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and their breakaway territories as well as the wider Black Sea region.

The repercussions of the Russian takeover of Crimea continue to cascade across the post-Soviet space. President Vladimir Putin's move has re-opened the Pandora's Box of sovereignty disputes that spread conflict across the region in the 1990s. In the Caucasus, the protagonists are now re-assessing what this means for the unresolved conflicts of that era. The spokesman for the president of Abkhazia has said that there is no question of joining the Russian Federation. Others in Abkhazia—specifically Russians and some Armenians—may disagree. It is not a good moment to stir up Nagorny Karabakh, the oldest and biggest of the conflicts. The spring thaw in the mountains often causes breaches in the ceasefire—and, sad to say, two Armenian soldiers have been reported killed in the past week.

Global War

World war III – military simulations prove

Chossudovsky 3/12/14

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-the-worst-case-scenario-is-world-war-iii/5373075>

Michel Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the University of Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal and Editor of the [globalresearch.ca](http://www.globalresearch.ca) website. He is the author of *The Globalization of Poverty and The New World Order* (2003) and *America's "War on Terrorism"* (2005). His most recent book is entitled *Towards a World War III Scenario: The Dangers of Nuclear War* (2011). He is also a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His writings have been published in more than twenty languages. He can be reached at crgeditor@yahoo.com

Ukraine: The Worst Case Scenario is World War III

We are at a very **dangerous crossroads**. We are observing the confrontation between the two major nuclear powers, namely the US and Russia. **The worst case scenario is World War III.** I'm not suggesting that it is going to occur, but I should also mention, having reviewed military documents over the last 10 years, that WWIII, from the point of view of US military planners – Pentagon and NATO – is not an abstract concept. They have been involved in various exercises with the so-called **WWIII scenarios**. One of these famous exercises was called TIRANNT, which stands for Theater Iran Near Term. That's when Iran was the object of military threats from the West. But in fact, this particular WWIII scenario involved several countries, including Russia, China and Iran, and North Korea. These were the stated enemies of the Western military alliance. That particular WWIII scenario was leaked to the Washington Post. It is well-documented and it is a very detailed simulation of different actions and failures of diplomacy leading up to a WWIII scenario. So, let's be under no illusions –

the weapons systems are devastating, the decision-making processes are very complex and errors and misjudgments can take place.

World war III and depression

Von Greyerz 3/8/14

http://kingworldnews.com/kingworldnews/KWN_DailyWeb/Entries/2014/3/8_The_Ukraine_Crisis_%26_A_Terrifying_Global_Economic_Melt_down.html

ounder and Managing Partner of Matterhorn Asset Management AG (MAM) and GoldSwitzerland based in Zurich, Switzerland. EvG forecasted the current present problems in the world economy well over 10 years ago. In 2002 when gold was \$300 per ounce, MAM recommended to its investors to put 50% of their investment assets into physical gold stored outside the banking system. Egon von Greyerz started his working life in Geneva as a banker and thereafter spent 17 years as Finance Director and Executive Vice-Chairman of a FTSE 100 company in the UK, Dixons Group Plc. Since the 1990s EvG has been actively involved with financial investment activities including Mergers and Acquisitions and Asset allocation consultancy for private family funds. This led to the creation of Matterhorn Asset Management in 1998, an asset management company based on wealth preservation principles. The GoldSwitzerland Division was created to facilitate the buying and storage of physical gold and silver for private investors, companies, trusts and pension funds. EvG makes regular media appearances such as on, CNBC, BBC and King World News and speaks at investment conferences around the world. He also publishes articles on precious metals, the world economy and wealth preservation.

We have also discussed the potential catalysts around the world that could trigger the world falling into the **black hole.** These can be economic events such as Japan defaulting, or it could a collapse of the dollar. It could also be geopolitical like the Middle East. Each one of those risks can create a major disaster. But we also have the possibility of black swan events. These are events that very few people can forecast, and **Ukraine is such an event.** Very few people thought the problems in **Ukraine could be the trigger for the collapse of the world economy** but we have to remember that any of these events are just catalysts. The world is bankrupt economically, financially, and morally. And **if Ukraine now will be the trigger for the inevitable economic collapse**, it's also possible that **it will be the beginning of World War III** as Paul Craig Roberts has indicated. Ukraine is an important pawn for both Russia and the West, which is led by the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has a strong hand with almost 40 percent of Europe's gas requirement going through Ukrainian pipelines from Russia. But

Ukraine is bankrupt and needs money either from Russia or the West. The \$1 billion the U.S. has offered would pay only half of Ukraine's debt to Russian giant Gazprom. And I'm sure the U.S. does not want to pay \$1 billion to Putin. This crisis will have a major impact on both the Ukrainian and Russian economies. Ukrainian bonds are collapsing and interest rates are up to 47 percent now, from 10 percent in January, and the currency is falling fast. The same thing is happening in Russia, with the ruble down 10 percent this year and the stock market falling. The Russian central bank had to raise interest rates from 5.5 percent to 7 percent in order to stabilize markets. But in spite of economic problems, I doubt that Putin is going to give in on Ukraine. And for Obama, a war would be a good solution to the U.S. economic pressure. So with this potential black swan event in Ukraine, the risks are extremely high and the consequences could be devastating. But whether Ukraine is the catalyst or some other event is, the outcome is inevitable. The world is already set up to go into a hyperinflationary depression. That in itself is bad enough, but a major war would also be horrific. Today we are looking at commodities that are still going up strongly, and pointing out that inflation is coming. Most currencies are weak, not just emerging-country currencies but also the dollar. The falling dollar will be the trigger to the hyperinflation I expect, and to higher precious metals prices. Investors should ignore event-driven price movements. Gold went up this week on Ukraine, and then down today on non-farm payrolls. Precious metals investors must understand that long-term price movements in gold and silver have nothing to do with events. Gold is going up because currencies are being destroyed by virtually every nation due to deficit spending, debts, and money printing. So precious metals investors must ignore these short-term moves. The trend is clear and will not change. So it won't matter what happens in the world politically or economically. With regards to the non-farm payroll figures today, it had to be a good figure. The U.S. had to counteract the bad Ukraine news with some good unemployment figure. But what is interesting and important is that the dollar did not move higher on the bogus jobs release. Currently the euro is just under 1.39, and the U.S. Dollar Index is around 79.7. This is what precious metals investors must focus on. The weak dollar indicates that the 1-percent move down in gold today will be short-lived. What investors must realize is that the time for protecting their wealth is running out. Ukraine could be the black swan event or there could be another. Therefore, it is critical to own physical gold and protect against the inevitable consequences of the mess that the world is in. You must ask yourself if you are prepared for such a collapse. If not, as I said, time is running out.

Food Prices

Massive global food price spikes, depression and political instability Brombry 3/1714

First, an update on my decades-long jack-of-all trades career. You can read me each Monday in "The Australian", each Thursday on Miningnews.net, each month in "Australia's Mining Monthly" - and then at least three times a week (discussing rare earths, graphite, potash and others) on the Toronto-based investorintel.com. 1. First and foremost, I'm a mining and resources writer, having carved out a niche within a niche with critical and strategic metals. Latched on to the rare earth story in 1996 (somewhat before most others) and have branched out into what I see are the more fascinating commodities from potash/phosphate to graphite/graphene, not to mention antimony, tungsten and tin. Defending gold's corner takes up a fair bit of my time, too. 2. Forging a new path in book publishing, using both print and electronic formats. The books reflect my interests: "The Farming of Australia", "German Raiders of the South Seas" (my contribution to the present Great War publishing tsunami - this one deals with merchant raiders operating in this region from 1914 and Australia and New Zealand's naval dramas), "Australian Railways: Their Life and Times". And, before the year is out, a book on minerals and metals. No, not a "copper is used for ..." tome, but trying to make sense of how the world is changing and how this will affect future metals demand. Others to follow. How to get them? Highgate Publishing (www.highgatepublishing.com.au) is issuing titles available as paperbacks (via Amazon), for e-book readers (Amazon Kindle, Smashwords, Nook, etc.) and also can be purchased as PDF books for downloading on computer through my website. Fifty-one years in this racket, one way or another. Written for and edited newspapers, written a handful of books, made radio documentaries, reported for TV and made a television wild life documentary, written and published books, started a magazine which actually found its audience and would go on for more than 30 years. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/russian-invasion-of-ukraine-could-drive-global-food-prices-up/story-fnciuhm9-1226856346079#>

Russian invasion of Ukraine could **drive global food prices up**. The last thing the **shaky global recovery** -- and the mining industry in particular, we would add -- **needs now is a further spike in food prices** caused by disruption to farming in eastern Ukraine. **Ukraine is the world's third-largest exporter of corn**, the sixth-largest of wheat, and almost all of that is grown in the Crimea and other eastern parts now trembling under Moscow's boot (voting in Crimea was due to begin late yesterday). Any denting of the fragile global recovery sentiment would (probably) have severe consequences for metals demand, a blow this sector can barely afford, with copper down 13 per cent so far this year and fears of a huge unloading of physical metal as financing deals are unwound (as explored here last week). Copenhagen-based Danske Bank says of potential disruption of Ukrainian food exports that **this is the last thing the "shaky global economy" needs.** It adds that both Russia's and Ukraine's economies are struggling and they need every cent of revenue they can lay their hands on. Ukraine supplies about 40 per cent of all the wheat grown in Europe, 20 per cent of the corn and 10 per cent of the rapeseed. While the wheat and corn are grown mainly in the threatened eastern part of the country, the rapeseed is produced mainly in the west, so is not (yet) threatened by Russian acquisitiveness. Up to 60 per cent of Ukraine's output of wheat and corn is exported while 95 per cent of rapeseed is shipped abroad. **Disruption, especially of grain exports, would have "severe repercussions" for the global grain market,** the bank says. Here's another cruncher: **there are just a few months before the wheat harvest is due.** Unavailability of Ukrainian grain is not what Europeans would like to see. This past week we have seen what the Commonwealth Bank termed "massive speculative investor and fund" buying of wheat positions, all pushing the prices higher. **Food prices do, indeed, pose a threat to the global economy -- and global stability** (remember the food riots in Tunisia and Egypt that brought down those governments). As of last week, coffee prices have risen 78 per cent since January 1, sugar by 23 per cent and soybeans by 11 per cent. Now wheat prices are on the march.

US-Russia relations

Ukraine invasion tanks across the board

Rumer and Weiss 3/1/14

<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putins-reckless-ukraine-gambit-104125.html#ixzz2urZPI6c0>

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We should not take for granted that even in Ukraine's east and south, where so many ethnic Russians live, that a military occupation will be a cakewalk. Many local residents surely do not want to become Russia's 90th province. In Ukraine's west, where the Soviet Army had to fight a protracted counterinsurgency campaign after WWII against Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas, armed resistance is certain to be strong. During the revolution, many army depots and armories were overrun so there are more weapons floating around Ukraine than at any point since 1991. And the leadership of the main instruments of coercion – the Army, the Interior Ministry, and the intelligence service – are all in the hands of political leaders with strong Ukrainian nationalist credentials. Any invasion—which is what it would be—of a vast country of 46 million in the heart of Europe, sharing borders with NATO allies Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, would pose a major security challenge for the United States and other key European powers. Even without further Russian action, allies such as the Baltic countries will be seeking U.S. reassurance. Lithuania has already asked for Article IV consultations under the NATO Treaty in response to a clear threat to its security. These countries likely will also ask for hard reassurances—such as deployments of U.S. and other allied troops and equipment on their territory—as Turkey did in 2012 when Syria shot down a Turkish jet. They will also need help to shore up their eastern borders and prepare for possible flows of refugees from Ukraine. The Baltic states will probably ask for similar reassurances. One can also expect cyber attacks and intrusions, false alarms and an atmosphere of tension the likes of which have not been seen since the worst days of the Cold War. Post-revolutionary Ukraine is in bad shape. Its economy is wrecked. Government institutions broke down completely after the Yanukovich government disappeared overnight. Corruption and criminality, Ukraine's twin scourges, remain basically intact. Thanks to Russia's unexpected moves in Crimea, the West will now have to put Humpty Dumpty back together on its own. These tasks demand that the president designate a senior point-person for coordinating Ukraine policy in all its complexity. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, one of America's ablest diplomats and an old Russia hand, is the obvious choice. The break in the West's relations with Russia is bound to be deep and lasting. The G-8 will be its first casualty with the Western powers likely to reconstitute the G-7 in its original form as a direct rebuff to Putin. Other important international mechanisms —the U.N. Security Council, ad hoc diplomatic efforts on Syria, the P5+1 process on Iran, the Six-Party talks on North Korea, and so on—will be filled with renewed acrimony and dysfunction. Some may break down entirely. Inevitably, there will be congressional calls for sanctions against Russia, which the White House will be hard-pressed to resist no matter how much it may want to preserve the shreds of cooperation with Russia on Iran, Syria or Afghanistan. The West and Russia are in uncharted waters.

Prolif

Failure to protect Ukraine causes global proliferate cascade by invalidating Budapest Memorandum – Japan, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia

Boyes 3/6/14

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/the-lesson-hang-on-to-your-nukes-if-putins-on-the-prowl/story-fnb64oi6-1226846228761#>

Editorial writer, the Times

Twenty years ago Ukraine had the third-largest strategic nuclear weapons stock in the world after the US and Russia, having inherited its share of the Soviet arsenal. It gave up those stocks in return for Western cash and a piece of paper, the 1994 Budapest memorandum that was meant to guarantee its territorial integrity. Today, it seems that Kiev made a bad deal. The agreement, signed by the US, Britain and Russia, has done nothing to shield Ukrainians. Had Ukraine stayed nuclear Russia would have thought twice about snatching Crimea. The invasion is thus not just about the regional manipulation of power and Russian President Vladimir Putin's effective threat to foment a European civil war unless Ukraine stays in his orbit. It is **about the new international order and about**

nuclear security's role in it. **How safe do non-nuclear Japan and Taiwan feel** at the moment?

How much are their security agreements with the US worth if Washington is powerless to deter a Russian land-grab in a country that borders four NATO members? How credible as world policemen are the five leading nuclear powers - the US, Russia, China, Britain and France - as the permanent members of the UN Security Council? In the 1990s it was briefly possible to believe in the merits of unilateral disarmament and the dream of global non-proliferation. South Africa admitted to having had secret nuclear plans and promptly dropped them. The threat of Soviet encroachment had evaporated. So, too, had the Soviet Union. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus had more pressing economic problems than keeping their nukes in working order. Ukraine in 1991 boasted inter-continental ballistic missiles, almost two dozen strategic bombers, more than 1000 long-range cruise missiles and several hundred tactical nuclear weapons. To turn that into a purely Ukrainian force, to target it on Moscow rather than NATO, would have meant an investment of \$US30 billion to replace Russian-owned early warning systems and communication centres. Some in Kiev argue it would have been worth the effort. "If we had hung on to even a fraction of that force it would have been like hanging a gun on the wall of your living room," said one Ukrainian politician. "Maybe the gun has no bullets but when the neighbour comes round for dinner, he's afraid of it." Neither the West nor Russia bought into the idea of a Ukrainian deterrent. The US did not trust the 90s Ukrainian leadership to keep tight control of the weapons. It paid Ukrainians to load their nuclear kit on to 100 trains and send it to Russia. In 1996 Ukraine officially became a non-nuclear nation - and soon afterwards the Kremlin piled pressure on Kiev to pay more for its gas. Unilateral disarmament doesn't pay. It only results in nuclear weapons becoming the sole property of those nations that do not

renounce them. The quest for nuclear advantage can poison the politics of the whole region. **Iran** is pushing its

nuclear program not only to "balance" Israel's undeclared weapons but also to win a pivotal role in the Middle East. That **prods Saudi**

Arabia towards getting its own atomic deterrent, perhaps with the help of Pakistan - an enormous challenge to non-proliferation efforts.

Hegemony

Ukraine is the litmus test of US primacy

Kanat 3/17/14

<http://setav.org/en/the-ukrainian-crisis-as-a-new-chessboard-of-global-geopolitics/opinion/14586>

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Halford Mackinder, one of the founding fathers of geopolitics, once wrote "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world." Ukraine was one of the integral parts of the Heartland

that he stated. Now, the crisis in Ukraine is becoming an arena for a **major geopolitical confrontation.**

The problem in Ukraine that has been overshadowed in recent days with the mysterious loss of the Malaysian Airlines plane is quickly being transformed into a global problem instead of a regional challenge for countries in Eastern Europe. The crisis not

only brought Western powers and Russia face to face in Crimea but is becoming **a global chessboard in which global**

powers have stakes. The most significant centers of gravity in international relations, namely the United

States and China and their positions and diplomatic steps regarding the crisis will be very important for the **future of**

the conflict in Crimea, their bilateral relations, as well as **the international system**. The crisis and its outcomes will be **a**

major determinant of future global geopolitics. The crisis in Ukraine is yet another serious test of U.S. leadership in terms of its international alliances, guarantees and assurances.

The world is watching the reaction of the U.S. after Russia's invasion of Crimea.

Sanctions Not Now

US reining in sanctions now

FoxNews 14

(June 25, 2014, "Can Putin be trusted? US weighs sanctions pullback as Russia shifts course on Ukraine")

<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/25/can-putin-be-trusted-us-weighs-sanctions-pullback-as-russia-shifts-course-on/>)

The Obama administration could reconsider a looming package of sanctions on the Russian economy as Vladimir Putin makes an about-face and signals a willingness to ease the crisis Moscow helped create in Ukraine. In recent days, Putin has worked with lawmakers in Moscow toward rescinding a parliamentary resolution authorizing him to use the Russian military in Ukraine -- the parliament's upper house canceled it on Wednesday. Putin also urged the new Ukrainian government to extend a weeklong cease-fire and called for talks between Ukraine and pro-Russian rebels who are widely believed to be backed by the Kremlin. Asked about the developments, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest floated the possibility of reining in sanctions. "The goal of sanctions was to accomplish a couple of things," he said Tuesday. "The first is to further isolate the Russians and to put pressure on them to take the kind of action that would be conducive to de-escalating tensions in the neighboring country of Ukraine." He added: "Obviously, if we started to see a change in the behavior of the Russian government and we saw some concrete steps along the lines that we've been calling for ... that would be a positive development and it would make additional sanctions less likely." But Obama administration officials are "reserving judgment," he said, as they wait to see whether Putin's words are matched with actions. On Wednesday, Secretary of State John Kerry said Moscow still needs to stop the flow of weapons across the border and urged Putin to publicly call on separatists to "lay down their arms." Putin's turnaround comes at a curious time -- as the United States and European allies are set to finalize a package of sanctions with the goal of putting them in place as early as this week. The U.S. and Europe already have sanctioned Russian individuals and entities, including some with close ties to Putin, but have so far stayed away from the broader penalties, in part because of concern from European countries that have close economic ties with Russia. But with the crisis in Ukraine stretching on, a senior U.S. official said the U.S. and Europe are moving forward on "common sanctions options" that would affect several areas of the Russian economy. A Western diplomat said those options included Russia's energy industry, as well as Moscow's access to world financial markets.

Sanctions Fail

Sanctions fail for Russia

Mufson 14

(Steven, Washpost contributor, April 29, 2014, "Why the sanctions against Russia probably won't work"
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/29/why-the-sanctions-against-russia-probably-wont-work/>)

Correction: An earlier version of this story contained incorrect figures for Russia's daily oil exports and the annual revenue they generated. This version has been corrected. Do economic sanctions work? In Russia, maybe not. Russia is sitting on roughly half a trillion dollars in foreign exchange, and it exports about 7.5 million barrels a day of crude oil bringing in about \$300 billion a year — not including its sales of natural gas. It has will as well as means. Russian President Vladi-mir Putin seems content to suffer some economic damage for the sake of correcting what he sees as a historical wrong and bringing Crimea and perhaps more of Ukraine back into the Russian fold. "The whole idea that we are going to defeat Russians by imposing hardship on them boggles my mind," said Clifford Gaddy, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution, noting that the Russian economy contracted 40 percent after the fall of the Soviet Union. "It's not a matter of how much pain you can impose, but how much they can tolerate. And how much they can tolerate depends on the motivation for behavior," he said, adding that Russia's dispute with the United States and Europe was a "matter of national interest and survival" and not just greed. This is bad news for foreign companies operating in Russia for whom the gradual tightening of sanctions on Monday by the United States and Europe is worrisome. So far the Obama administration has tried to zero in on top officials and advisers to Putin. And trade with Russia outside the energy sector is relatively small; U.S. trade with Russia accounts for less than 1 percent of U.S. overall trade. Still, some international companies have big stakes there. The biggest U.S. investor in Russia is Exxon Mobil, which has an oil and gas production facility off Sakhalin Island in northeastern Russia and which has joined with Russian oil giant Rosneft to explore the country's Arctic region. It also has an operation extracting natural gas from complex geological formations. Russia accounts for about 6 percent of Exxon Mobil's global production, according to oil analyst Pavel Molchanov at the investment firm Raymond James. London-based oil giant BP is even more exposed to Russia. It owns a 19.75 percent stake in Rosneft, whose chief executive Igor Sechin was just added to the U.S. sanctions list. The stake is valued at about \$13 billion, about 9 percent of BP's total market capitalization. The Rosneft holding also accounts for about 30 percent of BP's production, 36 percent of its reserves and contributes about 15 percent to the firm's net income, Molchanov says. Royal Dutch Shell has a stake in a Gazprom oil and gas field in Siberia and is a partner in Sakhalin 2, which has a liquefied natural gas terminal that in 2012 supplied a tenth of Japan's gas needs. The company's chief executive, Ben van Beurden, in Russia for the 20th anniversary of the project, met Putin on April 18 to discuss expanding the facility. "We also know that this is going to be a project that will need strong support to succeed," he said, according to Russian media. "So one of my purposes of meeting with you, Mr. President, is to also secure support for the way forward on this project." Weatherford, a U.S. oil services company, is also deeply involved in Russia. As of March 2014, Weatherford had 346 rigs, 74 percent of its international rig count, operating in Russia, Molchanov said. Outside the energy sector, international companies with investments in Russia range from those selling luxury consumer goods to those investing in other natural resources. Putin, like other countries' leaders, has insisted that automakers have certain levels of domestic content if they are selling in Russia. Ford and General Motors both have plants in Russia. But so far, the United States and European Union have targeted Russian individuals and companies. The intention is to make clear to Russians that the target is Putin and his close allies, not the Russian people overall. Gaddy doubts that will work either. "We are targeting the very best of Russia, the part that's most modern, most eager to integrate into the global economy, most progressive," he said. "Sanctions will tend to hurt them." Russia joins a long list of countries that have been subjected to international sanctions, and the track record is mixed, at best. Even where effective, they work slowly. The U.S. embargo of Cuba has lasted more than half a century, and the Castros still rule there. The embargo of North Korea has inflicted suffering and starvation on the populace, but the Kim family remains in power. Both countries received oil and economic support from Russia and China respectively. The U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on South Africa over President Ronald Reagan's veto in October 1986, prompting many U.S. companies, such as General Motors and Mobil Oil, to withdraw. The sanctions contributed to ending apartheid, but domestic foes of apartheid had already shaken the country for two years with demonstrations, consumer boycotts and strikes, sparking a flight of capital, no-shows for military service and a reassessment by influential members of the ruling National Party. The United States and European nations are currently negotiating with Iran, which is widely seen to have been brought to the bargaining table by tight sanctions on oil exports and transactions by Iran's central bank. But the United States imposed sanctions on Iran after the 1979 hostage-taking, and other countries added sanctions after Iran resumed its uranium-enrichment program in 2005. Sanctions were tightened again in 2012, leading to a sharp drop in Iranian oil exports that provide the bulk of government revenue. But Molchanov argues that Russia is different. "Even if Russia were to cross the border into eastern Ukraine , it would be hard to imagine a full embargo on Russian exports because the world needs the oil," he said. Iran at its peak was exporting about 2.5 million barrels a day, and the embargo eventually cut that to about 1 to 1.5 million barrels a day. "The world can lose a million barrels a day from Iran, and it's not especially painful," Molchanov added. "But if it lost 9 million barrels a day from Russia, there is no supply elsewhere that could fully compensate for that loss immediately. If Russian exports went to zero tomorrow, there would be a global oil crisis." One argument in favor of imposing economic sanctions on Russia is the theory that Putin has made a

bargain with the Russian people (similar to the implicit bargain made by China's Communist Party): The Russian people give him power, and he will give them better living standards. But Russian living standards weren't that great before the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, many Russia experts think that is the wrong way to look at Russia. Gaddy says that Russians want a better standard of living, but not if it means they aren't treated as a great power. He said that given a choice of being Sweden or Russia, most Russians would sacrifice Sweden's comforts and choose Russia for its great-power status. Mark Medish, a National Security Council adviser on Russia and Ukraine under President Bill Clinton, believes Putin's behavior has been reckless, but he also doubts the effectiveness of economic sanctions. "Sanctions may cause economic inconvenience and reputational pain for the targets, and imposing sanctions may also make us feel correct, that we have done the right thing," he said. But he warned that "the stated objective of sanctions is to get Russia to change its behavior, and this is unlikely to work. Sanctions are more likely to galvanize the will of the other side." He added that "great powers, especially nuclear superpowers, do not allow themselves to be extorted."

Sanction fail and drive Russia to China

Aris 14

(Ben, Business News Europe, May 6, 2014, "Why western sanctions will fail" <http://russialist.org/why-western-sanctions-will-fail/>)

With the violence in eastern Ukraine escalating by the day, the West's policy of imposing sanctions on Russia is bound to fail. All this policy has done is to paint both the Kremlin and Washington into their respective corners, making the chances of military confrontation look increasingly likely. As the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, warned in interviews published in four European newspapers on May 6, "The bloody pictures from Odessa have shown us that we are just a few steps away from a military confrontation." Thus the time for both Washington and Moscow to cut their losses and agree to meet to thrash out a compromise is now. Each day that passes will see the body count rise and drive the proxies that are actually doing the fighting at the behest of the two Great Game players become more and more invested in the violent cycle of anger and revenge, so that if the overlords try to pull the plug they might find it is too late. Indeed, this point may already have passed with the death of over 40 pro-Russian activists in Odessa. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and US President Barack Obama warned Russia the West would scale up to phase III sanctions, those that target sectors like banking and energy, if Russia interferes in any way with the upcoming Ukrainian presidential poll, slated for May 25. But with the situation in eastern Ukraine clearly spinning out of control, it will be impossible to hold what the international community considers to be a "free and fair election". Having drawn a line in the sand, the West will be forced to take the nuclear option of doing real economic damage to the Russian economy and so force the Russians to retaliate in kind. We will be lucky if both sides hold themselves to just attacking on the economic front and not the military one as well. The irony is the Germans have tied themselves to a policy that they clearly don't want, or can ill afford. Of all the European countries, Germany's economy is the most closely bound to Russia. Germany depends heavily on Russian oil and gas, which accounts for the bulk of the €40bn it imported from the country in 2012. In the other direction, German exports to Russia totalled €38bn in 2012, which was 31% of all European exports to Russia. Therefore, doing real and significant damage to the Russian economy will do similar damage to Germany's nascent economic recovery. The idea that sanctions, especially the pathetically weak ones that have been imposed so far, will have any impact on the Kremlin's "calculus" is to totally misjudge the situation. "The whole idea that we are going to defeat the Russians by imposing hardship on them boggles my mind," says Clifford Gaddy, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution and the author of the "virtual economy" meme that dominated the 1990s discussion of Russia's problems. "It's not a matter of how much pain you can impose, but how much they can tolerate. And how much can they tolerate depends on the motivation for their behaviour. For Russia it is a question of national interest and survival. It is not just about greed." Gaddy's voice is one of a growing chorus questioning the wisdom of the sanctions policy. Europe is clearly split on the issue, but the US holds the trump card: if Washington imposes financial sanctions on a major Russian firm, due to the integration of the global financial system these sanctions will effectively lock the Russian company out of the international capital and banking markets. "What is less clear, however, is what these sanctions will actually achieve," says Dmitri Trenin, the highly respected director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. "Making Putin back down and concede defeat in Ukraine is improbable. Driving wedges between the Russian leader and his close associates is equally hopeless. The Russian liberal opposition, already marginalized, will hardly get a shot in the arm thanks to the sanctions. As to the bulk of the Russian people, their instinctive reaction to massive outside pressure against their country is more likely to be a patriotic surge rather than a regime change. The Russian government will now have an excellent reason to explain away the coming economic hardships: US sanctions." Backfire In reality, the sanctions have so far had precisely the opposite effect to what was intended. Designed to undermine Putin's support, they have actually lifted the president's approval rating to an all-time high of 82% – exactly at the time when his popularity was becoming vulnerable due to the woeful state of Russia's economy – while the popularity of Obama is now at a record

low of 42%. Likewise, his inner circle, which has been hardest hit by the current “sanctions-lite”, has closed ranks and mocked their effectiveness. The boost in Putin’s popularity has also handed him shiny new armour against the slings and arrows of Russia’s young opposition movement, at one of the very few junctures where it actually had a chance of finding a flaw in the president’s defences. Domestically, the Ukrainian crisis has killed the nascent opposition dead for the time being. At the same time, other polls show that public approval of the government actions is rising and Russians now regard the country as being on “the right path.” Finally, Putin is clearly digging in his heels and the transparent divisions in European support for the US line on tougher sanctions is child’s play to exploit. Not only was Putin not prepared to back down in the face of western threats, now he is reaping huge domestic political capital from his tough-talking defiance – exactly the capital he needs to weather the disapproval that was bound to follow the first fall in the standard of living in Russia since he took over 2000. The West will truly have to destroy the Russian economy before they can persuade the people that Putin is the wrong man for the job. And that nuclear blitz option would do just as much damage to the European recovery. Indeed the only country that is truly committed to imposing tougher sanctions on Russia is the US, which has virtually no economic interests in the country; those American companies there are in Russia are for the most part multinationals, which are notorious for their lack of interest in politics. “There is palpable resistance on the part of various Western business interests – from German manufacturers to US big oil – against ratcheting up sanctions. The Obama administration’s effort to talk Russia down is countered by the Kremlin’s outreach to the CEOs of the companies that are doing well in Russia,” Trenin concludes. Perhaps the biggest irony of the sanctions policy is that it is driving Moscow into Beijing’s arms. China has been one of the very few emerging market powers to openly condemn the sanctions policy. Beijing’s ambassador to Moscow told reporters on May 2 that China “strongly opposes unilateral sanctions against Russia.” “We are against imposing unilateral sanctions on Russia. They are not a way out,” Chinese Ambassador Li Hui said the day after Washington released a new sanctions list singling out Putin’s friends and other officials on April 28. If Washington’s policy is one of containment, then facilitating a closer alliance between Moscow and Beijing is clearly counter productive. If Russia is cut off from the west, the only place Moscow can go is into the open arms of the and commodity-hungry east. China is already siding with Russia and said on May 5 that it would help finance and build a bridge over Kerch Strait to permanently link the recently annexed Crimean peninsula to Russia. Boris Titov, Russia’s business ombudsman and head of the Sino-Russia business council for the last decade, has said exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), ecologically clean food, timber and wine to China will more than compensate for any losses Russia incurs if relations with the EU worsen.

AT Russia drilling now

Oversaturation of oil market means no Arctic drilling now

Keil 14

(Kathrin, Freie Universität Berlin, Otto-Suhr-Institut, May 16, 2014, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas" Cooperation and Conflict 2014, Vol. 49(2) 162–190)

However, the global gas market is changing. The USA has developed new technologies to extract huge amounts of unconventional gas, and the global economic crisis since 2008 has led to an overall decline in energy demand. Increased gas production and international decline in demand for gas have created an oversupplied gas market, which weakened demand for Russian gas. This might, however, hold for only the short- to mid- term future as gas is generally considered a cleaner form of energy than coal and oil, and lower prices can, in the mid- to long-term, generate increasing demand, which in turn can lead to rising prices. Given this uncertain market situation, Russia is at the moment hesitant to move forward with big gas exploitation projects, as the August 2012 decision to postpone the Shtokman gas project for the foreseeable future illustrates (Macalister, 2012). The launch of the Prirazlomnoye oil field in the Pechora Sea has also been postponed several times in the past, which would be Russia's first ever offshore oil field in the Arctic (BarentsObserver, 2010c).

Aff Answers

Obama structurally weak

Obama can't deter Putin because the US sucks

Crowley 3/1/14

Michael Crowley is a senior correspondent for TIME. He previously covered domestic politics and foreign policy for The New Republic, and was also a reporter at the Boston Globe. He has also written for such publications as New York magazine, GQ, Slate, and the New York Times magazine.

<http://swampland.time.com/2014/03/01/ukraine-obama-influence-russia/>

Putin appears to have calculated that the benefits of maintaining control of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, home to a large ethnic Russian population and a major naval base, would outweigh any costs that Obama and the West can impose. He's probably right. The prospect of a U.S. or NATO military response is roughly nil. The West has limited, if any, economic leverage over Russia. In fact, the leverage may work in the opposite direction as Russia is a major oil exporter at a time of already-high crude prices. Rhetorical shaming? Putin has endured months of it over his support of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, without budging from his position. Western support for Putin's domestic opposition would likely undermine its recipients and allow Putin to dismiss all protest as foreign intervention. So Obama is left to issue tough statements and place overseas phone calls, to little likely effect. By now it's a familiar story—and a particularly frustrating one, given the American public's unrealistically high expectations for presidential problem-solving. Consider several other crises that have left him stumped: In Syria, Obama stubbornly refuses to wade more than ankle-deep into the bloody fight against al-Assad's regime. He doubts whether the U.S. can influence the course of the war and worries that the risks of action—including an Iraq-style quagmire—outweigh the costs of inaction. His critics argue that he's wrong about that, a debatable proposition. But the practical result is Obama's pursuit a diplomatic solution that has gone nowhere, along with rhetorical condemnations of Putin, who supports Assad, that achieve nothing. In Afghanistan, president Hamid Karzai refused to sign a carefully negotiated agreement that would allow a residual U.S. military force in his country after 2014, saying he would leave that decision to his successor, who will be chosen in elections this spring. Obama has threatened that such a delay might require scrapping plans for a residual force. But with the stability of the Afghan government uncertain and al-Qaeda operatives just across the border in Pakistan, he wants to avoid a total withdrawal. Lacking any real leverage over an Afghan leader who seems willing to let the Americans exit for good, Obama endures Karzai's bluster and false accusations, while letting his deadline slide for deciding on a full withdrawal. And in Egypt, Obama has largely been a spectator to that country's ongoing political turmoil. His condemnations of a July 2013 coup—though he won't actually use the word—hasn't rattled the generals in Cairo, whose military aid he can't bring himself to sever. Meanwhile, bolstered by financial and political support from wealthy Arab neighbors, Egypt's military regime has ignored U.S. pleas for restraint and waged a brutal crackdown. Libya, Iraq, Sudan — all are places where terrible things happen that the U.S. can do little about. Obama's critics say he's been risk-averse, reactive and lacking vision. But even they would have to concede that American power is not what it was before two costly foreign wars and a budget-wrecking economic crisis. The result is a frustrated president whose foreign policy often amounts to tough statements which fall on deaf ears.

AT Ukraine Invasion Impact

Ukraine invasion spread non-unique – happening now Remnick 3/1/14

<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/putin-goes-to-war-in-crimea.html?currentPage=all>

David Remnick, editor of The New Yorker since July, 1998, began his reporting career at the Washington Post in 1982. He is the author of several books, including “King of the World,” “Resurrection,” and “Lenin’s Tomb,” for which he received both the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction and a George Polk Award for excellence in journalism. Remnick’s most recent book, “The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama,” was published by Knopf Doubleday in April 2010. He became a staff writer at The New Yorker in 1992 and has since written over a hundred pieces for the magazine. In 2000, Remnick was named Advertising Age’s Editor of the Year. Since Remnick became editor, The New Yorker has won thirty three National Magazine Awards.

I spoke with Georgy Kasianov, the head of the Academy of Science’s department of contemporary Ukrainian history and politics, in Kiev. “It’s a war,” he said. “The Russian troops are quite openly out on the streets [in Crimea], capturing public buildings and military outposts. And it’s likely all a part of a larger plan for other places: **Odessa, Nikolayev,**

Kherson. And they’ll use the same technique. Some Russian-speaking citizens will appear, put up a Russian flag, and make appeals that they want help and referendums, and so on.” **This is already happening in Donetsk and Kharkov.**

“They are doing this like it is a commonplace,” Kasianov went on. “I can’t speak for four million people, but clearly everyone in Kiev is against this. But the Ukrainian leadership is absolutely helpless. The Army is not ready for this. And, after the violence in Kiev, the special forces are disoriented.”

Putin will invade Ukraine – solvency impossible Kalb 3/4/14

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/03/03-putin-russia-plan-ukraine-kalb>

Marvin Kalb Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Marvin Kalb is a nonresident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and senior advisor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. He focuses on the impact of media on public policy and politics, and is also an expert in national security, with a focus on U.S. relations with Russia, Europe and the Middle East. His most recent book is The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed (Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

Having gobbled up Crimea, is he now planning to invade the generally pro-Russian eastern half of Ukraine, and split the country in two? Has he indeed lost “touch with reality”? Or, more likely, has he now concluded, pursuing his own cold logic, that he can recapture a large portion of Russia’s former imperial glory by moving aggressively against Ukraine—and doing so with relative impunity? Who, or what, is going to stop him? Putin is not mad, and he is not in “another world.” He is very much in his own world, which is for him a very realistic world of a new, frothy, determined Russian nationalism. Indeed, he is master of this world. Now that he has gambled—and won—on a successful, terror-free Olympics, creating a global image of a slick and modern Russia and inspiring ordinary Russians to be proud of their country once again (and polls show they are), he figured it was time to take on the chronic, nagging problem of Ukraine: put simply, whither Ukraine?—east or west? That question may haunt politicians and pundits in the west, but it does not trouble Putin. He knows the answer: for hundreds of years, Ukraine was part of the Tsarist and Stalinist empires, and it will remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. That is his reading of history, and that is his policy. When it seemed last November as though Ukraine might slip out of Russia’s tight economic and political embrace, and accept a loose form of membership in the European Union, Putin acted swiftly to smash this possibility. He offered then President Yanukovich a \$15 billion loan, plus a cut in gas prices, to tie Ukraine to the east, to Russia, thus effectively squashing the illusion of many Ukrainians that they were on the edge of genuine independence through formal association with the west. Putin wanted no part of that. In despair, Ukrainians organized widespread demonstrations in central Kiev. Anger deepened, as casualties mounted. Finally, protest leaders met with Yanukovich, a Russian emissary appointed by Putin, and the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France. They all agreed that Yanukovich would remain in power until December, when new elections would be held under international inspection. Within 48 hours, the deal collapsed, Yanukovich fled, and the Ukrainian parliament appointed a new and inexperienced government, which was greeted with guarded optimism in the west and obvious disapproval in Moscow. Over the next few days, top Russian officials, fearing they were losing their grip over Ukraine, began to blast the new Ukrainian leaders as “ultranationalists” and even “fascists.” Prime Minister Medvedev described conditions in Kiev as “lawless” and “extremely unstable.” It will end, he predicted, “in a new revolution...and bloodshed.” It seemed as if Medvedev was seeding the ground for a Russian military intervention. Last weekend, the Russians acted with uncharacteristic precision, suggesting lots of advance planning. They took control of Crimea, a strategic appendage hanging precariously from Ukraine into the Black Sea, where Russia has maintained a major naval base for many years. And, in addition, the Russians seemed to have their eye on the eastern half of Ukraine, where pro- and anti-Russian protesters were in frequent and bloody combat. The Kremlin, in a special statement, said that “any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine and Crimea” would give Russia “the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those regions.” Though stridently nationalistic and proud of the occasionally restless Russian masses, Putin is also a Russian leader fearful of popular unrest. When tens of thousands of Russians objected to his

election a few years ago, he let them demonstrate until the demonstrations became too blatantly anti-him, and then he stopped them. Putin hated the Chechen uprising and crushed it. He distrusts the rising Islamist rattling in nearby Dagestan, and aggressive Russian action there is considered

likely, and soon. And, obviously, Putin is prepared to use additional military force, if necessary, to keep Ukraine in his bailiwick. **What**

can the West do? **It can condemn Russia** for “blatant aggression.” Its leaders can threaten to boycott the G-8 meeting scheduled for June in Sochi, of all places; it can even threaten to kick Russia out of the G-8. It can impose a number of business sanctions on Russia. It may even produce an economic package to help Ukraine, but big enough? With strict conditions? And while this collective western

response to his moves against Ukraine may all end up hurting Russia economically, **it will not change Putin’s mind** about his controversial war-like policy in Ukraine. Years ago, when Russia was run by a weaker, older leader, namely Leonid Brezhnev, and Russia sent the Red Army into Afghanistan, ostensibly to save a communist government in trouble, the West wailed and President Carter decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. East-West relations suffered, no doubt, but Brezhnev did not change his reckless policy. He did what he thought he had to

do to protect Russian interests and to project Russian power, just as Putin is doing right now. **Unless the West,** led by the United

States, **is prepared to use military power** to stop Russian aggression, **and that is not in the cards** for very good

reasons, **Ukraine will again be swallowed up** in the Russian orbit. Let us then hope that this sad result does not trigger a mindless political exchange between Republicans and Democrats during our November elections this year.

No More Aggression

Russia's deterred – no further O'Hanlon 3/3/14

Michael Edward O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He began his career as a budget analyst in the defense field.

<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/03/the-power-of-sanctions-against-putin-on-ukraine/>

The main reason for my relative **lack of anxiety** derives from the fundamentals of the situation in Ukraine. It is serious, to be sure. But it does not look likely to become **catastrophic**. As coercive as Russian President Vladimir Putin has been in this crisis, there have been limits. He hasn't killed people (so far at least, as of this writing on Monday, March 3). He is apparently trying to make a show of force in a way that gets a specific task done. He wants to protect his military bases in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (historically one of Russia's big four) is based. He also wants to assert certain prerogatives in a former Soviet republic. He wants, he says, to protect fellow ethnic Russians and Russian speakers — of whom there are many in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is nothing to admire about how Putin has proceeded. His approach is indeed 19th century-ish, as Secretary of State John Kerry said on Face the Nation Sunday. But it's not totally surprising for the way great powers behave. Even in this century. For example, the main distinction to draw between what Putin has just done in Crimea and what Washington did in Panama in 1989 — when a dictatorial government started to mistreat its own people badly and jeopardize our bases and access to the Panama Canal — is that we were more patient, and more justified, in making the decision to invade. In fact, we went further in that crisis than Putin is likely to do here. But Putin saw a government in Ukraine that he believed illegitimate. From a certain perspective, it had violated the February 21 deal that would have led to early elections, almost as soon as it was reached. He also saw the Ukrainian parliament last week look to degrade the status of the Russian language within Ukraine — an understandable reaction by angry Ukrainians at one level, to be sure, but also a provocation and a pointless one. I am hardly defending Putin. But I doubt very much that he is seeking to forcibly annex part of Ukraine. Part of his worldview may desire that, to be sure. But we have a pretty strong set of potential economic sanctions and Putin **knows it**. The West has gotten a lot better at applying sanctions — largely because of the Iran experience, and also our dealings with North Korea, and before that Serbia. The international community now knows how to do this — how to go after the banking sector, the individual wealth of top Russian leaders, their visa travel rights, and so on. We can try to help Europe gain new sources of energy as well, a point Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute wisely made when we appeared together Sunday on Face the Nation. Russia cannot thrive if the Western world collectively seeks to punish Putin and to do so for a considerable period. Were the current crisis to escalate to a bad situation — which it hasn't yet — and Ukraine to face civil warfare and an invasion by Russia to back up one side, then I think these kinds of tools would be applied. They'd be effective **and Putin knows it**. So I'm relatively confident **he won't take this gamble**, provided we are clear in our communications about how we would respond.

Interdependence will check escalation Dreyfuss 3/10/14

<http://www.thenation.com/blog/178761/capitalism-will-prevent-cold-war-over-ukraine>

Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor, is an investigative journalist specializing in politics and national security.

plain, old-fashioned capitalism will **prevent a new cold war** between the United States and Russia over Ukraine and Russia's gobbling up of the Crimean region. Capitalism, plus the fact that probably not one American in a thousand could locate Crimea on a map, and even the most hard-headed US political analysts have trouble coming up with a decent definition of what US interests in Ukraine might be. Helping to contain the crisis is the fact that Russia, Europe and to a lesser extent the United States are tied together in a **powerful web of financial and economic ties** that didn't exist, say, during the real Cold War. Their influence runs counter to the many, many cries from hawks to impose tough economic sanctions on Russia, as if the giant Eurasian power were a small "rogue state." The Washington Post, for instance, said in an editorial: Some argue that the West lacks the means to damage the Putin regime or that the United States cannot act without Europe, but neither claim is true. Banking sanctions—denying Russians and their banks access to the U.S. financial system—could deal a powerful blow. Mr. Obama must respond to Mr. Putin with measures that force the Russian ruler to rethink his options. But, as CNN reports: Russia is the European Union's third-biggest trading partner after the United States and China, with goods and services worth more than \$500 billion exchanged in 2012. About 75% of all foreign direct investment in Russia originates in EU member states, according to the European Commission. In addition, Russia is the single biggest supplier of energy to the European Union. British energy firm BP is the second-largest shareholder in Russia's leading oil producer Rosneft, and some of the biggest energy companies in Germany, the Netherlands and France are invested in a joint venture with Russian gas giant Gazprom. And, in a lengthy interview in The American Interest,

Zbigniew Brzezinski points with regret to the fact that British bankers, who have large deposits of Russian cash—particularly from Russian oligarchs—are resisting any sort of confrontation over Ukraine: The British seem inclined to argue, “Well, there’s a lot of Russian money in our banks.”... The bankers doubtless have a lot of influence, particularly in political systems in which money is increasingly the mechanism that oils the “democratic process.” Earlier, the BBC had reported that a document carried by a top British official read: “The U.K. should not support for now trade sanctions or close London’s financial center to Russians.” The New York Times, in a long March 7 piece analyzing US and European business interests in Russia and their effect on the politics of the situation, quoted several executives with Western firms who clearly want to cool the crisis talk: European businesses “have no interests in any deterioration of the current international situation linked to Ukraine,” Frank Schauff, the chief executive of the Association of European Businesses in Russia, said on Friday. “We call upon all parties to engage in a constructive dialogue, which will secure stability, welfare and economic growth on the European Continent.” Among American companies cited in the Times are Pepsi, Ford and John Deere. The Times quoted Ken Golden, director of global public relations for Deere, in its piece: While Russia represents less than 5 percent of Deere’s total equipment sales, the company recently cited Russia as being key to its future growth. “We urge political leaders to solve this issue without violence and in accord with international agreements,” Mr. Golden said. Please support our journalism. Get a digital subscription for just \$9.50! It even extends to the defense industry. According to Defense News, in a piece titled “Amid Ukraine Crisis, EU Plays It Safe,” various European arms manufacturers, including in Sweden, value current and potential sales to Russia. France is apparently insisting that it will continue to sell arms to Russia, including a \$1.7 billion deal for two Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Said one expert quoted in the piece: It looks like the Europeans are extremely keen to do everything except anything that hurts their commercial interests. There is zero appetite to hurt business interests, and arms sales fit into that category.

Sanctions Now

Global Sanctions now

PressTV 14

(June 17, 2014, "US sanctions to target Russia key sectors" <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/06/17/367307/us-says-will-sanction-russia-key-sectors/>)

The United States says it has closed ranks with European allies to impose further sanctions on Russia over the political crisis in eastern Ukraine. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland told the German Marshall Fund, a think tank in Washington, that the sanctions will target Russia's energy, banking, and defense sectors. "We are well aligned now on what a next round of economic sanctions would look like, in addition to continuing to look for individuals who one would sanction," Nuland said. She also accused Russia of undertaking further efforts to aid anti-Kiev protesters in eastern Ukraine by sending tanks and rocket launchers. Russia already denied such accusations. The West and Russia have been on a collision course ever since the Ukraine crisis began. After Crimea broke away from Ukraine and rejoin Russia, the US and the European Union imposed sanctions on a range of high-ranking Russian officials and some business leaders connected with the Kremlin.

US Sanctions now but Russia is fighting them now

Khaleej Times 14

(June 22, 2014, "Russia challenges US at WTO over sanctions" http://www.khaleejtimes.com/biz/inside.asp?xfile=/data/internationalbusiness/2014/June/internationalbusiness_June61.xml§ion=internationalbusiness)

Russia has filed a complaint with the World Trade Organisation against the United States for imposing sanctions over the Ukraine crisis. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said. Moscow had already told Washington it considered the sanctions, imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea and its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, to be illegal under WTO rules. "When the United States imposed sanctions against Russia, which had a negative impact on our foreign trade, we decided to challenge these sanctions in the World Trade Organisation," Medvedev told a law conference in Russia's northern city of St Petersburg. "We've sent a communique to the World Trade Organisation." Washington and the European Union have imposed sanctions on several Russian and Ukrainian individuals, but Washington has also targeted a number of Russian firms and banks it says are linked to President Vladimir Putin or his close associates. In particular, it accuses Russia of backing armed separatists fighting the government in eastern Ukraine. A spokesman for the US Trade Representative said the United States took its obligations under the WTO very seriously. "Prior to instituting the sanctions against the Russian Federation, the United States carefully considered their consistency with WTO rules," he said. But Medvedev said the sanctions violated WTO rules, arguing that banning service providers from another country constituted an infringement of the "most favoured nation" status that WTO members accord each other. Although it joined the WTO less than two years ago, Russia has already become embroiled in trade disputes with the European Union and Japan. A flurry of Russian threats and warnings suggest that more cases could soon follow. He said challenging the United States may not be easy. "The US has both doctrinal and practical authority in the World Trade Organisation," he said. "The state is a leader in the raising of trade disputes with the WTO." He also suggested that disputes between Russian and Ukraine companies could be solved in an arbitration court. National security can be used as an argument to claim exemptions from WTO rules. The United States invoked national security as a member of the WTO's predecessor organisation to justify its economic embargo on Cuba.

More international sanctions coming now

Mohammed 14

(Arshad, foreign-policy correspondent for Reuters, June 21, 2014, "U.S., EU threaten Russia with more sanctions over Ukraine" <http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.600153>)

The United States blacklisted seven separatists in Ukraine on Friday and threatened "scalpel" sanctions on Russia's financial, defense and high-tech industries as more Russian military material has flowed into Ukraine. The U.S. moves respond to what American officials say is Russia's recent increase in support to Ukrainian separatists, including the provision of Russian tanks and the preparation of more to

cross into eastern Ukraine. President Barack Obama spoke separately on Friday with French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the White House said. The three leaders agreed that Russia faces the risk of new sanctions from the West if it fails to defuse tensions on the Ukraine border, the White House added. "They agreed that should Russia fail to take immediate concrete steps to de-escalate the situation in eastern Ukraine, the United States and the European Union would coordinate additional steps to impose costs on Russia," the White House said in a statement. Separatist rebellions erupted in eastern Ukraine in early April after street protests in Kiev toppled the Moscow-backed leader Viktor Yanukovich and Russia in turn annexed the Crimean peninsula. Eastern rebels have called for union with Russia. The U.S. Treasury named seven people, including separatist leaders in Donetsk, Slovyansk, Luhansk and the Crimean city of Sevastopol, whose assets under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen and with whom U.S. individuals and companies will be generally be barred from dealing. The Treasury said one of the seven was a Russian citizen but gave no information on the citizenship of the other six. Separately, the U.S. State Department said it was confident that Russia last week sent tanks and rocket launchers from a deployment site in southwest Russia into eastern Ukraine and believed more tanks were being readied for delivery. "We also have information that Russia has accumulated artillery at a deployment site in southwest Russia, including a type of artillery utilized by Ukrainian forces but no longer in Russia's active forces, and believe Russia may soon provide this equipment to separatist fighters," said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki. A senior Obama administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity said Ukrainian officials told diplomats in Brussels that they had "evidence of some additional 10 tanks, fuel trucks, and additional supporting vehicles coming over the border outside of Luhansk in the last 24 hours." "We have information that additional tanks departed from a deployment site in southwest Russia yesterday," said the official. The official also said the United States had intensified its conversation with the European Union about imposing additional targeted sanctions on Russia because of the flows of Russian material to Ukraine. "We have been in active conversations with our EU partners on what we call 'scalpel' sanctions, which would be targeted primarily in the financial, defense and high technology sectors," the official told reporters. "The idea here is to deny Russia the kinds of investment and next-generation technology that it needs to continue to grow," the official said.

Global Sanctions now but no more coming

ITAR-TASS 14

(June 5, 2014, "Merkel: G7 leaders abstain from further sanctions against Russia" <http://en.itar-tass.com/world/734823>)

Leaders of the Group of Seven most industrialized countries (G7) decided to abstain for the moment from imposing further sanctions against Russia and intend to discuss situation concerning conflict-hit Ukraine with Russian President Vladimir Putin in France this week, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said. "At the upcoming meetings in Normandy we intend to send a signal to the Russian president concerning the necessity of de-escalation in Ukraine," Merkel said following the first day of the G7 summit in Brussels. "If this [the de-escalation] does not take place then in the future we intend to consider again the possibility of imposing the third set of sanctions." The European Union jointly with the United States declared two sets of sanctions against Russia earlier in the year, particularly after the republic of Crimea seceded from Ukraine and later merged with Russia. Speaking at a news conference late on Wednesday night, Merkel said the G7 leaders agreed to discuss three key issues with Ukrainian newly-elect President Pyotr Poroshenko and Russian President Putin in France. Firstly, she said, the leaders intend to stress the importance that Russia must provide "measures for de-escalation in Ukraine." Secondly, to call on the Russian authorities to begin joint work with the Ukrainian president. Thirdly, Merkel said, Russia needs to put an end to flow of volunteers and weapons to the east of Ukraine. Asked whether further sanctions would follow against Russia, Merkel said the issue "requires extra discussions and thorough analysis of the situation."

Arctic Conflict Defense

No arctic war

Keil 14

(Kathrin, Freie Universität Berlin, Otto-Suhr-Institut, May 16, 2014, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas" Cooperation and Conflict 2014, Vol. 49(2) 162–190)

The evidence shows that talk of a new Cold War in the Arctic is overblown. Closer analysis of the actual importance of Arctic oil and gas to the countries concerned, as well as the consideration of the uncertainty and spatial distribution of Arctic hydrocarbons, offers a much more differentiated picture. The USA and Canada are unlikely to join a potential rush for Russia's Arctic resources given their own vast resource bases. Norway and Denmark both concentrate on their own hydrocarbon potential, because it is needed for economic and autonomy reasons, respectively. Activities concerning the most promising resources, Arctic offshore oil and gas, are currently of rather secondary importance in a global perspective. In the near- to medium-term future, however, increased activity can be expected.

Given the empirical findings, **it is safe to conclude that this will not lead to major inter-state**

confrontations, but if any conflict about Arctic natural resources were to arise, it will most likely concern complicated business relationships between the Russian state and foreign oil and gas companies wanting to get a share of Russia's vast hydrocarbon base to satisfy especially high European demand. In this respect, Russia is confronted with a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it aims to protect its resources by declaring them strategic and thus strongly limiting non-Russian involvement in any development activities. On the other hand, Russia's economy is highly dependent on the continued expansion of its oil and gas production, which will be impossible to achieve in the future without foreign expertise and capital. This precarious situation is exacerbated by the overall risky and unpredictable Russian investment climate. It remains to be seen how joint exploration and exploitation agreements between Russian (state) firms and foreign companies will work out. After the failed Rosneft–BP agreement, the new deal between Rosneft and Exxon to explore and exploit fields in the Kara Sea offers a new chance of observing the development of such a joint venture (Kramer, 2011b; Washington, 2011; Werdigier, 2011). The empirical conclusions suggest, first and foremost, that it is of utmost importance to start the analysis of the political state of a region by critically examining the actual stakes and interests involved, rather than arriving at premature conclusions based on underlying assumptions. Closer empirical scrutiny indicates that neorealist expectations of a geopolitical rush for Arctic resources are unrealistic, while the addition of constructivist variables in empirical analysis can supplement rational materialist accounts of actors' interests. While the overall interest-based approach is useful to unpack the black box of 'Arctic interests', the constitution of these interests cannot be solely understood in rationalist terms but has to include identity, cultural and historical considerations of the importance of the Arctic region to the respective countries.

No escalation

Zero risk of Ukraine escalation

Peck 3/5/14

I'm a defense writer, avid gamer and history buff. I'm currently a contributing editor for Foreign Policy Magazine, a writer for the War is Boring defense blog and of course a contributor at Forbes. My work has also appeared in the Washington Post, Slate, Defense News, USA Today, the Philadelphia Inquirer and other fine publications.

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/>

7 Reasons why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, **the U.S. is not going to get into a**

shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or

Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn't inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the "Military Balance 2014" from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine's coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It's much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America's armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn't have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain's words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." America's allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region's sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn't evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let's not even go there.

at us-russia relations

Ukraine permanently tanked relations

Mankoff 3/14/14

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/14/who_lost_europe_ukraine_asia_pivot

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The most direct impact of the current standoff will be on Washington's relationship with Moscow. Although the U.S.-Russia "reset" was a signal achievement of Obama's first term, bilateral relations have cooled significantly in recent years. With tension mounting over Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, crackdown on dissent and gay rights at home, and decision to grant asylum to NSA leaker Edward Snowden, the Obama administration made a conscious decision to de-prioritize relations with Moscow, cancelling a September 2013 summit and refusing to send a high-level government delegation to the Sochi Olympics.

Nevertheless, Washington attempted to preserve limited cooperation in order to broker an end to the Syrian civil war and roll back Iran's nuclear program. Even before the crisis in Ukraine, it was becoming clear that a second round of Syria talks in Geneva were going nowhere, and that the fate of an Iranian nuclear deal would depend on direct contacts between Washington and Tehran. Coupled with the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (a priority area for U.S.-Russian cooperation during the reset), these developments were already reducing Washington's interest in partnership with Moscow. With its need for Russian cooperation significantly reduced, the invasion of Ukraine sets the stage for the U.S. to further disengage, and to pursue a harder line toward Moscow, likely for several years.

at ukr invasion impact

Ukraine invasion spread non-unique – happening now

Remnick 3/1/14

<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/putin-goes-to-war-in-crimea.html?currentPage=all>

David Remnick, editor of The New Yorker since July, 1998, began his reporting career at the Washington Post in 1982. He is the author of several books, including “King of the World,” “Resurrection,” and “Lenin’s Tomb,” for which he received both the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction and a George Polk Award for excellence in journalism. Remnick’s most recent book, “The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama,” was published by Knopf Doubleday in April 2010. He became a staff writer at The New Yorker in 1992 and has since written over a hundred pieces for the magazine. In 2000, Remnick was named Advertising Age’s Editor of the Year. Since Remnick became editor, The New Yorker has won thirty three National Magazine Awards.

I spoke with Georgy Kasianov, the head of the Academy of Science’s department of contemporary Ukrainian history and politics, in Kiev. “It’s a war,” he said. “The Russian troops are quite openly out on the streets [in Crimea], capturing public buildings and military outposts. And it’s likely all a part of a larger plan for other places: **Odessa, Nikolayev,**

Kherson. And they’ll use the same technique. Some Russian-speaking citizens will appear, put up a Russian flag, and make appeals that they want help and referendums, and so on.” **This is already happening in Donetsk and Kharkov.** “They are doing this like it is a commonplace,” Kasianov went on. “I can’t speak for four million people, but clearly everyone in Kiev is against this. But the Ukrainian leadership is absolutely helpless. The Army is not ready for this. And, after the violence in Kiev, the special forces are disoriented.”

Putin will invade Ukraine – solvency impossible

Kalb 3/4/14

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/03/03-putin-russia-plan-ukraine-kalb>

Marvin Kalb Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Marvin Kalb is a nonresident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and senior advisor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. He focuses on the impact of media on public policy and politics, and is also an expert in national security, with a focus on U.S. relations with Russia, Europe and the Middle East. His most recent book is The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed (Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

Having gobbled up Crimea, is he now planning to invade the generally pro-Russian eastern half of Ukraine, and split the country in two? Has he indeed lost “touch with reality”? Or, more likely, has he now concluded, pursuing his own cold logic, that he can recapture a large portion of Russia’s former imperial glory by moving aggressively against Ukraine—and doing so with relative impunity? Who, or what, is going to stop him? Putin is not mad, and he is not in “another world.” He is very much in his own world, which is for him a very realistic world of a new, frothy, determined Russian nationalism. Indeed, he is master of this world. Now that he has gambled—and won—on a successful, terror-free Olympics, creating a global image of a slick and modern Russia and inspiring ordinary Russians to be proud of their country once again (and polls show they are), he figured it was time to take on the chronic, nagging problem of Ukraine: put simply, whither Ukraine?—east or west? That question may haunt politicians and pundits in the west, but it does not trouble Putin. He knows the answer: for hundreds of years, Ukraine was part of the Tsarist and Stalinist empires, and it will remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. That is his reading of history, and that is his policy. When it seemed last November as though Ukraine might slip out of Russia’s tight economic and political embrace, and accept a loose form of membership in the European Union, Putin acted swiftly to smash this possibility. He offered then President Yanukovich a \$15 billion loan, plus a cut in gas prices, to tie Ukraine to the east, to Russia, thus effectively squashing the illusion of many Ukrainians that they were on the edge of genuine independence through formal association with the west. Putin wanted no part of that. In despair, Ukrainians organized widespread demonstrations in central Kiev. Anger deepened, as casualties mounted. Finally, protest leaders met with Yanukovich, a Russian emissary appointed by Putin, and the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France. They all agreed that Yanukovich would remain in power until December, when new elections would be held under international inspection. Within 48 hours, the deal collapsed, Yanukovich fled, and the Ukrainian parliament appointed a new and inexperienced government, which was greeted with guarded optimism in the west and obvious disapproval in Moscow. Over the next few days, top Russian officials, fearing they were losing their grip over Ukraine, began to blast the new Ukrainian leaders as “ultranationalists” and even “fascists.” Prime Minister Medvedev described conditions in Kiev as “lawless” and “extremely unstable.” It will end, he predicted, “in a new revolution...and bloodshed.” It seemed as if Medvedev was seeding the ground for a Russian military intervention. Last weekend, the Russians acted with uncharacteristic precision, suggesting lots of advance planning. They took control of Crimea, a strategic appendage hanging precariously from Ukraine into the Black Sea, where Russia has maintained a major naval base for many years. And, in addition, the Russians seemed to have their eye on the eastern half of Ukraine, where pro- and anti-Russian protesters were in frequent and bloody combat. The Kremlin, in a special statement, said that “any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine and Crimea” would give Russia “the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those regions.” Though stridently nationalistic and proud of the occasionally restless Russian masses, Putin is also a Russian leader fearful of popular unrest. When tens of thousands of Russians objected to his

election a few years ago, he let them demonstrate until the demonstrations became too blatantly anti-him, and then he stopped them. Putin hated the Chechen uprising and crushed it. He distrusts the rising Islamist rattling in nearby Dagestan, and aggressive Russian action there is considered

likely, and soon. And, obviously, Putin is prepared to use additional military force, if necessary, to keep Ukraine in his bailiwick. **What**

can the West do? **It can condemn Russia** for “blatant aggression.” Its leaders can threaten to boycott the G-8 meeting scheduled for June in Sochi, of all places; it can even threaten to kick Russia out of the G-8. It can impose a number of business sanctions on Russia. It may even produce an economic package to help Ukraine, but big enough? With strict conditions? And while this collective western

response to his moves against Ukraine may all end up hurting Russia economically, **it will not change Putin’s mind** about his controversial war-like policy in Ukraine. Years ago, when Russia was run by a weaker, older leader, namely Leonid Brezhnev, and Russia sent the Red Army into Afghanistan, ostensibly to save a communist government in trouble, the West wailed and President Carter decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. East-West relations suffered, no doubt, but Brezhnev did not change his reckless policy. He did what he thought he had to

do to protect Russian interests and to project Russian power, just as Putin is doing right now. **Unless the West,** led by the United

States, **is prepared to use military power** to stop Russian aggression, **and that is not in the cards** for very good

reasons, **Ukraine will again be swallowed up** in the Russian orbit. Let us then hope that this sad result does not trigger a mindless political exchange between Republicans and Democrats during our November elections this year.

impact d: no more aggression

Russia's deterred – no further O'Hanlon 3/3/14

Michael Edward O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. He began his career as a budget analyst in the defense field.

<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/03/the-power-of-sanctions-against-putin-on-ukraine/>

The main reason for my relative **lack of anxiety** derives from the fundamentals of the situation in Ukraine. It is serious, to be sure. But it does not look likely to become **catastrophic**. As coercive as Russian President Vladimir Putin has been in this crisis, there have been limits. He hasn't killed people (so far at least, as of this writing on Monday, March 3). He is apparently trying to make a show of force in a way that gets a specific task done. He wants to protect his military bases in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (historically one of Russia's big four) is based. He also wants to assert certain prerogatives in a former Soviet republic. He wants, he says, to protect fellow ethnic Russians and Russian speakers — of whom there are many in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is nothing to admire about how Putin has proceeded. His approach is indeed 19th century-ish, as Secretary of State John Kerry said on Face the Nation Sunday. But it's not totally surprising for the way great powers behave. Even in this century. For example, the main distinction to draw between what Putin has just done in Crimea and what Washington did in Panama in 1989 — when a dictatorial government started to mistreat its own people badly and jeopardize our bases and access to the Panama Canal — is that we were more patient, and more justified, in making the decision to invade. In fact, we went further in that crisis than Putin is likely to do here. But Putin saw a government in Ukraine that he believed illegitimate. From a certain perspective, it had violated the February 21 deal that would have led to early elections, almost as soon as it was reached. He also saw the Ukrainian parliament last week look to degrade the status of the Russian language within Ukraine — an understandable reaction by angry Ukrainians at one level, to be sure, but also a provocation and a pointless one. I am hardly defending Putin. But I doubt very much that he is seeking to forcibly annex part of Ukraine. Part of his worldview may desire that, to be sure. But we have a pretty strong set of potential economic sanctions and Putin **knows it**. The West has gotten a lot better at applying sanctions — largely because of the Iran experience, and also our dealings with North Korea, and before that Serbia. The international community now knows how to do this — how to go after the banking sector, the individual wealth of top Russian leaders, their visa travel rights, and so on. We can try to help Europe gain new sources of energy as well, a point Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute wisely made when we appeared together Sunday on Face the Nation. Russia cannot thrive if the Western world collectively seeks to punish Putin and to do so for a considerable period. Were the current crisis to escalate to a bad situation — which it hasn't yet — and Ukraine to face civil warfare and an invasion by Russia to back up one side, then I think these kinds of tools would be applied. They'd be effective **and Putin knows it**. So I'm relatively confident **he won't take this gamble**, provided we are clear in our communications about how we would respond.

The invasion will fizzle out – no serious impact Ignatius 3/12/14

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-for-putin-a-possible-pyrrhic-victory/2014/03/12/109c6130-aa23-11e3-9e82-8064fed31b5b_story.html

David R. Ignatius, is an American journalist and novelist. He is an associate editor and columnist for The Washington Post. He also co-hosts PostGlobal, an online discussion of international issues at Washingtonpost.com, with Fareed Zakaria.

My guess is that Putin will be a winner only in the short run. The negatives for Russia have probably increased because of the events of the past month. Russia has likely lost most of Ukraine as a buffer state, even if it claims Crimea as a consolation prize. **The world simply isn't moving Russia's way**. A small sign of Putin's long-term problem is that **both China and Japan have pulled back from Moscow**, thanks to the Crimea adventure. China fears that the Crimean secessionist movement could be a model for Tibet; Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who had been warming to Putin, has shown solidarity with America and Europe. **Will the Ukraine crisis prove a major turning point**, tipping the world toward a new Cold War? Despite the obvious dangers of confrontation, many analysts say **that's unlikely**. Should Crimeans endorse independence as expected, the Russian parliament may raise the ante by voting to annex the region. But what may follow is a period in which the region's status is legally undefined and the United States continues to seek a compromise between Kiev and Moscow. Putin could disrupt that by encouraging unrest in Russian-speaking cities of eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk and Kharkiv — and threatening further

intervention. But that risky course is unlikely. U.S. officials also doubt that Russia will sabotage the chemical-weapons disposal agreement in Syria or the international negotiations to limit Iran's nuclear program. Putin has a personal stake in both, and they are symbols of Russia's influence. If he were to scuttle such diplomacy, it would deepen Russia's isolation. Putin must also be careful about the domestic consequences of his Crimea putsch. Yes, it has brought him popularity in Russia as a tough, nationalistic leader. But it may also encourage secessionists in Dagestan, Chechnya and other potential breakaway regions. The Ukraine showdown, in a sense, has been a confrontation, as Kerry argues, between a 19th-century worldview and a 21st-century approach. Putin's moves on the ground have been decisive, with immediate impact. The U.S.-led response has been collective, deliberative and slower to emerge. The world was impressed initially by the "shock and awe" of America's military intervention in Iraq in 2003. One thing on which Putin and President Obama can agree is that the benefits of that military intervention didn't last.

impact d: interdependence

Interdependence will check escalation

Dreyfuss 3/10/14

<http://www.thenation.com/blog/178761/capitalism-will-prevent-cold-war-over-ukraine>

Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor, is an investigative journalist specializing in politics and national security.

plain, old-fashioned capitalism will **prevent a new cold war** between the United States and Russia over Ukraine and Russia's gobbling up of the Crimean region. Capitalism, plus the fact that probably not one American in a thousand could locate Crimea on a map, and even the most hard-headed US political analysts have trouble coming up with a decent definition of what US interests in Ukraine might be. Helping to contain the crisis is the fact that Russia, Europe and to a lesser extent the United States are tied together in a **powerful web of**

financial and economic ties that didn't exist, say, during the real Cold War. Their influence runs counter to the many, many cries from hawks to impose tough economic sanctions on Russia, as if the giant Eurasian power were a small "rogue state." The Washington Post, for instance, said in an editorial: Some argue that the West lacks the means to damage the Putin regime or that the United States cannot act without Europe, but neither claim is true. Banking sanctions—denying Russians and their banks access to the U.S. financial system—could deal a powerful blow. Mr. Obama must respond to Mr. Putin with measures that force the Russian ruler to rethink his options. But, as CNN reports: Russia is the European Union's third-biggest trading partner after the United States and China, with goods and services worth more than \$500 billion exchanged in 2012. About 75% of all foreign direct investment in Russia originates in EU member states, according to the European Commission. In addition, Russia is the single biggest supplier of energy to the European Union. British energy firm BP is the second-largest shareholder in Russia's leading oil producer Rosneft, and some of the biggest energy companies in Germany, the Netherlands and France are invested in a joint venture with Russian gas giant Gazprom. And, in a lengthy interview in The American Interest, Zbigniew Brzezinski points with regret to the fact that British bankers, who have large deposits of Russian cash—particularly from Russian oligarchs—are resisting any sort of confrontation over Ukraine: The British seem inclined to argue, "Well, there's a lot of Russian money in our banks."... The bankers doubtless have a lot of influence, particularly in political systems in which money is increasingly the mechanism that oils the "democratic process." Earlier, the BBC had reported that a document carried by a top British official read: "The U.K. should not support for now trade sanctions or close London's financial center to Russians." The New York Times, in a long March 7 piece analyzing US and European business interests in Russia and their effect on the politics of the situation, quoted several executives with Western firms who clearly want to cool the crisis talk: European businesses "have no interests in any deterioration of the current international situation linked to Ukraine," Frank Schaff, the chief executive of the Association of European Businesses in Russia, said on Friday. "We call upon all parties to engage in a constructive dialogue, which will secure stability, welfare and economic growth on the European Continent." Among American companies cited in the Times are Pepsi, Ford and John Deere. The Times quoted Ken Golden, director of global public relations for Deere, in its piece: While Russia represents less than 5 percent of Deere's total equipment sales, the company recently cited Russia as being key to its future growth. "We urge political leaders to solve this issue without violence and in accord with international agreements," Mr. Golden said. Please support our journalism. Get a digital subscription for just \$9.50! It even extends to the defense industry. According to Defense News, in a piece titled "Amid Ukraine Crisis, EU Plays It Safe," various European arms manufacturers, including in Sweden, value current and potential sales to Russia. France is apparently insisting that it will continue to sell arms to Russia, including a \$1.7 billion deal for two Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Said one expert quoted in the piece: It looks like the Europeans are extremely keen to do everything except anything that hurts their commercial interests. There is zero appetite to hurt business interests, and arms sales fit into that category.

impact d: no econ crisis

Doesn't spill over to global economy

Allen 3/8/14

<http://www.eturbonews.com/43477/fiscal-consequences-conflict-between-russia-and-ukraine>

Media Relations Specialist at IBISWorld Board Member at Citizen's Advisory Committee on Furnishing and Interpreting the Executive Mansion Past Senior Associate, Communications at The Century Council Copy Editor at The Breeze Communications Intern at Republican National Committee Volunteer at Delegate Matt Lohr Public Affairs Intern at National Association of Manufacturers National Journalism Center Intern at Young America's Foundation Government Affairs Intern at Boston Scientific

Unfortunately for consumers and businesses in the United States, neither is likely to be affected in the near future.

Producers are hedged against short-term fluctuations of global commodity prices, making it unlikely that the current conflict will affect prices for consumers at the gas pump or at the grocery store.

Long term: A tale of two stories

A continuation or escalation of the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine, could lead to potential sanctions and asset freezes and subsequently, global economic tremors. However, the direct consequences for the US economy are minimal. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a significant US trade partner, cumulatively accounting for just 1.1% of the total export/import flow for the United States.

Econ risks low – insulated

Allen 3/8/14

<http://www.eturbonews.com/43477/fiscal-consequences-conflict-between-russia-and-ukraine>

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Furthermore, Russia is one of the largest exporters of oil and natural gas, with a significant portion of its supply piped through Ukraine. If supply is disrupted, or if fear of disruption persists, global energy prices could climb, leading to higher oil and gas prices in the United States. In turn, consumers and business would experience higher transportation costs, and subsequently, spikes in the prices of most goods. Fortunately for US consumers, because the United States lacks the necessary infrastructure to export its growing supply of natural gas, the domestic natural gas market is relatively insulated from spikes in natural gas prices.

Due to the region's essential role in the flow of global grains and energy, any disruption in trade relations will most likely not be aimed at these commodities. Only under certain circumstances will the supply of these commodities be impacted (i.e. if military conflict occurs, or if Russia coerces Ukraine by shutting down its supply of natural gas and oil). Overall, though the conflict is bound to influence the position of certain companies, the threat of large-scale economic turmoil is minimal.

Putin crazy – can't deter/bargain

Structurally non unique – Putin will keep going to maintain power

Shevtsova 3/10/14

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/10/falling-into-putins-trap/>

Lilia Shevtsova, an AI editorial board member, is senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

never expected so many intelligent, perceptive, and influential media and political personalities to so easily fall into Vladimir Putin's trap. After the initial shock to the world, and especially to the West, following Moscow's announcements about the possible use of Russian armed forces in Ukraine, and then after being forced to acknowledge that Russia has already occupied Crimea, the West breathed a collective sigh of relief upon hearing Putin's March 4 press conference, where he suggested Russia doesn't have any plans to seize eastern Ukraine. I intentionally waited a while to make sure that this would indeed be the prevailing Western reaction after the dust settled—and it was. Western capitals felt encouraged by Putin. In the New York Times, that "American officials took some solace" after hearing Putin's explanations. One may suppose that the Europeans, who are much more inclined to forgive Putin than is Washington, have felt more than just relief, but actual satisfaction, at the news. When it became apparent that Moscow was hurriedly attempting to annex Crimea through a "referendum" scheduled for March 16—in the presence of thousands of Russian troops—some in the West have grown nervous once again. They're wondering why the Kremlin is in such a hurry, and why it is acting so crudely, without even pro forma attempts to clothe its naked aggression. But they needn't wonder. By now it's obvious that both Europe and the United States, unable to reverse the course of recent events and unwilling to pay the price for restraining Russia, are ready to participate in Putin's gamble. Until now, stunned and appalled, the Western capitals have been merely reacting to the Kremlin's moves, however belatedly or inadequately. But now the liberal democracies seem prepared to accept the new status quo—that is, to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea as a fait accompli, since they do not dare force Russia to back down. They are now focused on stemming Russia's expansion to Ukraine's eastern and southern regions, apparently fearing that anything but acceptance of the new geopolitical reality will result in a much more dreadful outcome. Let us clarify what this reality is all about. First, it is about the destruction of the post-Cold War world order. This order was based on the premise that Russia and the West are not in the business of "containing" each other anymore, and that both support the principle of the territorial sovereignty of the independent states that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union. Moscow began to destroy that order as early as its 2008 war with Georgia, followed by the virtual annexation of Georgia's breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. No less than President Nicolas Sarkozy, during France's term of presidency of the European Union, ratified and legitimized the Russian occupation of Georgia's territories. And Moscow's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs and its use of force in dealing with Kiev dates back to the Kremlin's trade war against Ukraine in August 2013. So there's nothing new or strange in the West's inability to find a convincing way to react

to Russia's moves. **Moscow concluded some time ago that it was free to take additional steps** toward establishing the new order. Second, it is about more than just setting a precedent allowing the Kremlin's direct interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. Not only did its behavior validate the presence of Russia's spheres of influence, thanks to the lack of meaningful Western reaction, but the Kremlin also reintroduced the "doctrine of interference" under the pretext of protecting the "Russian-speaking population." Since Russian speakers live in most of the newly independent states, this "doctrine" threatens the stability of the entire post-Soviet space. Even Russia's willing partners—Belorussian leader Lukashenko and Kazakh leader Nazarbayev—understand the looming threat to their countries' territorial integrity, and so have stubbornly refused to support the Kremlin "solution" for Ukraine. Third, it is about paving the way for the second stage of Moscow's plans, which is to bring **southeastern Ukraine** under Russian control. This would make Ukraine a failed state and zone of instability, which will serve as an invitation to Moscow to "stabilize" it. One should even expect there to be Western supporters of Russia's "moderating" role. Indeed some have already hinted that Moscow has its "interests" in the regions that have to be "accommodated." And **Moldova is likely the next target.** In short, **Eurasia is entering a**

period of instability. I would argue that, so far, the Western political community has demonstrated a rather simplistic understanding of Putin's psyche and goals, and this has made it easier for the Kremlin to carry out its agenda. Here is a sampling of Western explanations for Putin's mindset and goals, proffered by various politicians, analysts, and journalists: "Because Putin can." "Because of 'Putin's appetite for expansion.'" "Because it's a 'land grab.'" "Because 'he wants Ukraine back.'" (If these explanations are true, then why is he only trying this now? And why was he interested in Ukraine, specifically, rather than, say, Moldova?) "Because Putin is afraid of NATO expansion." (But NATO currently has no plans for expansion.) "To prevent clashes between the nationalists and the pro-Russian population in Crimea and the East." (But there had been no such clashes, until Russia got involved.) "To protect the Russian-speaking population." (But why, then, hasn't Moscow shown any enthusiasm for protecting the Russian speakers in Central Asia, where their rights are genuinely being violated? And why is Moscow so interested in this group's fate in Ukraine at this particular time?) "To recreate the Soviet Union." "To start a Cold War with the West." (In my view Putin hardly looks the part of an insane person who has totally lost contact with reality. He hardly wants to rally the world against Russia to fulfill some sort of bizarre dream of going down in flames with his country. Besides, the Cold War actually had some rules that both belligerents observed; the Kremlin has demonstrated that it does not respect any rules.) As you can see, **there are major questions about most of the popular explanations offered** to explain the

recent events in Ukraine. I do not claim to have a monopoly on the truth on this or other questions. We political pundits have demonstrated how pathetic we are, not just when it comes to making adequate forecasts of developments in Ukraine, but also when it comes to explaining what is happening in real time. We all could use a healthy dose of humility when discussing these developments. With that in mind, I would suggest the

following explanation of the Kremlin's motives and its agenda regarding Ukraine. Annexing Crimea is not an end in itself for the Kremlin, nor is partitioning Ukraine. These are just means to a more ambitious end. The Kremlin's intervention in and involvement in the destabilization of southeastern Ukraine exemplifies, formulated by the Kremlin in 2012—13. One of the goals of this doctrine is to find ways to reproduce the traditional Russian state and Putin's regime, and to respond to new domestic and international challenges.

This doctrine is based on three premises: Russia is a “unique” civilization and must contain the demoralized West; Russia can only exist as a galactic center, around which orbit satellite-states; Russia is the civilizational pillar whose mission is to defend “traditional values” globally. Many have viewed the Putin Doctrine as an exercise in empty rhetoric, but Putin has proved that it is the real thing. He has also proved that foreign policy is now the key instrument serving his domestic agenda. What a lesson this has been for those Western politicians who believed they could rest their Russia policy on the basis of “de-linking” domestic and foreign affairs! We need to keep in mind that, even if a new imperialism and a hunger for land are behind Russia's recent actions, they do not fully account for the brashness of the invasion, nor for Moscow's open rejection of all accepted norms and principles of international order. The

invasion and destabilization of Ukraine are Moscow's means of pursuing not just the geopolitical goal of guaranteeing influence, but **a**

civilizational goal as well: **eliminating the very idea of the Maidan as an alternative to the**

Russian Matrix (namely, the Russian personalized power system and the individual's subjugation by the state). In the Kremlin's view,

the Maidan is the Absolute Evil, which must be erased permanently and utterly, with the utmost cruelty. The

Kremlin's Ukrainian campaign is thus a preemptive strategy with the ultimate goals of reproducing and preventing any threats to the personalized power system in Russia and the post-Soviet space. I also think that the flagrant and aggressive beating to which Putin has subjected Ukraine has certain psychological underpinnings. We might surmise that they also come from a desire to humiliate the Ukrainian state and nation, to both punish and terrify—pour encourager les autres, including Russians. In fact, Putin is demonstrating the judo style his coach once described: “You

have to hit first and whack down the opponent to scare the hell out of him, **forcing him to accept your domination**.”

Actually, the Kremlin's tactics against Ukraine are the same ones it used against the Bolotnaya protesters in Russia: The government will use both psychological and physical terror tactics to ensure dominance and guarantee obedience—both here and over there. This is an up-to-date version of the Brezhnev Doctrine used in 1968 against Czechoslovakia, an aggression which was also meant as a warning to Soviet society. Ukraine has long been . The site of a stinging rebuke during the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine now presents an opportunity for the Kremlin to exact revenge for both past and present Maidans, to teach the rebellious Ukrainians a lesson, and to warn Russians about the price of insubordination or attempts to escape the Russian Matrix. Yet another angle: Russia is warning the West, “Don't meddle—this is our playground!” But this is not the end for the Kremlin's agenda. Ukraine is supposed to test the West's ability to accept Putin's rules of the game. Let us not forget that this test has already been conducted once before, in Georgia. Moscow's decision to take over Crimea indicates that Putin has concluded that the West is ready to accept the Putin Doctrine, or that it can be persuaded to do so. The chain of recent Kremlin statements and steps—Putin's March 4 press conference; various comments by Kremlin officials, including Putin's Press Secretary and the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Kremlin press releases summing up Putin's talks with Western leaders (and first of all with Obama)—all signal the start of a new phase in Moscow's self-affirmation of its civilization-state status. This new phase will be characterized by a combination of “hot” and “cold” tactics: constant threats to use force beyond Russian borders, as well as a wide range of administrative, financial, and other pressure mechanisms. It's ironic that the Western leaders have been discussing “face-saving” options for Putin—moves that would allow him to voluntarily “de-escalate” the crisis. Escape valves are the last things on his mind: He's looking for ways to destroy the West's reputation and to force it to accept his way of dealing with the world. What the West is treating as a pause, perhaps even as a prelude to retreat, is in fact a new stage in the Kremlin's offensive. Just look at recent Kremlin rhetoric: At his March 4 press conference, the Russian President delivered an ultimatum to both Kiev and the West. But this ultimatum, which has been repeated by Russian officials non-stop since Putin first uttered it, is itself a safety valve for the West—couched in rhetoric allowing Western leaders weary of the Ukrainian headache to accept it without completely embarrassing themselves. Since March 4, Putin has repeated his former position on Ukraine: that the current Kiev regime is not legitimate. But he hasn't stopped there. He has also charged that Ukraine has been supplanted by a “new state” whose legitimacy he has also called into question. Moreover, he has listed several terms under which he is ready to deal with Kiev. These terms go beyond a desire to control Ukraine's foreign policy. Now Moscow is even telling Ukraine how to build its state, by calling for a constitutional change and a referendum, and by calling on Ukraine to accept the February 21 agreement, which would return Yanukovich to power. These are the kinds of demands one would issue to a protectorate or a colony. Besides, Putin has openly referred to the possibility of a military option if his demands are ignored. He has also reminded us that Russia has other instruments for influencing Ukraine at his disposal. When Putin mentioned that “Russia will not be sidelined if the Russian speakers are persecuted,” he alluded to the influence Russia wields over gas prices and over Ukraine's debt. He's perfectly willing to cooperate with the “legitimate” Ukrainian regime, just as once cooperated with the Timoshenko government—as long as this cooperation is on the Kremlin's terms.

In short, the Russian President made it clear that Russia will not be satisfied with grabbing Crimea. (Who really

cares about Crimea in the Kremlin?). **Russia isn't about to loosen its grip on Ukraine** He has dangled possibilities in

front of the West's nose (for instance, he won't send troops into Ukraine unless it is absolutely necessary!) in order to get it to be more receptive to the Kremlin's other demands. Putin has essentially asked the West to turn a blind eye to any further moves by Moscow to establish its control over Ukraine. He even suggested that the West take part in “normalizing” the situation in Ukraine in conjunction with Russia. It is quite possible that the Kremlin believes (or has grounds to believe) that the West is ready for a repeat of the 1938 Munich Agreement and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to the press release the Kremlin issued after the nearly hour-long conversation between Putin and Obama on March 7, the Russian President said, “These relations should not be sacrificed to differences over individual—even though very important—international problems.” Translation: “What's done is done. Accept it, and we're ready to discuss other problems. But you need to understand that the world has changed.” Even the West's current goal for the Ukraine crisis, to “de-escalate” the situation, is perceived in Russia not as a demand to return to the status quo ante, but as an effort to stop any further expansion by Russia. In other words, Moscow believes that the West recognizes and tacitly accepts the new situation. But if the West is ready to recognize one alteration to the status quo, why not another? Meanwhile, all the

talk in the West **about sanctioning the Kremlin** has only served to strengthen Putin's belief that the West will not dare to really hurt his regime. All of these sanctions—from imposing visa restrictions to freezing the assets of a limited number of people in the Russian elite—don't inflict any pain on the Russian political class. The visa restrictions on travel to the United States and Europe don't alarm most of the elite. Many Russian officials, alerted earlier by the threat of Magnitsky Act, have found ways to safeguard their assets. The Russian elite would stand to lose more if key figures of Putin's gang and oligarchs are closed out of Western banks. But there are signs that this is not going to happen—at least not anytime soon. According to a government briefing paper accidentally exposed to journalists by UK officials, the UK government should “not support for now...trade sanctions...or close London's financial center to Russians.” Similar briefing papers could just have easily been exposed in other Western capitals. Western journalists analyzing the issue confirm that Western financial centers are hardly ready to lose access to Russian money. See Michel Weiss in the , Ben Judah in , and Oliver Bullough in the . The Kremlin has nothing to worry about on this score, then. Moreover, the Kremlin is now opening a discussion about freezing and confiscating Western assets in Russia, demonstrating its ability to launch a counterstrike. So Moscow is trying to bolster the already powerful world business lobby, which protects the Kremlin's interests in order to guarantee its own interests inside Russia. The German business community is currently acting as the most fervent defender of the Kremlin's interests. The Russian regime will do everything in its power to make sure that the rest of the business community in Russia, as well as influential Western lobby groups that serve the Russian regime, will become more active in defending Russia's interests. They will force Western leaders to abandon their efforts to hurt Putin. The latest rhetorical nuances show that **Western politicians are cautiously looking for compromise with the Kremlin** on the basis of the new status quo, hoping that its appetite has been sated for the time being. Never before has the West had such powerful mechanisms for influencing Russia, thanks to the Russian elite's integration into Western society. At the same time, never before has the West been so impotent when it comes to using those mechanisms, thanks to the Russian (Ukrainian, Kazakh) elite's ability to corrupt and demoralize the Western political and business establishment. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was right to say that Russia's exports to the West are commodities and corruption. What about other means of pacifying Putin? Sailing an American fleet into the Black Sea? Doing this would only give the Kremlin yet another pretext to prove that the West is a threat to Russia. Cutting investments to Russia? Surely Putin has already anticipated this, and if he's willing to accept this risk, it means that the logic of the regime survival is stronger than the problems presented by a withdrawal of investments. An EU gas boycott, then? Who really believes that could happen today? But let's imagine what would happen if the West decided to start dismantling the money laundering machine the Russian elite has built with the assistance of the Western “service lobby.” Would that precipitate a moment of truth for the Kremlin and the Russian ruling class? I'm not so sure. The Kremlin has prepared for this eventuality. In fact Putin, having declared the need for the “nationalization” of the Russian elite (meaning that the elite must repatriate its wealth back to Russia), is ready for a new challenge along these lines. Moreover, if **the West were to cut off the Russian elite, that could only help Putin tighten control** over the political and business establishment. Those members of the political class who “come home” would become his political base; others would become the new traitors. One could conclude that Putin is fully prepared to close off the country and pay the price of increased isolation in order to stay in power. You might respond here by saying that Putin wants to remain a member of the Western club—the G-8, the NATO-Russia Council, the WTO, and so forth. But I'm not so certain of this either. Indeed he would like to prolong his stay in Club West, but only if he gets to set his own agenda. He doesn't necessarily want to remove Russia from the international system; he wants to align the system with his wishes, and he wants an endorsement of his right to break the rules. If the West isn't ready to do these things, Putin would be ready to turn in his club membership card.

From now on, he'll be breaking the rules—with or without the West's consent! In any event, **Putin is in bobsled mode**. He is **hurtling down the track; no one can stop him**, and he can no longer reverse course. But the more he acts to preserve his power, the more damage he will inflict on his country. Angela Merkel was wrong saying that Putin is living in another world. He actually fits rather well into his system of power. **Every new step he takes along this course makes his departure from power even more improbable, forcing him to take greater and greater risks.** Putin may be convinced that he is succeeding. He may think that the West is tamed, or that it is only capable of wagging its finger at Russia. Berlin continues to defend Putin against the possibility of any serious Western reaction. Obama is reluctant to risk precipitating another European headache. Russian society is applauding Putin's actions. **His approval rating is skyrocketing:** In March 2014 his approval rating rose to 67 percent (compared to 60 percent in 2013). A majority of Russians support the official view of the motives behind the Ukrainian conflict. In February 69 percent of Russian respondents accused the Ukrainian opposition and the West of provoking the conflict and the violence. Thus, majority of Russians are prepared to accept the annexation of Crimea and further Russian action in Ukraine. Thus once again Putin has the support of a nation that only yesterday seemed to be so tired of him! **He has regained control over the elites, too.** He has returned triumphantly to the scene as a War President and as a Triumphantist. True, we know how War Presidents end up. But at the moment his strategy is to focus on his plans for this evening and try to make it last as long as possible. Thus, **nothing could have stopped** Vladimir **Putin** from his current course of action. He has become **a hostage of his own logic**, and **couldn't even free himself if he wanted to.** He can't leave power, and **he can only preserve the regime by showing might**, strength, aggression, and recklessness. The only strategy left to him by political circumstances was to mobilize Russia by resurrecting a policy of containment of the West and by the search for new enemies. The inexorable logic of this strategy has even driven him to dig up old slogans from World War II about liberating the Soviet people from fascists and Nazis. **There's no stopping now**; this strategy dictates that **Putin must press on. The moment he stops, he is politically dead;** there are too many people waiting in the wings for their chance to knock him down.

Putin won't stop – ideology

Illarionov 3/17/14

<http://inforesist.org/putins-former-adviser-regime-of-yanukovich-its-a-kids-playground-comparing-to-putins-regime/?lang=en>
is lecture at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy former adviser of Putin,

o what happens now? Putin's aggression that includes invasion by Russian military troops, taking over Crimean Institutions and attacking Ukrainian military bases, human deaths. Aggression is one of the biggest crimes against international peace and security. As well it's a crime under the Criminal Code of Russian Federation (Art. 353 and 354) . The first stage of this aggression – invasion of Crimea and attempt to annex. Those who believe that Putin's aggression will stop at Crimea are wrong.

In “**Ukrainian Plan**” that was developed long time ago **that is only a first step**. Next one will be to destabilize situation in the South and East of Ukraine. According to this plan, provoke local fights which will lead to the civil war. This situation in Ukraine will be the most desirable for Kremlin for the next few years. 3. One of the most important goals of “Ukrainian plan” is to represent Ukraine to Ukrainians, as well as to International and Russian community as a politically invalid country. Territory of chaos. Place of anarchy. A land of war against everything – West against East, Christians against Muslims, lefts against rights. 4. Putin's Ukrainian plan includes a third element and it's very popular argumentation among Kremlin's chiefs. They insist that what happened in Kiev was a violent coup d'etat. That present Ukrainian government is illegitimate. And that the only legitimate government, according to Kremlin, is at Crimea. Ministry of foreign affairs of Russia often calls present government in Kiev as “Nazis, Banderas, fascist thugs regime”. So **the third goal** of Putin's aggression against Ukraine is the **change of Ukrainian government.**

5. And here we have a question – why to punish so hard? Ousted regime is Ukraine was a light copy of Putin's regime in Russia. Yanukovich's regime was a kids playground comparing to present regime in Russia. Both regimes are connected by the blood ties. So the fall of the first one is the huge knock out to the second. It's a death threat to the chief and symbol of the same regime at the North-East from Ukraine, but with bigger power and with more commodities. 6. Euromaidan – is anti-criminal, anti-Soviet/anti-Communism and anti-Empire revolution. The same kind of revolution that happened a quarter century ago at many counties of Central and Eastern Europe, but didn't realize in Russia, Belarus and Asian Republics of ex-USSR. Georgia had its own anti-criminal. Anti-Communist and anti-Soviet revolution in 2003. But Ukrainian “Orange revolution” of 2004 was not able to bring changes. And because today's Russia re-births communist's and Stalin's symbols, ideas and institutions, when present regime is clearly criminal and Russia reconstructs into Empire – to all that Ukrainian February's Revolution is the biggest knock out, that's a death threat to the present ideology and power structure of

Russia. 7. So **what is Putin scared of** so much in Kiev and Ukraine? Why does he hate so much independent Ukraine? Why did he prepare such a cruel vengeance? First of all – **Maidan, a Public Democratic institution** created by people. Second – **possible** raise/creation/appearance(?) of “**Ukrainian Saakashvili**”. A Person, that will represent all 3 elements of last revolutions at the post-soviet territory – Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia, Maidan Revolution of 2014 in Ukraine : the anti-Criminal, anti-Soviet and anti-Imperial movement .Putin's aggression is a punitive expedition against Ukrainians for the creation of the Maidan, for the attempt to break loose from the tenacious and sticky imperial entanglement. 8. **To understand Putin**, one must try on “his shoes”, try to understand his

thinking and logic, try to imagine how he himself is seeing his task. **He believes that he is chosen by the Divine**

Providence to punish liberated Ukrainians by the means of destabilising the country, overthrowing the government, annexing territories, “unification of Russian land and of separated Russian people”. He imagines that he has got a cart-blanch from Above to fulfil the “historical imperial dream”. All the more so, he does not consider a neighbouring country to be an established state. He has said that much in the April of 2008 on the NATO summit in Bucharest. In his opinion, such country does not exist, and **half of the Ukrainian territory is “ancestral Russian land”**. He believes that now there is a unique historical situation: Ukraine is in state of severe crises, its authorities and institutions do not function effectively. **He dreams that the Providence demands him to fulfil**

this mission. That is why if on the one side of the political balance is such a “historic mission” and on the other –

possible economic and personal **sanctions, will he be afraid** of the latter? Will the decision to exclude Russia from the G8

influence him? **Will he care** even about the exclusion from the UN, as was excluded the USSR from the League of Nations for a military

attack on Finland in 1939? He has a choice between the “voice of **Providence**” and noise of “**some papers**”, he will

choose the former. And at the end of all, **the sanctions will pass, but the land will remain.**

War's inevitable – Putin panslavic ideology

Motyl 3/18/14

<http://ca.digitalnewsdaily.com/2014/03/18/why-putin-wont-stop-at-crimea/>

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Many Ukrainians in Ukraine now believe that a Russian invasion of mainland Ukraine is **inevitable**. If it happens, **war will break out** and thousands will die. It’s hard to believe that Putin will stop with Crimea. Putin’s former economic adviser Andrei Illarionov, who resigned in protest after a bloody hostage crisis, believes **Russian armies will march on Kiev**. Putin’s ideological mentor, Aleksandr Dugin, insists that Russia’s goals go beyond Ukraine into Europe — a **reunification of the Slavic peoples**. Meanwhile, Russian troops and tanks are massing on Ukraine’s borders. Terrified realists that we have become, we suspect the worst: that **they will soon be attacking** a country that dared say no to Putin.

It’s irrational – Russian invasion based on INSANE HOMOPHOBIA Snyder 3/1/14

<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116812/how-europe-should-respond-russian-intervention-ukraine>

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In dispatching troops to Ukraine, Russia has violated international law, flouted multiple treaty commitments, and set the stage for a European war. **It has no casus belli**, aside from an eccentric understanding of the domestic politics of a neighboring country. The Kremlin’s surreal warmongering is bad enough, and obviously demands a response from the European Union, the entity that, beyond Ukraine itself, is most immediately concerned. Ukraine borders on four European Union members, and its new government has made joining the EU its foreign policy priority. Russian intervention in Ukraine is directed against the EU, which Moscow has now decided is a threat to its interests and indeed a civilizational challenge. **President Putin’s global crusade against gays has become, during these last few weeks, a specific foreign policy doctrine** directed against the EU. The Kremlin has made clear that **control of Ukraine is one step towards the creation of a Eurasian Union, which will reject European “decadence” in favor of** a defense of Christian **heterosexuality et** c. For months **press organs** close to the Kremlin have referred to Europe as **“Gayropa.”**

Putin’s personally vengeful – only regime change solves Gessem 3/21/14

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/03/putin_s_crimea_revenge_ever_since_the_u_s_bombed_kosovo_in_1999_putin_has.2.html

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This raises three questions. First, if Putin thinks he is paying the West back for Kosovo, why has he waited so long to strike? Second, what could the United States have done differently to avoid setting off this long and frightening chain reaction? And finally, what can the United States do now? In retrospect, the long wait makes perfect sense. Once Putin held power in Russia, he never planned to cede it, so he had all the time in the world. Two of **Putin’s key character traits are vengefulness** and opportunism. **He relishes his grudges and finds motivation in them**: He has enjoyed holding the bombing of Yugoslavia against the United States all these years—and knowing he would strike back some day. He is anything but a strategic planner, so this knowledge was abstract until it wasn’t, when the opportunity to grab Crimea presented itself. Revenge has been sweet, but **when other opportunities present themselves**—and this will happen more often now, at least from Putin’s point of view—he will deploy Russian military force or the threat of Russian military force in other neighboring countries. **He will take his revenge not only cold but plentifully.** Could the United States and its allies have undertaken anything other than military intervention to resolve the Kosovo crisis? In fact, they did. After the bombing campaign, which strengthened support for Milosevic and weakened his opponents, the U.S. poured cash into rebuilding the Serbian opposition. The funding was contingent on the disparate opposition groups agreeing to work together and attending regular coordination meetings held in Budapest, Hungary, and run by people whom participants understood to represent the State Department. The plan for the anti-Milosevic revolution was

worked out in these meetings down to the smallest detail, including where the leaders of each of the 18 participating political organizations would be if mass protests broke out in Belgrade. They did, in October 2000, and Milosevic didn't seem to know what hit him. Could a plan like that have been carried out without the NATO bombing campaign? Could Milosevic have been removed sooner without the bombing? I think so. On the other hand, would he have succeeded in killing and displacing many more people in Kosovo before being deposed, if it hadn't been for the NATO intervention? This is an impossible question to answer. What we do know is that Yugoslavia's wars were very much one man's wars, and it was the removal of that man from power, not the bombing, that finally ended them. Russia's wars are, similarly, Putin's wars. It is also impossible to know whether Putin would have happened to Russia if it had not been for the bombing of Yugoslavia. I believe he would not have. But now that he has been in power for more than 14 years and is planning to stay forever, what should the United States do? Bombing Moscow does not seem to be an option. But helping the Russian opposition in the same committed, involved, and even meddling manner as the U.S. once helped the Serbian opposition should be **. Putin already believes** the U.S. State Department is backing the few protest activists left in Moscow—and is punishing the activists for it. There are many differences between Putin today and Milosevic 15 years ago, all of which boil down to the fact that Putin is a lot stronger and harder to remove—all the more reason for the U.S. to put its best minds to work on helping Russians accomplish just this. It **may be our only chance of righting the course of history.**

Putin can't stop – ideological commitment and conspiracy theorist6

Talbott 3/14/14

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page3.html#ixzz2x0ms8dKr

Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution, served in the State Department from 1993 to 2001, first as U.S. ambassador-at-large to the former Soviet Union and then as deputy secretary of state.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page3.html#ixzz2x0mz4HHp

Three things to keep in mind about Putin as he prepares to annex Crimea: 1) He's committed to his own version of rollback—i.e., not just stopping but reversing what he sees as the across-the-board capitulation of Russia to the West going back to the late Mikhail

Gorbachev period; 2) When assessing a crisis, his instinct is to believe and react to **the most extreme conspiracy**

theory that his advisers and intelligence services tell him about the actions and motives of the West; and 3) As the flipside of No. 2,

he believes in **the best case** of what his bold and/or stealthy actions will produce (e.g., that the Russian speakers of eastern

Ukraine would welcome Putin's invasion and are in favor of returning to the bosom of Mother Russia). As for the endgame, it's not just replacing the Ukrainian flag with the Russian tricolor over the government buildings in Crimea—it's to use Crimea as a beachhead to destabilize as much of the rump state of Ukraine as possible and, very likely, also to apply the Crimean precedent to the

Russian-majority Transnistria region in **Moldova.**

Can't deter

Deterrence strategy fails – rally round the bear

Shevtsova 3/10/14

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/10/falling-into-putins-trap/>

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Does it mean that the West is trapped? Does it mean that whatever it does, it will only help Putin in his desperate gamble? The West's current tactics to calm Putin down—“de-escalation” and “diplomatic conclusions” without definite resolve—will only feed the Kremlin's sense of impunity. However, if the West were to develop a strategy that had as its goal influencing the part of the Russian elite that will lose out most if Russia turns into a “cast-into-concrete” state, it could cause a split in the Russian establishment, hopefully leading to the emergence of forces inside Russia that would break it out of its trap. Not soon, but with time. Current Western tactics, however, are only serving to consolidate Russia's elites around their leader.

putin's gone mad ext

EVEN through Putin WAS a realist, he has GONE MAD Kuchins 3/14/14

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Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page5.html#ixzz2x0sOEfGi

My read on Putin over his decade and a half in power is that he is a brutally cold, calculating pragmatist in foreign and security policy, combining pursuit of his perception of Russian national interests, which almost always correspond with Russian public opinion, along with his main goal of preserving his political power. My deep concern, however, is that the Putin we have seen since the stealth Russian military occupation of Crimea has become **unhinged;** that his deeply rooted anger at the West coupled with his failing Ukraine policy led him to a decision on Crimea that defies logic. If the goal is influencing any Ukrainian government to be more pro-Russian, this move has backfired. He has done more to promote Ukrainian national identity in the past several days than any Ukrainian politician ever could. If the goal is to advance his pet post-Soviet integration project, I am afraid that the impact on capitals from Baku to Astana and everywhere in between has been to scare the daylights out of political elites to run from rather than run to Moscow. If somehow this is to enhance Russia's overall geopolitical position in the world, Putin is weakening his options rather than strengthening them. I will not even bother to spend time on the near- and longer-term economic impact, but prosperity is the principal reason he has been popular with Russians over his long tenure, not bare-chested machismo. **The frightening thing is** **that he appears to believe his own propaganda and lies.** Official Russian positions about justifying Crimea have absolutely no legal basis. Right now, **any diplomatic solution seems impossible** when Putin says black is white and vice versa. More dangerously, he seems to be operating on a mistaken and outdated perception of Ukrainian nationhood. While there are deep political cleavages in Ukraine broadly between east and west, the country has been independent for more than 20 years. Even those in the more Russian east and south do not seem to be clamoring for breaking up Ukraine. **Putin's miscalculation has led us very** **dangerously to the reality of a war** between Ukraine and Russia that will have disastrous consequences for all of us, and especially Ukrainians and Russians.

at “putin not crazy”

Russia can't be stopped – it's national ideology not Putin psychology

Shevtsova 3/25/14

<http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55081>

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True, there are a growing number of Western experts and politicians who acknowledge the gravity of the situation. But they try to concentrate on one issue—the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea. As if this is just a paranoid deviation of the Kremlin's policy, or the result of President Vladimir Putin becoming delusional. Let's deal with this annexation and return to the business as usual, say the new Realists.

I agree with Philip Zelikow who in his recent Financial Times article (“We Require a Strategy Not Just a Reaction to Russia”) writes, “In the West, the conversation is dominated by discussion of how to punish and isolate Russia for its role in the invasion and annexation of Crimea. That is a reaction not a strategy.” Exactly! But what strategy does Zelikow suggest? A “new international agreement” that will aim “to protect a new status quo.” This means that the West has to agree to the Russian annexation and think about how to prevent further Russian incursions. This is exactly what the Kremlin would expect from the West—to endorse the current status quo, which the Kremlin will see as an invitation for new adventures.

Those who believe that the Kremlin will be satisfied with Crimea and will agree to return to a new “reset” do not understand the nature of the Russian personalized power and its logic.

Let me explain: what the Kremlin is doing on the global stage today does not reflect Putin's venom, or aggressiveness, or him being “delusional.” This is the result of the Iron Logic of the Russian Matrix that tries to prolong its life into perpetuity at the expense of breaking the rules and even destroying the world order. Thus, “international agreement” on the new status quo will not solve anything if the political regime has decided to survive by turning to the War Paradigm and will be looking for a pretext to keep the nation in the War mood.

AT Arctic Link

Russia posture is defensive

Blanchfield 14

(Mike, Canadian Press, January 31, 2014, "Russia downplays Arctic military" l/n)

Vladimir Putin's senior Arctic envoy has defended Russia's military buildup in the north, saying it is not directed at Canada or any of its allies. Anton Vasiliev, Russia's ambassador at large for the Arctic, told The Canadian Press that Russia is solely concerned with defending its own vast northern regions, which are becoming more vulnerable due to climate change. Vasiliev said Russia once had a naturally secure border of 20,000 kilometres of ice, but that is literally melting away as temperatures rise in the Arctic. "Now the climate is getting milder, the ice is retreating and we simply need to protect our borders from illegal trafficking, illegal border crossing, mass crime, terrorism, narco-trafficking - all these bad things that come through this porous border," Vasiliev said Thursday in an interview. Russia, Canada, the United States and their five other Arctic Council members all enjoy good military co-operation, he said, stressing that his country's military buildup is not meant to be provocative to any of them. "We don't feel there is a militarization of the Arctic," Vasiliev said. "But there is a growing interest for more military presence, more mobilization of military forces going on in each and every Arctic state, including Russia, and we are quite open about that." He said Russia is also keenly interested in protecting the emerging northern sea route. With growing ship traffic, there will be a need to protect critical infrastructure such as the oil rigs that are expected to become a key feature in the Arctic's future. Russia is encouraging its Arctic Council allies to bolster their military assets in the Arctic, Vasiliev added.